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Cover
The cover reproduces an oil-on-canvas 
painting by “Andy,” ca. 1970. In early 
October 1973, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, with 
USS Little Rock (CG 4) as flagship, 
mobilized in the eastern Mediterranean 
during that year’s Arab-Israeli war, also 
known as the Yom Kippur War. A Soviet 
fleet in the same area created a potential 
for the localized war to escalate, so Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. 
Zumwalt Jr., USN, ordered the American 
ships to move westward to reduce the 
potential for provocation. In “The 
Transformation of the Israel Defense 
Forces,” Avi Jager traces the challenges 
and fortunes of the Israel Defense Forces 
following the 1973 conflict, especially 
with regard to low-intensity conflict 
with nonstate actors, and discusses the 
changes made to its various branches, 
units, and armaments to operate better 
in the modern environment.
Source: Naval History and Heritage 
Command
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FROM THE EDITORS
The geostrategic picture in the Middle East has been transformed fundamentally 
over the last several years by the rapprochement between Israel and the Arab 
world, midwifed by the Trump administration in a series of unexpected diplo-
matic coups� The ramifications of these developments have only begun to play 
themselves out and to be assessed adequately by observers� Surprisingly little 
attention seems to have been paid to their impact on the Israeli military� In “The 
Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces,” Avi Jager provides a concise but 
comprehensive account of the significant changes that have occurred throughout 
the IDF in recent years, one informed by authoritative, high-level sources within 
Israel� These changes include major reductions in the conventional arms, par-
ticularly infantry and armor, and increased emphasis on unconventional forces 
and cyber; they reflect a conviction that in the future the threat the nation likely 
will face no longer will come from states but rather from irregular organiza-
tions such as Hamas� And, perhaps most importantly, they signal a shift from 
the long-standing Israeli preference for offense and preemption toward a more 
defensive orientation� Jager makes clear, however, that there are voices in Israel 
that question the wisdom of such a shift� Avi Jager is a reserve officer in the IDF 
special forces�
The eastern Mediterranean as an arena of sea-power competition has been 
lost from view since the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the U�S� 
Sixth Fleet in its aftermath� Times are changing� It recently was announced that, 
for the first time in forty years, an American naval vessel will be based at Souda 
Bay in Crete� Greece and Turkey are at odds over territorial maritime claims, 
and the discovery of enormous natural gas deposits in the waters off Cyprus in 
recent years has opened up a complex face-off among Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, 
and Israel� In this context, the question of Israel’s relation to the sea takes on 
major strategic significance� In “Cultural Challenges for Israeli Sea Power in 
the Eastern Mediterranean,” Samuel Helfont provides a fascinating overview 
of the State of Israel’s cultural attitudes toward the sea, as limited by its deeply 
felt connection with the “Land of Israel�” He argues that Israel has yet to make 
the fundamental cultural turn toward its clearly ordained strategic maritime 
future� Samuel Helfont is a Naval War College professor teaching at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California�
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The centrality of culture in developing a state’s maritime orientation is also 
the theme of Andrew Rhodes’s “The 1988 Blues: Admirals, Activists, and the 
Development of the Chinese Maritime Identity�” Rhodes points to 1988 as a deci-
sive year in the turn to the sea of the People’s Republic of China, witnessing as it 
did two unrelated but important developments: the airing on Chinese television 
of the six-part documentary River Elegy, which became wildly popular, and the 
beginning of the PRC’s commercial and military expansion into the South China 
Sea� Strikingly, the young filmmakers who produced the series were prodemoc-
racy activists who fled the country after the Tiananmen massacre of the following 
year, while not all members of the Chinese leadership at the time were happy with 
the criticisms the documentary had expressed over the country’s past neglect of 
its maritime frontier� Andrew Rhodes is a professor in the China Maritime Stud-
ies Institute at the Naval War College�
To grasp the full magnitude of the maritime challenge posed by the People’s 
Republic of China to the United States and its allies, it is essential to look beyond 
the purely naval dimension� In “The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While 
America Turns Its Back: How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime 
Industry, and the Implications for the World,” Christopher J� McMahon issues a 
stark warning about the consequences of the U�S� government’s continuing vir-
tual abandonment of the commercial maritime industry� The Chinese have made 
no secret of their ambition to dominate this industry with regard to commercial 
shipbuilding as well as infrastructure construction around the world (the so-
called Belt and Road Initiative), and they are well on their way to doing so—the 
number of large private corporations in this business continues to shrink at an 
alarming rate� The consequences are not merely economic but also political and 
strategic� Christopher J� McMahon holds the Maritime Administration Emory S� 
Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College�
How military organizations adapt to the (real or supposed) lessons of battle 
remains a matter of great interest to military historians and practitioners alike� 
Ethan Rafuse, in “One Approach, Two Results: The French Army, the U�S� Ma-
rines, and the Frontal Assault during the World Wars,” lays out what at first seems 
an improbable comparison between French battle tactics in the two world wars 
and the Marine Corps’s approach to amphibious warfare during the Pacific War� 
In neither case, he argues, was maneuver warfare an option; the challenge was 
rather that of finding the proper balance of artillery and infantry assets employed 
in frontal assaults� While not denying that French performance suffered in both 
wars from doctrinal rigidity, he suggests that the conventional wisdom fails to 
account for France’s eventual success in World War I� As for the Marines, he ar-
gues that their well-deserved reputation for doctrinal innovation enabled them 
to learn from initial mistakes in ways not altogether dissimilar to what the French 
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army did in that conflict� Ethan Rafuse is a professor of military history at the U�S� 
Army Command and General Staff College�
Finally, in “London and Washington: Maintaining Naval Cooperation despite 
Strategic Differences during Operation EARNEST WILL,” Richard A� Mobley of-
fers a fine-grained case study of coalition operations—specifically, the uniquely 
intimate U�S�-U�K� alliance relationship in the Persian Gulf during the reflagging 
and protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1987, toward the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War� This analysis, based primarily on recently declassified material from British 
archives, shows the extent to which differing perceptions and interests can com-
plicate alliance relationships and should require a more sophisticated approach 
to such relationships than has been the norm, at least on the U�S� side� Richard 
A� Mobley is a former intelligence officer in the U�S� Navy�
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
AS I WRITE THIS COLUMN, we have reached the one-year an-
niversary of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has impacted 
people, families, organizations, and societies significantly worldwide, including 
here in Newport, in Monterey, and in the Navy’s many other dispersed distance-
learning environments� I continue to be amazed by the flexibility and creativity 
of our students, faculty, and staff, who have adapted so well to ensure that the 
College has been able to continue to execute effectively its education, research, 
and outreach missions� The College’s value and contribution to the entire Navy / 
Marine Corps enterprise continue to be recognized, and I thought I would high-
light several initiatives that demonstrate the College’s relevance and significance 
to the maritime services’ future success�
Most recently, in January 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) re-
leased his Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN) that charts the course for how the Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will execute the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy� 
The NAVPLAN outlines the challenges the nation and the Navy face, the Navy’s 
unique role in meeting those challenges, and the four priorities that will focus 
the Navy’s efforts� These priorities are identified as Readiness, Capabilities, Ca-
pacity, and Our Sailors� The educational, research, and outreach expertise of the 
Naval War College (NWC) is vital to meeting the challenges delineated in the 
NAVPLAN, particularly in the areas of Capabilities enhancement and Sailor 
development� The complete NAVPLAN can be found by searching “Navy 
NAVPLAN 2021” using any search engine� There is much to learn from its fifteen 
skillfully written pages!
During calendar year 2020, a major reorganization within the CNO’s staff re-
sulted in the establishment of the position of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
13
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(DCNO) for Warfighting Development (known as N7)� The DCNO (N7) directs 
the development of Navy strategic concepts by applying strategic guidance, 
aligning strategic activities, and prioritizing analytic efforts� The goal is to im-
prove the Navy’s ability to develop warrior-scholars and war-fighting ideas and 
to deliver war-fighting advantage� Of particular interest to all of us at NWC is 
the defined mission to “align the naval education enterprise with strategy and 
improve how the Navy utilizes its flagship educational institutions�” We are work-
ing closely with key leaders within N7 to refine our educational and research 
products to serve the Navy’s needs better� The College also is being tasked to play 
a leading role in providing higher-fidelity, decision-quality information to Navy 
leadership�
All of us are aware that many key decisions must be made in the near term 
to shape the Navy of the future� To this end, the Office of the CNO (OPNAV) 
Warfare Development Division (N72) has developed a naval Analytic Master 
Plan (AMP) as an enterprise-level means of supporting informed decisions by 
the CNO and other senior leaders� By following the AMP, all key stakeholders 
will be kept apprised of the full range of analytic tools (such as war games, ex-
ercises, fleet experiments, modeling and simulation, etc�) that Navy commands 
and organizations are using to evaluate new technologies, techniques, platforms, 
weapons, and other potential solutions to emerging challenges� The AMP has the 
following seven main “pillars”:
Intelligence—led by the Office of Naval Intelligence
Studies—led by OPNAV N72
Exercises—led by Fleet Forces Command
Fleet Experiments—led by the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
Test and Evaluation—led by the Operational Test and Evaluation Force
Modeling and Simulation—led by OPNAV N81
Wargaming—led by NWC
The primary purpose of the AMP is to bridge gaps and identify redundancies in 
naval analysis that have occurred previously owing to the lack of an overarch-
ing coordinating structure and inadequate information sharing and knowledge 
management�
As the Wargaming Pillar Lead, NWC is spearheading efforts to integrate all 
research activities within the naval wargaming enterprise and facilitating the 
promulgation and integration of research findings across the naval analytic 
community� The goal of this integration is to create a faster-learning organization 
that produces the high-fidelity information our leadership needs to make critical 
14
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decisions in a time- and resource-constrained environment� Our partners in this 
effort include NWDC, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Marine Corps War-
fighting Lab, the systems commands (e�g�, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center), 
and the Office of Naval Research�
I am happy to report that rapid progress has been made in meeting the goals 
of the AMP� In February 2021, NWC hosted a virtual, two-day event to launch a 
series of recurring discussions within the Wargaming Pillar and across the ana-
lytic pillars of the naval enterprise� This research summit convened more than a 
hundred stakeholders, all of whom are working toward a shared understanding 
of the total capacity for gaming within the maritime services� They embody the 
wide range of capabilities available to support the CNO, the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, and fleet commanders� In addition, this first summit addressed 
opportunities for collaboration and research integration in support of a long-
term, analytic campaign that addresses future-force design�
The impressive amalgamation of talented and dedicated gamers will convene 
for a second summit in late March 2021 to refine the governance of the Wargam-
ing Pillar and agree on issues such as the need for a recurring call for research, 
prioritizing problems for examination, allocating scarce wargaming capacity, 
and scheduling analytic events� Additionally, the second summit will introduce 
a new Title 10 war game on future-force design that will nest within an extended 
(eighteen-month) campaign of analysis across the AMP� This research approach 
will be both iterative and integrated and will draw from all corners of the research 
enterprise to provide high-fidelity analysis for use by senior decision makers�
As noted, one of the primary challenges the CNO faces relates to future-force 
design, and the AMP will integrate the efforts of the overall Navy research com-
munity to inform CNO guidance and decisions� Since one of NWC’s principal 
missions is to “define the future Navy and its associated roles and missions,” the 
College is well positioned to contribute to this effort� The research, analysis, and 
gaming conducted here in Newport produce focused, forward-thinking, and 
timely research that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges, devel-
ops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges, 
assesses the risk associated with these concepts, provides analytic products that 
inform the Navy’s leadership, and helps shape key decisions about the design of 
the future fleet and other strategic challenges�
As I mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this column, NWC has done 
remarkable work under the constraints brought about by the pandemic response� 
In the summer of 2020, the Strategic and Operational Research Department 
within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) supported an effort by 
OPNAV N81 to identify key components and capabilities of the future naval 
force in response to direction from the Deputy Secretary of Defense� This project 
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laid the foundation for NWC to develop a long-term “arc of research” that will 
be undertaken over the next several years to gain a deeper understanding of the 
technologies, capabilities, and requirements the Navy will need to deter, defend 
against, and defeat potential adversaries in the future�
Another demonstration of our College’s expertise in executing complex games 
was CNWS’s exceptional conduct of the Northwest Pacific (NWPAC) War Game 
2021� The wargaming team expertly designed and executed a distributed, clas-
sified war game with Seventh Fleet and our Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
allies� Breaking new ground in areas of collaboration across CNWS and the 
College, as well as pushing the technology to execute a distributed game across 
fourteen time zones, NWPAC 21 set new standards that will influence all war 
games going forward� Commander, Seventh Fleet reported that the game yielded 
a significant number of actionable issues on which U�S� and Japanese navy com-
mands already are beginning to work� This distributed game was designed to 
reduce the risk of transmitting COVID-19, and required the support of many 
people to send two key team members to Japan safely�
Over the past two years, CNWS has been reshaping its approach to research 
and analysis by realigning efforts, strengthening internal collaboration, hiring 
and aligning faculty, and establishing partnerships across the enterprise in an-
ticipation of the emerging analytic requirements of the fleet and the CNO� These 
initiatives, coupled with the foundational work accomplished by the center, have 
poised NWC to lead the Wargaming Pillar and to make major contributions to 
the AMP and the research enterprise�
In his closing comments in the 2021 NAVPLAN, CNO Admiral M� M� Gilday, 
USN, told all hands, “I am counting on you to take in all lines and get us where 
we need to go—and do so at a flank bell!” Be assured, the Naval War College is 
ready, willing, and able to do so!
SHOSHANA S� CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ISRAEL  
DEFENSE FORCES
Avi Jager
 Over the past decade, Israel’s military—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—has enacted major changes to its structure and war-fighting priorities� Infantry, ar-
mor, and artillery forces have been reduced and ordered to implement structural and 
doctrinal changes to make them more relevant to anticipated future conflicts against 
Hamas and Hezbollah� Naval and air forces expanded their unconventional ca-
pacities at the expense of their conventional-warfare capabilities� Equally important, 
while Israel has allocated vast resources toward strengthening its defensive forma-
tions, the IDF has prioritized expanding cyber and intelligence units above all others�
The driving forces behind these changes were the rise of nonstate adversaries, 
the declining threat from neighboring nation-states, and groundbreaking inno-
vations in military technology� The implications of this transformation for Israel’s 
security and military preparedness are potentially severe� Hamas and Hezbollah 
have kept developing new ways to challenge Israel actively, which has responded 
principally by developing defensive measures to protect against these new threats 
rather than engaging with the sources of those threats offensively� Nonetheless, 
contending with the existential threats Israeli security experts foresee on the 
horizon—a multifront war with hundreds of thousands of missiles and rockets 
targeting Israeli population centers—could require deploying ground forces to 
capture areas in the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon, Syria, and perhaps even Iraq 
and Iran� Since the IDF ground forces have been reduced, deprioritized, and 
neglected, they will encounter much greater difficulty achieving those objectives�
This article uses interviews with IDF intelligence analysts, security research-
ers, and past and present defense ministry personnel to present a comprehensive 
survey of these changes and reforms across the IDF, their sources, and their 
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operational implications� Among the interviewees were the alternate prime min-
ister of Israel, Lieutenant General (Ret�) Benjamin (Benny) Gantz, former defense 
minister and chief of general staff Lieutenant General (Ret�) Moshe Ya’alon, and 
former IDF comptroller Major General (Ret�) Yitzhak Brick� In addition, ten 
IDF intelligence analysts and commanders of varying ranks and specializations 
were interviewed� The remaining data were collected from official publications 
of government agencies, military publications, archival materials and protocols, 
and over one thousand testimonies of IDF soldiers and reservists�
THE SOURCES OF IDF TRANSFORMATION
The primary reason for the IDF’s transformation was a deliberate decision by 
Israel’s political and military leadership to strengthen the country’s defensive 
formations, prioritize cyber and intelligence capabilities, and implement struc-
tural and methodological changes to make the IDF more relevant to future wars 
with nonstate actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah� Benny Gantz, who currently 
serves as Israel’s alternate prime minister and who led the IDF during this trans-
formation period as chief of general staff, explained its rationale as follows:
[T]he purpose of [these changes] was to create a smaller yet deadlier army, capable of 
confronting non-state adversaries in complex environments and on multiple fronts� 
� � � The ability to be a smaller yet deadlier military depends primarily on the ability 
to obtain accurate intelligence, process and analyze it effectively, and transfer it to the 
combat forces in real time� � � �
I am saying, unambiguously, that I prioritized cyber and intelligence over infantry 
and armor � � � [;] unlike the threat of ground invasion, the threat of cyber is realistic�1
Indeed, Israel’s political consensus is that the last conventional military threat 
to Israel, the Syrian state, evaporated almost entirely during the civil war that 
began there in 2011� Until then, Israel had considered a conventional war with 
Syria to be a likely conflict scenario� Unlike Jordan and Egypt, Syria never signed 
a peace agreement with Israel, nor did it establish any diplomatic or economic 
relations� Syria confronted Israel directly in 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and 
continued to require mass conscription for its army� In 2011, the Arab Spring 
spread to Syria and put the al-Assad regime on the cusp of extinction� The Syrian 
armed forces suffered tremendous losses following the outbreak of the civil war, 
from both casualties and defections� As a result, the regime lost territory and 
sovereignty to such an extent that it had to rely on foreign support to preserve 
its rule� Syria’s declining demographic and economic stability, combined with 
its deteriorating military power, led Israel to judge that the al-Assad regime no 
longer was a central threat to its national security, at least over the short term�2
The structural and doctrinal changes to the IDF were, by and large, the op-
erational and organizational response to the gradual transformation of Hamas 
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 JAG E R  1 5
and Hezbollah from local resistance movements into powerful militant orga-
nizations� Within twenty-five years, Hamas has transformed from a grassroots 
socioreligious movement into a political regime with a military wing consisting 
of over thirty thousand combatants and an arsenal of approximately twenty 
thousand rockets capable of reaching targets two hundred kilometers away�3 
Hezbollah has undergone an even greater organizational transformation, from 
a grassroots political movement into what many experts consider to be the most 
powerful nonstate military force in the world, with an estimated fifty to sixty 
thousand fighters and more than a hundred thousand rockets�4 Hezbollah’s tac-
tical skill set evolved drastically as a result of its experience in the Syrian civil 
war and it now is capable of carrying out offensive attacks beyond Lebanon’s 
borders and on Israel’s home front�5 Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s combat experience, 
firepower, and confidence have elevated their status in the eyes of the Israeli 
military leadership, which regards them as being among the primary military 
threats to Israel’s security now�6
THE IDF’S NEW BATTLEGROUP FORMATION
In the summer of 2015, the IDF launched the Gideon multi-year plan (GMYP) 
under General Gantz to shrink, modernize, and reform the Israeli military to 
meet the asymmetric, nonstate adversary threats that now were prioritized 
over its traditional state-on-state warfare mission� The IDF cut combat and 
noncombat forces alike and across both active and reserve military formations� 
The IDF standing army was instructed to cut 10 percent of the commissioned 
and warrant officer posts and reduce their total number from 45,000 to 40,000 
troops�7 The size of conscripted forces was reduced as well; the length of male 
conscripted service was shortened by four months, and it is expected to be 
reduced by an additional two months in the coming years�8 The reserve forces 
were affected most by the GMYP, which suggested cutting 30 percent of the re-
serve army, which meant releasing one hundred thousand out of three hundred 
thousand active reservists�9
Perhaps the most profound change suggested by the GMYP was the reorga-
nization of the IDF’s combat formations� Since the founding of the IDF, the di-
visional formation had been the IDF’s core operational battle group�10 Following 
the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the decline of conventional warfare and the rise of 
nonstate adversaries led to an erosion of the divisional framework as the IDF’s 
primary battle formation� As time went on, the IDF operated in smaller areas 
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and southern Lebanon that did not require, nor 
could they accommodate, large task forces� The IDF’s missions no longer were 
to occupy vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to gain operational control 
over geographically limited hostile areas and eliminate localized threats such as 
missile capabilities and arms-smuggling tunnels� The capabilities of the nonstate 
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adversaries against which the IDF increasingly was being tasked—disorganized 
militias in southern Lebanon and local Palestinian terrorist cells in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip—as advanced as they were, did not justify deploying entire 
divisions� Furthermore, deploying large task forces could have resulted in more 
casualties, more collateral damage, and ineffective use of the combat forces�
In 2011, the IDF began implementing a new operational doctrine that es-
tablished brigades as independent battle groups instead of division-sized for-
mations, each capable of planning and executing ground maneuvers without 
divisional support�11 The new brigade battlegroup formation consisted of six 
battalions, including infantry, armor, artillery, and combat-engineering forces� 
In addition, each battalion now could communicate directly with the air force 
and navy for exfiltration or 
fire support� To allow better 
control and coordination be-
tween the different battalions, 
each brigade battle group was 
given its own command-and-
control headquarters� These 
headquarters were in continuous communication with other field forces, as well 
as with parallel forces and the senior commander� Brigades were now responsible 
for managing their own logistics, rearmament, and tactical extractions�12
The primary purpose of the new battlegroup formation was to create a fight-
ing force that would be more relevant in future conflicts against Hezbollah 
and Hamas� Israel expects its future conflicts will be characterized by dynamic 
adversaries that constantly change their structure and methods, in addition to 
acquiring new techniques and weaponry� The shift to smaller battle groups with 
the combined capabilities of different corps and the ability independently to plan 
and execute battle plans increases the IDF’s effectiveness and flexibility�13
In turn, this reform of the IDF’s primary fighting formations had profound im-
pacts on the organization of the army branches and corps that contributed forces 
to the new brigades�
Infantry
In recent years, the IDF reduced the size of its combat infantry forces and ex-
panded the constabulary forces that guard Israel’s borders and the occupied 
territories� In 2005, the IDF established a new infantry brigade to specialize in 
those security missions, the Kfir Brigade� The Kfir Brigade was larger than most 
combat infantry brigades; IDF infantry brigades usually consist of four battal-
ions, whereas the Kfir Brigade consisted of five battalions� The brigade’s purpose 
The driving forces behind these changes were 
the rise of nonstate adversaries, the declining 
threat from neighboring nation-states, and 
groundbreaking innovations in military  
technology.
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was to maintain a permanent presence in the West Bank to perform routine se-
curity missions, protect the Israeli settlements, and prevent infiltration attempts 
into Israel�14 Between 2004 and 2017, to perform border-protection and routine 
security missions across Israel’s borders, the IDF established four more similar 
battalions: the Caracal, Lions of the Jordan Valley, Cheetah (Bardelas), and Lion 
of the Valley battalions�15
The IDF’s combat infantry units, after experiencing a significant reduction in 
manpower following the decision to reduce the length of compulsory military 
service, began focusing their training on combating guerrilla warfare and prepar-
ing for future conflicts against Hezbollah and Hamas� The basic training of IDF 
infantry units is divided into two parts, general training and specialized training� 
The IDF has not changed the general training style and requirements significantly 
over the last several decades� The first part of the basic training is focused on fun-
damentals� These include preparing, using, and maintaining a personal rifle; walk-
ing long distances with heavy weight; team protocols such as battle formations 
and movement; and military sign language and chain-of-command structures� 
The second part of the basic training is conducted after the soldiers are assigned 
to their individual specializations: squad leaders, advanced marksmen, machine 
gunners, grenade gunners, shoulder-fired-missile operators, medics, or riflemen� 
In this phase, they learn about the theory and practice of their respective roles and 
undergo extensive training and tests to qualify as fully operationally proficient�16
In contrast, the specialized training of IDF infantry soldiers has seen substan-
tial changes in response to Israel’s changing adversary priorities� In the past, the 
specialized training focused on open-field warfare techniques� This included 
individual, squad, platoon, and company open-field-warfare drills, focused on 
capturing and holding strategic geographic positions to support seizing and 
controlling large swaths of territory� Urban warfare was practiced only rarely 
and underground warfare and fighting techniques in tunnels and underground 
fortifications were excluded entirely from the training curriculum of standard 
infantry units� The most basic principle regarding underground installations and 
urban areas was simply to avoid them� However, from 2014 onward, the special-
ized training focused on urban warfare and introduced underground warfare as 
a new concept with its own combat doctrine� Open-battlefield warfare practices, 
such as occupying Syrian and Egyptian fortifications, were removed from spe-
cialized training programs�
Armored Corps
Historically, the two fundamental principles of the IDF armored corps were 
mobility and speed; the underlying logic behind these principles was to lever-
age the armored corps’s unique movement capabilities to minimize its exposure 
and vulnerability�17 The IDF exploited these capabilities to achieve decisive 
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victories against conventional enemy forces� During the Suez crisis of 1956, the 
38th Armored Division, led by Ariel Sharon, penetrated the armistice line with 
Egypt along the Sinai Peninsula and captured the strategically crucial Abu-Ageila 
military compound�18 During the Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF armored corps 
bypassed Egyptian defensive lines on the southern front and captured the eastern 
bank of the Suez Canal within two days�19 In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the 
armored corps pushed Syrian forces to retreat from the Golan Heights and then 
breached their lines to establish a forward offensive position only forty kilome-
ters from Damascus�20 These conflicts all were characterized by open-battlefield 
warfare, and the guiding principle on urban warfare at the time was to avoid it 
unless it was essential to the mission�
Over the years, the battle space and adversaries shifted away from that tra-
ditional paradigm toward more-urban conflict environments, and the armored 
corps’s role in subsequent operations diminished� The armored corps, like the 
rest of the IDF, went from fighting open-field warfare against conventional 
armies to conducting urban warfare against nonstate adversaries� In urban 
warfare, armored units are unwieldy, less effective, and more vulnerable than in 
rural environments� Urban defenders have inherent advantages; they can prepare 
strong defensive formations and fortifications, lure their adversary into vulner-
able positions, and move unexposed across infrastructure and populations� An 
armored attacker, on the other hand, has limited ability to navigate, mobilize, 
and communicate with other forces, especially as part of a diverse battle group�
The Lebanon war of 2006 illustrated armored units’ diminishing effectiveness 
in urban and asymmetric warfare environments� During the first three weeks of 
fighting, the armored corps and the rest of the IDF ground forces waited in stag-
ing areas while air forces engaged Hezbollah� When the ground invasion com-
menced, only two of four active armored brigades participated, using just 370 of 
the estimated four thousand tanks in the Israeli inventory� The missions assigned 
to armored units in Lebanon were also much different than in Israel’s previous 
conflicts� Instead of penetrating deep into southern Lebanon, the armored corps 
carried out raids against suspected Hezbollah compounds near the border� It 
also engaged in routine security missions, such as patrolling an operational route 
leading from Israel to southern Lebanon, performed rescue missions, and pro-
vided logistical support (e�g�, transporting food, water, ammunition, and equip-
ment to the other fighting forces)�21
To remain relevant, the IDF armored corps significantly reduced its size and 
changed its structure to adapt to Israel’s evolving security challenges� According 
to former deputy chief of general staff Major General (Ret�) Yair Nave, more than 
ten reserve brigades were eliminated over the last decade�22 Still more brigades are 
expected to be phased out as the IDF continues to downsize its armored corps� 
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In addition, instead of having four to six armored companies in each battalion 
of the remaining tank brigades, they are being reorganized to have three tank 
companies, two infantry companies, and one combat-engineering company�23 
With this mix of forces, armored units now can operate independently as small 
task forces, complete a wider variety of missions, and operate more effectively 
in urban-warfare environments� These changes to the armored corps’s structure 
and its integration into the new battlegroup formations made armored units 
much more relevant and effective in Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE of 2014 than 
they had been in other recent conflicts� The operation employed all four active 
armored brigades for the first time in thirty-two years, and five hundred tanks 
took part in the fighting� The armored corps suffered fourteen fatalities in the 
operation, but all these were caused by mortar fire outside the Gaza Strip or by 
sniper fire against personnel while outside their vehicle; no IDF tanks were de-
stroyed or permanently incapacitated by enemy fire�24
Artillery
During the first decades of Israel’s existence, the official mission of the IDF artil-
lery corps was to provide covering fire for the maneuvering forces� The artillery 
corps played a key role in Israel’s armed conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s� In the 
Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF artillery corps destroyed twenty-six of forty Syr-
ian missile batteries and provided covering fire for the maneuvering IDF ground 
forces, enabling them to capture the Syrian Golan Heights within two days of 
fighting� In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the artillery corps divided its attention 
between two fronts� The Drakon battalion was instrumental in blocking the Syr-
ian armed forces from advancing in the north while the rest of the corps enabled 
the IDF’s counterattack against the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai Peninsula�25
However, as with the fate of the IDF’s armored corps, the waning of conven-
tional warfare reduced the artillery corps’s relevance in Israel’s modern conflicts� 
Since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, no foreign military has attempted to invade 
Israel and the IDF conducted multidivision ground maneuvers only once, during 
the Lebanon war of 1982� More importantly, when IDF combat forces penetrated 
hostile areas, battlefield conditions limited the ability of the artillery corps to 
provide fire support� The large kill radius of artillery shells combined with their 
inability to hit targets with sufficient precision increased the risk of friendly fire 
or of excessive collateral damage, limiting artillery’s useful role in the conflict�
The artillery corps began reforming and reorganizing itself to address the 
changing operational environment that the IDF faced by the time the second in-
tifada began in 2000� In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
Israeli military leadership established two new secretive units within the artillery 
corps to address the mismatch between the corps’s traditional capabilities and 
the needs of a more urban battlefield� Instead of artillery weapons, the new units 
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were equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct assault and 
reconnaissance missions�
The assault UAV unit, called Zik or Unit 5252, operates the Israeli-made 
Hermes 450 UAV� The Hermes 450 is a multirole, high-performance, tacti-
cal UAV capable of collecting intelligence, conducting electronic warfare, and 
launching missiles�26 The main virtue of the Zik unit is its ability to use precision-
guided munitions to launch surgical strikes, thus minimizing collateral damage 
and threatening distant and hidden targets�
The reconnaissance UAV unit, called Sky Rider or Unit 5353, operates the 
Israeli-made Skylark I, II, and III UAVs�27 The Skylark is a miniature, modular, 
and autonomous UAV; it is small enough to be packed up and carried by ground 
forces and deployed within minutes� The UAV is equipped with advanced com-
munication features that allow it to pass real-time, high-resolution videos, day or 
night, within a forty-kilometer radius�28 The role of the Sky Rider unit is different 
from other UAV units, as its primary mission is to deliver real-time, tactical intel-
ligence directly to junior combat officers on the battlefield�29
The innovative Zik and Sky Rider units presaged other paradigm shifts within 
the IDF artillery corps� In 2014, the artillery corps created a new Detection Unit, 
whose original mission was to 
identify, monitor, and report on 
the trajectory of missiles and 
rockets fired into and out of 
Israel�30 The Detection Unit also 
collected meteorological data 
to pass on to weapons system 
operators� The unit deployed 
sensors at various altitudes using several unique platforms� These sensors col-
lected meteorological data such as air pressure, humidity, wind, and tempera-
ture, which are critical for making accurate ballistic calculations and increasing 
weapon accuracy� The data were used to improve the accuracy and effectiveness 
of artillery guns, UAVs, and precision-guided missiles�31 As the artillery corps’s 
tools changed, its personnel structure was reduced or reallocated significantly� 
In the past decade, half the IDF reserve artillery brigades were disestablished, 
their equipment was sold or scrapped, and the reservists who had served in these 
brigades were released or assigned to regular infantry brigades�32 This left the IDF 
with four active artillery brigades and four reserve artillery battalions�33
AIR FORCE
In the first decades of Israel’s existence and in its early military conflicts, the 
Israeli Air Force (IAF) was tasked with supporting the ground forces as they 
The IDF’s missions no longer were to occupy 
vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to 
gain operational control over geographically 
limited hostile areas and eliminate localized 
threats such as missile capabilities and arms-
smuggling tunnels.
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progressed toward and captured enemy territory, and with maintaining aerial 
superiority� To achieve this, the IAF operated under two guiding principles that 
persist to this day, in some respects� The first principle was the element of sur-
prise; because the IAF had limited air resources compared with the combined air 
assets of the Arab alliance that Israel faced in its early years, it was vital to opera-
tional success for the IAF to strike adversaries first�34 The IAF’s second principle, 
also driven by its relative size, was to concentrate its effort against a single front or 
objective before moving on to the next one, rather than dividing into small task 
forces to attack multiple targets simultaneously�35
The Six-Day War of 1967 illustrated the decisiveness of these principles in 
practice� The war commenced with a surprise aerial attack against Egypt, focus-
ing on its airfields and aircraft while they were still on the ground� Within five 
hours, the IAF performed 347 sorties and destroyed more than three hundred 
Egyptian fighter jets and eleven Egyptian military airfields�36 The IAF then car-
ried out 125 sorties against targets in Syria and Jordan, destroying most of the 
Syrian air force and severely damaging the Jordanian air force� The IAF suffered 
twenty-four fatalities and lost forty-six fighter jets�37
Six years later, the IAF faced the reverse scenario� On 6 October 1973, Egypt 
and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel� The IAF first had to defend Israel’s 
airspace; only then could it go on the offensive� The IAF also was challenged by 
Egypt’s and Syria’s newly acquired, Soviet-made antiaircraft systems, which they 
purchased pursuant to the lessons of the previous conflict�38 Unlike the Six-Day 
War, the Yom Kippur War lasted almost three weeks, and the IAF suffered ninety-
two fatalities and lost 103 fighter jets�39
In the wake of these wars, the IAF worked to improve its aerial dogfighting 
capabilities, procure new technologies to defeat Soviet antiaircraft systems, and 
increase the accuracy and efficacy of its strikes against enemy targets� In 1978, 
Israel purchased seventy-five Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter 
jets, designed for stealth and air-to-ground attacks, and the McDonnell Doug-
las F-15A Eagle, designed for aerial dogfighting against adversary jets�40 These 
modernizations led to improved IAF performance during the 1982 Lebanon war� 
Over ninety days of operations, the IAF destroyed Syria’s Soviet-made antiaircraft 
systems and shot down a hundred Syrian fighter jets, with zero losses to IAF air 
forces�41
However, as Israel increasingly became engaged in low-intensity conflict 
against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Hezbollah, the 
IAF’s operational role in Israel’s military campaigns decreased� Israel’s nonstate 
adversaries diminished the relevance of Israel’s air superiority by adopting guer-
rilla tactics� They operated in small groups; carried out low-profile operations in 
unexpected locations; and used light weapons, suicide bombers, and rockets� To 
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protect themselves, they moved constantly, kept strict secrecy about the locations 
of their military installations, and assimilated themselves into civilian popula-
tions and infrastructure� During the first and second intifadas, the IAF made 
a significant contribution to Israel’s attempt to achieve military victory but was 
much less influential to the outcome than the ground forces� During the Lebanon 
war of 2006, IAF operations were lethal and efficient but failed to influence the 
results of the war� Over thirty-three days, the IAF executed eighteen thousand 
sorties and destroyed thousands of rocket launchers and military installations�42 
But throughout that period, Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel, 
showing Israeli military leadership that the IAF’s dominance was no longer a 
guarantor of victory in battle�
Toward the end of that decade, the IAF began prioritizing precision-strike ac-
curacy and stealth over air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capabilities� These ca-
pabilities were vital to Israel’s attempt to prevent advanced weapons systems from 
reaching Hamas and Hezbollah� This allowed the IAF to conduct long-distance 
air operations to carry out precision strikes far beyond Israel’s border areas, such 
as in Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, while leaving no footprint or signature that 
could be attributed to Israel� Perhaps the highest national priority for the IAF was 
to maintain and demonstrate the ability to attack and destroy hardened nuclear 
facilities by air in remote and hostile territories, as it did in 1981 against Iraq’s 
Osirak reactor, and later in Syria� Following its successful strike against the Syrian 
nuclear reactor in 2007, the IAF prepared for a potential attack against what were 
suspected widely to be Iranian nuclear facilities�43
These sensitive strike missions had significant implications for the IAF’s force 
composition and engagement� In 2015, the Israeli defense ministry procured four-
teen Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets, which were added to nineteen 
units Israel had purchased already�44 The F-35, while not suited for dogfights, 
has improved stealth capabilities and can reach distant and remote targets easily, 
conduct air-to-surface attacks, and even deploy some nuclear-armed missiles�45 
Simultaneously, Israel also expanded its UAV arsenal and doubled its fleet of Lock-
heed Martin C-130J Super Hercules aerial-refueling aircraft, expanding Israel’s 
ability to attack remote targets at long distances�46 These advanced acquisitions 
strained IAF budget constraints, forcing the IAF to deprioritize other capabilities� 
To save money, the IAF decided to disestablish several combat squadrons, includ-
ing squadrons of F-15 and F-16A/B fighters and Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopters�47
NAVY
Israel shares many of the characteristics of an island, in that it is surrounded 
alternately by adversarial states or territories and the Mediterranean Sea� Is-
rael has maritime borders with Egypt, Jordan, Hezbollah-controlled southern 
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Lebanon, and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip� Having a small population and 
limited natural resources, Israel always has been challenged to provide for its 
own subsistence and, therefore, has been reliant on imports via the sea� In fact, 
over the years, 98 percent of Israel’s imported goods have entered through the 
Mediterranean and Red Seas�48 With over 80 percent of Israel’s population spread 
across its 197 kilometers of coastline, this area is especially vulnerable to attacks�49 
Moreover, much of Israel’s critical infrastructure facilities, such as power stations, 
ports, military installations, communication channels, and water desalination 
facilities, are located near or along Israel’s coast�
That being the case, protecting trade routes, securing Israel’s territorial wa-
ters, and guarding the coastline are the Israeli navy’s most vital missions� Israel’s 
dependence on seaborne imports makes the need to maintain open sea routes 
especially important during wartime� Israel’s navy was designed to engage Egypt’s 
and Syria’s Soviet-backed navies, which Israeli leadership viewed as the primary 
maritime threat�50 To that end, the Israeli navy procured destroyers, missile boats, 
versatile patrol boats, and two submarines�51 To minimize dependence on mili-
tary imports, Israeli Military Industries developed maritime weaponry such as 
the Gabriel missile system, designed specifically for surface naval warfare�52
During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israeli navy defeated the Egyptian 
and Syrian navies while suffering no ship or personnel losses of its own�53 As 
with the ground forces, the quantitative power balance at sea seemingly tilted 
heavily toward Egypt and Syria, which enjoyed significant superiority in terms 
of warships and firepower� The Israeli navy had fourteen missile boats against 
Egypt and Syria’s combined twenty-four missile boats� Just prior to the war, the 
Israeli navy had decommissioned its two old submarines, leaving a significant 
capability gap against the Egyptian navy’s twelve active submarines� Nonetheless, 
the Israeli navy destroyed or captured twenty-four enemy vessels while suffering 
only minimal damage and personnel casualties� Throughout the entire war, the 
Israeli navy managed to keep Israel’s ports safe and most of the Mediterranean 
trade routes open, which permitted a continuous flow of energy and other sup-
plies to Israel�54 Most importantly, the Israeli navy pushed those rival navies out 
of Israel’s territorial waters and ensured that no Israeli coastal city was attacked 
from the sea during the conflict�55
After the 1973 war, the diminishing likelihood of a maritime battle with rival 
navies and increasing tension with nonstate adversaries led the Israeli military 
leadership to direct the navy to invest more resources in maritime-security 
missions to prevent attacks against Israeli citizens�56 The navy decommissioned 
all of its destroyers and large missile boats and began purchasing patrol boats 
and small- and medium-size missile boats�57 These changes came at a price� The 
navy was criticized for not making a sufficient contribution to the 2006 Lebanon 
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war� Two days into the war, Hezbollah launched two C-802 antiship cruise mis-
siles against an Israeli Sa’ar 5–class corvette, killing four members of the ship’s 
crew� The Winograd commission of inquiry into the war concluded that the 
navy operated in a mind-set of conducting policing operations rather than 
an offensive military conflict, leading crewmembers to disregard Hezbollah’s 
lethality and threat�58
In 2007, the navy took on responsibility for enforcing the blockade of the Gaza 
Strip�59 The Gaza conflicts and the continuous attempts by militant groups to 
infiltrate Israel via the sea or to break the blockade demanded that the navy play 
this growing role in routine security operations� In 2011, the navy added another 
routine security mission: the protection of Israel’s newly discovered offshore 
natural gas fields�60 Between 
2009 and 2012, Israel discov-
ered several gas fields with an 
estimated 680 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas�61 The 
discovery of the gas reserves 
led Israel to begin switching 
its power-generation infra-
structure to use natural gas, 
meaning that a successful attack against those gas fields could jeopardize Israel’s 
energy security�62 The navy was instructed to provide a tiered defense of Israel’s 
offshore energy infrastructure, including the gas wells, platforms, and underwa-
ter pipelines�63
In 2011, Israel purchased three additional submarines from Germany, dou-
bling its fleet to six hulls�64 While the German manufacturer was responsible 
for building the submarine hulls, Israeli teams were responsible for the combat 
systems and weapons that were installed on board� These included advanced 
radar and communication systems, electronic warfare systems, equipment for 
deploying special forces divers to infiltrate hostile areas, and the ability to launch 
torpedoes and cruise missiles with conventional and unconventional warheads 
and ranges up to 1,500 kilometers�65 The main catalyst for the latest submarine 
purchase was Iran’s pursuit of nuclear-weapons capabilities� The IDF was in-
structed to prepare for two possible scenarios to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions� 
The first was that Israel would launch an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities� 
In this case, Israel should be able to threaten Iran with a nuclear response in case 
the latter decided to retaliate with other strategic weapons� In the second scenario 
Iran would develop a nuclear weapon and threaten to use it against Israel� In this 
case, Israel would expand its deterrence to make sure Iran comprehended that an 
attack on Israel most likely would lead to mutual destruction�66
[B]y 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense 
as the most pressing need within the  
military, and new recruits who were eligible 
for combat service but also passed cyber  
units’ requirements were sent directly to  
the cyber units.
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SPECIAL FORCES
The IDF special forces can be classified into four groups� 
1� The elite units: General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal),  
naval commandos (Shayetet 13), air force commandos (Shaldag), and  
the Special Operations Engineering Unit (Yahalom)
2� The commando units: Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan
3� The reconnaissance units: Paratroopers Reconnaissance Battalion,  
Golani Reconnaissance Battalion, Givati Reconnaissance Battalion,  
Nahal Reconnaissance Battalion, and 401st and 7th Reconnaissance  
Battalions
4� The specialized units: 669 Unit for airborne combat search and rescue, 
canine unit (Oketz), 504 Unit of the Human Intelligence Division, and 
Moran Unit for precision-guided missiles
Despite the profusion of special-operations units in the IDF, on only two oc-
casions did the special forces make a significant contribution to the outcome of 
a war� The first was during the Suez crisis of 1956, in which the paratroopers 
were deployed behind enemy lines to the Mitla Pass in the Sinai Peninsula� The 
second was during the 1967 Six-Day War, when the paratroopers again deployed 
behind enemy lines to Abu-Ageila, also in the Sinai Peninsula�67 The IDF’s elite, 
commando, reconnaissance, and specialized units have not affected the outcome 
of any other wars decisively� In most cases, they either received small and insig-
nificant, yet complex, missions or were annexed to an operational brigade and 
fought under its command�
Following twenty-four years of low-intensity conflict in southern Lebanon, 
the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the IDF special forces’ ability to contribute 
decisively to a large-scale military campaign had reached its nadir� The Winograd 
Commission for the inquiry into the Lebanon war of 2006 concluded that the IDF 
did not make effective use of its special forces� According to the report, special 
forces were scattered across the IDF and were subordinated to various com-
mands: “the decentralized command of the special forces damaged their ability to 
constitute a significant force � � � [which explains their] limited contribution to the 
greater strategic cause�” The committee went so far as to conclude that some IDF 
special-forces units had been established to deal with specific operational chal-
lenges and that many of these challenges no longer existed� Pride and comradery 
prevented these units from pivoting their focus or creating collaborations that 
could have been relevant to large-scale conflicts�68
In 2011, as part of the lessons of the Lebanon war of 2006, the IDF estab-
lished the Depth Corps�69 The core of the new command was a new Com-
mando Brigade, which was a seminal unification of the IDF commando units� 
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Historically, the IDF’s commando units all operated independently, not under 
a unified command� When the new brigade was established, the three com-
mando units—the Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan commandos—were extracted 
from their existing organizational and command affiliations and began train-
ing and operating as a unified fighting force�70 The Commando Brigade uni-
fied these units under one centralized command, making it the most lethal 
synchronized brigade in the IDF, and the most relevant force to combat Hamas 
and Hezbollah�
The reconnaissance units underwent structural and doctrinal changes as well� 
Each of the IDF’s reconnaissance battalions was composed of three companies: 
an antitank company, a sabotage and engineering company, and a reconnaissance 
company� Following the implementation of the GMYP, the missions and training 
routines of these companies changed� The most significant modifications were 
the focus on underground warfare and the replacement of the antitank and sabo-
tage and engineering companies with three identical reconnaissance companies 
in each of the reconnaissance battalions�71 The operational rationale for this was 
that combating Israel’s new unconventional adversaries, which lacked armored 
forces and infrastructure requiring specialized units to handle, demanded differ-
ent capabilities from the reconnaissance units�
Elite units remained separate from the new battle groups even after the other 
special-forces units were reorganized� While the GMYP reduced the size of the 
IDF’s conventional combat forces, the elite units were expanded and allocated 
even more training resources, and their service track was modified� Prior to the 
new service track, male soldiers in the elite units were obligated to serve the same 
three years as other conscripts and then were required to complete an additional 
sixteen to twenty months of training before another three-year service period in 
an elite unit� Soldiers identified as potential commanders during that training 
period continued to Officer’s Cadet School, while the rest of the elite-unit soldiers 
continued their service as noncommissioned officers�72 Following the imple-
mentation of the GMYP, the elite units introduced a new service track� Now, all 
soldiers selected for the elite units would be admitted to Officer’s Cadet School 
and serve for seven consecutive years�73 This change is expected to increase dra-
matically the size of the elite units and help the members of those units be seen 
as professionals rather than conscripted troops�
IDF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE 
Israeli military intelligence is divided into four core units� The signals-intelligence 
(SIGINT) unit is responsible for intercepting communications and electronic 
signals� The visual-intelligence (VISINT) unit is responsible for mapping hostile 
areas and interpreting images from satellites and other visual resources, such 
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 JAG E R  2 7
as reconnaissance photographs�74 The human-intelligence (HUMINT) unit is 
responsible for recruiting and handling human assets, and related operations�75 
The research unit is responsible for providing threat warnings of possible hostile 
operations and indications of adversary intentions�
In the past, traditional military targets included military bases, concentrations 
of forces, defense formations, dams, power stations, bridges, and other elements 
of permanent infrastructure� These targets did not require precision targeting, as 
they mostly were large, static, and distant from civilian populations� The intel-
ligence process—researching, collecting, processing, analyzing, and distributing 
finished products—could take months or years to complete� Over time, with 
the declining likelihood of a conventional war and the rising threat of nonstate 
adversaries, military intelligence’s focus shifted� Rather than identifying the ca-
pabilities and intentions of nations, military intelligence’s focus now is on moni-
toring the military proliferation of nonstate adversaries, detecting and alerting 
on imminent threats, and developing methods to obtain and deliver intelligence 
quickly�76 This shift in focus forced the IDF Intelligence Directorate to implement 
new doctrinal and structural changes, as well as to introduce new capabilities to 
remain relevant�
The SIGINT unit, known as 8200 Unit, responsible for intercepting communi-
cations and electronic signals, experienced tremendous growth in recent years� It 
added a cyber unit that specializes in hacking and sabotaging electronic systems, 
and the Hatsav Unit, which collects intelligence from social media platforms�77 
The most significant addition to the SIGINT unit was the establishment of the 
Operational SIGINT Battalion� Intelligence analysts belonging to this battalion 
provide combat forces with real-time intelligence during operations�78 In prac-
tice, this means that intelligence analysts of the Operational SIGINT Battalion 
are annexed temporarily to a field unit for specific missions or operations� They 
join the field unit’s operational control center and synthesize existing information 
with real-time reports from the battlefield and other sources such as drones, cam-
eras, and wiretaps� They communicate their assessments directly to operational 
forces in the field to warn them of imminent threats, verify their observations, 
and support them amid the uncertainty of battle�
The VISINT unit, known as 9900 Unit, also grew significantly� In the 1990s, 
the VISINT unit began expanding its intelligence-collection platforms to include 
human observation and static cameras, as well as vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and, 
most importantly, satellites�79 In 1988, Israel became the eighth country in the 
world to launch a surveillance satellite into space independently� Israel success-
fully launched eight more satellites into orbit over the next three decades� The last 
one, the reconnaissance satellite Ofek 11, was launched in 2016�80 The VISINT 
unit was expanded to develop new techniques for producing intelligence from 
33
Naval War College: Spring 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 2 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
existing visual images and to cope with the constantly growing flow of visual data 
coming from the new collection resources�81
The IDF Intelligence Directorate also implemented cross-organizational 
changes to be more effective against nonstate adversaries and unconventional ca-
pabilities� In the past, internal groups within the research, SIGINT, VISINT, and 
HUMINT units had been organized around geographic areas or particular stages 
of the intelligence process� Now, for the first time, relevant sections were not 
limited to working on specific 
geographic areas but instead 
were organized to focus on 
organizational or ideological 
targets, such as the Islamic 
Jihad and ISIS� Other sec-
tions were organized by the 
type of threat, such as weap-
ons of mass destruction or 
low-intensity conflict� Finally, 
some units were aligned to different scopes of intelligence: national-level intel-
ligence for the prime minister, strategic-level intelligence for the chief of general 
staff, operational-level intelligence for headquarters and high commands, and 
tactical-level intelligence for combat forces�82
Moving from a geographic paradigm to a capability and organizational one 
necessitated additional reforms to military intelligence� Following the Arab 
Spring, the IDF Intelligence Directorate recognized its failure to anticipate the se-
verity of the uprisings and the regional instability that resulted� As a result, Major 
General Kochavi, then serving as the Military Intelligence director, established 
the Regional Section within the Research Department of the IDF Intelligence Di-
rectorate� The section’s purpose was to investigate and monitor economic, social, 
and political developments, primarily in the Middle East, and identify potential 
geopolitical shifts of strategic significance to Israel� General Kochavi also enacted 
a new approach of assembling ad hoc multidisciplinary teams, subcommittees, 
and provisional headquarters to address time-sensitive threats�83 Lastly, the IDF 
Intelligence Directorate established a new section—the Target Section—to build 
a database of targets using deep-learning algorithms and big data to take advan-
tage of advances in developing information and analyzing trends, patterns, and 
associations� The algorithms can scan billions of data points (e�g�, images, videos, 
audio, and electronic signals) to identify potential targets�84 Analysts then can 
investigate the suggested targets, after an initial triage by the algorithms, and 
confirm correct selections, which in turn improves the algorithms’ performance�
[T]he IDF’s transformation and Israel’s  
self-fortification approach to security means 
that the IDF may not be properly prepared  
to contend with evolving complex threats  
as nonstate adversaries grow in size and  
acquire rocket and missile capabilities that 
once belonged only to states.
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CYBER
The IDF established its first cyber units in 2011� Initially, the Shin Bet, Israel’s 
civilian internal-security service, was responsible for defending Israel’s critical 
cyber infrastructure� However, the IDF had greater organizational and technical 
capacity to establish and operate larger cyberoperations centers� As the cyber 
threat expanded beyond the capacity of any single agency’s resources into a stra-
tegic, crosscutting dimension of war, the IDF began to prioritize cybersecurity 
and took over responsibility for protecting both Israel’s security and civilian cy-
ber infrastructures� The IDF’s cyber activities were divided between two director-
ates� The Intelligence Directorate was responsible for offensive cyber operations 
and the collection of intelligence; the Computer and Information Technology 
(IT) Directorate was responsible for protecting the military and civilian infra-
structures from attacks�85 The Computer and IT Directorate then was expanded 
to include a new division, the Cyber Defense Division� Subsequently, the name 
of the Computer and IT Directorate was changed to the Computer, IT, and Cyber 
Defense Directorate�
The Cyber Defense Division is responsible for providing defense for air, sea, 
land, and cyberspace, and is the senior authority for cyber protection in the IDF� 
The division protects the IDF’s communication and computing systems and its 
technology-based offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and it trains all IDF 
forces in countercyber practices and operations� The Cyber Defense Division’s 
primary objective is to prevent electronic information from leaking out of the 
IDF, and it ensures the continuity of IDF operations without IT disruptions�86
The organizational structure of the Cyber Defense Division is unique and re-
flects the unit’s significance within the IDF� A brigadier general was appointed to 
command the division; in the IDF, staff divisions more typically are led by colo-
nels�87 The Cyber Defense Division also, rather than the normal three sections, 
has four—operations, intelligence, technological, and electronic warfare—each 
commanded by an officer at the rank of colonel�88 Finally, the Cyber Defense 
Division was given a unique modular structure in which soldiers could work as 
part of a large task force but also could be annexed to combat branches of the IDF 
to work independently or in small teams�89
Two additional organizations were created to assist the Cyber Defense Divi-
sion in implementing its policies and improving connectivity and cooperation� 
The first was a cyber branch within the IDF multi-corps command headquarters, 
which already had air force, armored, naval and infantry branches� The purpose 
of the cyber branch was to protect offensive and defensive military capabilities 
(e�g�, armored personnel carriers, weapons, radars, and computing systems) from 
cyber attacks� In practice, this required ensuring the safety of the entire manu-
facturing process and supply chain, as well as routine checks against malware�90 
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The IDF also established a Cyber Situation Center to manage cyber-related 
emergencies, track international trends in cyberspace, and coordinate between 
the separate cyber units in the IDF�91
The establishment of these organizations and priorities for cyber defense 
marked a significant cultural shift within the IDF� The Israeli military had a long-
standing tradition that prioritized combat units above all others in competitions 
for qualified manpower, budgets, and positions� IDF recruitment protocols dic-
tated that new recruits were directed first to combat units, and only those who 
were not assessed to be qualified for combat duty were directed to noncombat 
units� But by 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense as the most pressing need 
within the military, and new recruits who were eligible for combat service but 
also passed cyber units’ requirements were sent directly to the cyber units� 
Moreover, the IDF, for the first time in its short history, launched a program that 
offered eligible soldiers in combat units the option to transfer to a cyber unit�92 
Finally, while combat forces were experiencing a significant reduction in man-
power and the IDF cut five thousand officers, the cyber units were provided with 
a hundred new positions for commissioned and noncommissioned officers in 
2015, in addition to ten thousand new cyber posts already allocated�93
A TRANSFORMED IDF AND  
THE RISKS OF “SELF-FORTIFICATION”
At the center of Israel’s military transformation stands a new, defensive approach� 
Toward the end of the 2010s, Israel’s perception of its military objectives in a 
conflict changed dramatically� Israel no longer sought the total defeat of its op-
ponents or to uproot threats; it now sought to avoid large-scale confrontations 
by showing restraint, carrying out precision strikes, and building multiple layers 
of sophisticated defensive infrastructure and technology to protect itself� This 
defensive, rather than offensive, approach evolved into a new doctrine of “self-
fortification�” Instead of incorporating tactical defensive measures as part of a 
larger offensive effort to combat threats, these tactical measures, often based on 
groundbreaking innovations in military technology, became the principal deter-
rent to Israel’s nonstate adversaries�
Beyond surrounding itself with fences and concrete walls along its borders, 
Israel has integrated advanced technologies to increase the effectiveness of these 
physical barriers� Throughout the years, Israel’s border barriers have been forti-
fied and equipped with day- and night-vision cameras, touch sensors, motion 
detectors, and floating cameras� These measures are reinforced with military 
patrols, human observers, and sand-filled areas near the fence that professional 
military trackers scan for footprints� In some locations, Israel has replaced its 
border fence with concrete and steel walls, particularly in places with a higher 
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risk of infiltration and sniper fire� In 2017, Israel began replacing the border fence 
with Lebanon, which stretches across 130 kilometers, with a nine-meter-high 
concrete wall topped with another three meters of steel fencing�94
A year later, Israel began building the new Israel-Gaza barrier� The six-meter-
high barrier is made of galvanized steel and will stretch across the entire border 
between Israel and the Gaza Strip at completion�95 Under the Israel-Gaza barrier, 
Israel has constructed a belowground concrete wall to protect against infiltration 
tunnels� The underground wall is expected to stretch across the sixty-five kilome-
ters of the Israel-Gaza border� The barrier will consist of concrete and steel and 
will penetrate the ground as deep as thirty meters�96 In 2018, Israel completed the 
construction of a new sea barrier along the maritime border with the Gaza Strip� 
The barrier consists of three layers—a regular breakwater, reinforced stone, and 
barbed wire—all reinforced by smart fences equipped with alarm systems and 
touch sensors, day- and night-vision cameras, and motion detectors�97
Israel has an active, multilayered missile-defense system arrayed against bar-
rage threats from adversary states and militant organizations alike� This includes 
the Arrow 3, Arrow 2, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and Iron Beam—a newly devel-
oped active missile-defense system that uses concentrated laser waves to intercept 
smaller objects such as mortar shells and small drones� The multilayered defense 
system is under constant development and is expected to provide defense against 
mortar shells; short-, medium-, and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and 
rockets; medium- and long-range conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles; 
and UAVs�
Colonel Yehuda Vach, commander of the Heiram regional brigade of the 
Northern Command and one of the fiercest critics of Israel’s doctrine of self- 
fortification, warns against the illusion of security that it creates: “[A] nation that 
fortifies itself [with fences, barriers, and walls] is a nation that lives in fear� The 
more fences we built across the borders, the more our security doctrine became 
dependent on defense and self-fortification� A society that builds more and more 
fences is a society that lives in fear� Logically, it might seem that fortifications 
project strength but the truth is that it does not[;] if anything, it projects fear�”98 
Through this lens, Israel’s doctrine of self-fortification can be perceived as a 
symptom of national weakness� As Vach observed: “[T]he fighting spirit of the 
military will not be reinforced by physical barriers but by its mental strength� A 
nation that hides, projects mental weakness, is making it easier for the enemy 
to defeat it� � � � [T]he fence creates an illusion, a false perception that [misleads 
people into believing that] they are safe�”99
Major General (Ret�) Yitzhak Brick, who served as IDF chief ombudsman 
and examined the operational readiness of more than a thousand military 
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units during his service, is another fierce critic of the current trend in the IDF� 
Brick criticized political and military leaders for shifting the IDF’s force plan-
ning toward defeating nonstate adversaries and disregarding the possibility of 
a conventional war in the future� According to Brick, “the current misconcep-
tion [among] the IDF military command [is] that there won’t be any more big 
[conventional] wars� They do not consider the possibility that the Middle East 
will change � � � that the Syrians might recover, that the Egyptians will change 
their attitude, nothing� Just a small military for two arenas [the Gaza Strip and 
Lebanon]�”100
But Brick believes the IDF still will encounter difficulties facing nonstate ad-
versaries, even with a self-fortification doctrine�
The next war will be a multi-front war against Hamas from Gaza, Hezbollah from 
Lebanon and [at the same time we will have to deal with] missile attacks from Syria 
and perhaps from Iraq� � � � [The next war] will include pounding [heavy missile bar-
rages] of population centers in Israel by hundreds of thousands of rockets� � � � [Israel 
will be] attacked by 1500–2000 missiles every day, � � � among them, missiles with 
600–700 kilogram warheads� � � � [Israel] is facing a serious problem, as it is currently 
incapable of blocking such [heavy, coordinated bombardment]� The air force alone 
cannot do it, as we saw during the previous campaigns in Gaza� Our [anti]missile 
[systems] are not developed enough to deal with such a large number of missiles�101
Senior officers in the IDF have explained that the only way to prevent massive 
and destructive barrages from raining into Israel is to capture temporarily the 
hostile areas from which the shelling is taking place�102 Previous military cam-
paigns in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon demonstrated that the air force 
alone, despite its advanced antimissile capabilities, could not prevent missile 
launches into Israel altogether, much less a coordinated missile attack on four 
fronts� Thus, defending Israel effectively from major multiaxis barrages would 
require a major military ground operation in which the IDF captures and con-
trols launching areas in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria and, if need be, extends this 
ground control as far as Iraq or Iran� Because the IDF reduced and deprioritized 
its conventional fighting forces over the past decade, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the IDF is not sufficiently prepared to contend with this worst-case scenario 
and contemporary existential threats to Israel�
Overall, this article provides a primary analysis of recent structural changes 
in the IDF at the tactical level, based on interviews with IDF soldiers, and points 
to five observable trends: decreasing conventional capabilities, investing in and 
developing defensive capabilities, reorientation of the practices and structure 
of IDF combat forces toward guerrilla warfare, prioritizing cyber and intel-
ligence capabilities, and expanding nuclear capabilities in the air and at sea� 
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 Israel traditionally has been reluctant to build a large navy or to become a sea power� Nevertheless, the discovery of extensive natural gas fields in the eastern 
Mediterranean over the past decade has transformed the region further into a 
strategic powder keg that is drawing Israel out to sea� Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, 
Israel, and Lebanon disagree about the borders of their maritime exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs), and they have attempted to impose their overlapping claims 
by force� The simmering conflicts have drawn in an array of regional powers� 
More recently, the United States has waded into the dispute; Russia is not far 
behind�
Israel’s discovery of large gas fields in its own offshore EEZ has brought it 
into geostrategic alignment with Cyprus and Greece� From a regional security 
standpoint, it is one of the most interesting actors� In some circles, Israel has 
been touted as a type of silver bullet that will 
solve the imbalance between the Hellenic states 
and Turkey� Israel’s new interest in the eastern 
Mediterranean has produced a small but quickly 
growing literature on Israel’s “turn to the sea�”1 The 
rapidly changing strategic situation has spurred 
the creation of research centers and high-profile 
working groups asking whether Israel can become 
a sea power� The answer to this question mostly 
has been an enthusiastic yes�2
Yet, historically, sea power—the ability to employ 
the sea in achieving national interests—has required 
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more than a shift in operational focus toward the maritime domain; it involves 
adopting a much broader national and strategic culture that is able to channel sig-
nificant resources away from the land and toward the sea� Israel has begun to take 
the sea more seriously and it has developed its offshore operational capabilities 
significantly over the past few decades; yet, for several reasons that this article will 
discuss, Israeli culture remains tied to the land rather than the sea� Using cultural 
and constructivist approaches to security that have emerged over the past few 
decades, this article will show why that fact will continue to create challenges for 
the development of Israeli sea power�3 Israel and its allies need to consider these 
cultural constraints when developing naval strategy, and they should factor them 
into discussions about how much they can expect Israel to contribute to resolving 
potential maritime conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean�
Much of the growing literature on Israel’s turn to the sea highlights Israel’s off-
shore interests� However, Israeli interests at sea are not new� Because the country 
lacks close relations with its neighbors—indeed, they often boycott it—99 percent 
of Israeli trade by volume travels by sea� Thus, geostrategically, Israel is equivalent 
to an island, and it always has been extremely vulnerable to maritime threats�4 As 
David Ben-Gurion himself stated, “There is no Land of Israel without the sea of 
Israel�”5 These threats are not hypothetical; Israel fought two wars (in 1956 and 
1967) largely over access to the sea�
Additionally, the recent focus on Israeli maritime affairs is not the first time 
that political leaders and strategic analysts have proclaimed a turn to the sea by 
Israel� On multiple occasions over several decades, Zionist leaders who recog-
nized Israel’s vital interests at sea announced that they finally had overcome the 
Jewish state’s “sea blindness�” Yet the need to make such claims repeatedly dem-
onstrates that the transition has never quite occurred� Throughout its history, 
Israel’s navalists have had to fight a culture deeply rooted in the land, one that was 
not willing to make the necessary terrestrial sacrifices to build sea power� Assess-
ing the viability of Israel’s current turn to the sea requires examining the cultural 
impediments that Israel has faced in the past and that it will need to overcome 
in the future� In doing so, culturist and constructivist approaches to security in 
the eastern Mediterranean provide much-needed insight on a topic that has been 
dominated by materialist approaches�
This article first will lay out the rising tensions in the eastern Mediterranean 
and, by extension, the stakes for Israel’s development of sea power� Next it will 
turn to a discussion of cultural approaches to the theory and history of sea power� 
This theoretical analysis of sea power largely is missing from the literature on 
Israel’s turn to the sea, but, as this article will argue, grappling with the concept 
is critically important if one wishes to discuss Israel’s attempt to play a larger role 
offshore� Then the article will discuss the tensions between the foundations of 
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Israeli national culture and the requirements of sea power� Finally the article will 
outline the cultural challenges that Israel has faced in obtaining sea power, and 
why many of those challenges likely will persist in the future�
THE STAKES
Before discussing cultural impediments to Israeli sea power, this article first 
must discuss the forces that currently are pulling Israel offshore and are making 
Israel’s ability to operate at sea increasingly relevant� Over the past decade, Israel, 
Cyprus, and Egypt have located and begun to exploit massive natural gas fields in 
their maritime EEZs� Until recently, most estimates have valued these discover-
ies in the hundreds of billions of dollars, if not more;6 the economic downturn 
caused by the coronavirus has reduced the projected value of the gas in the short 
term and, in some circles, has led to questions about the viability of some plans to 
exploit it� However, over the medium to long term, the gas still has the potential 
to transform energy markets, and it has reconfigured strategic alliances�7 It also 
has kindled instability and conflict; several confrontations at sea already have 
occurred, and a naval arms race has kicked off among several eastern Mediter-
ranean states� The United States and Russia increasingly are taking sides�
The contentions mainly stem from Turkey’s interpretations of international 
law, which put it at odds with other states in the region as well as with the inter-
national community more generally� Since 1982, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has formed the basis for international maritime 
law�8 UNCLOS designates territorial waters and maritime EEZs that govern re-
source exploitation at sea� However, because UNCLOS grants small islands the 
same rights as continental states, Turkey’s EEZ is limited by the presence of Greek 
islands around its coast� Therefore, Turkey rejects UNCLOS and claims an EEZ 
without consideration for islands�9
This problem is compounded by the Cyprus dispute� Turkey is the only state 
in the world that recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, located 
in the northeast part of the island, and the Turks have anointed themselves the 
guardians of the rights of Turkish Cypriots� As a result of these disputes, Turkey 
asserts a claim to offshore gas fields that the rest of the world recognizes as be-
longing to the Republic of Cyprus� Turkey has turned to the use of force to defend 
its claims on Cypriot and Greek waters; Ankara repeatedly has sent its navy to 
prevent Nicosia and Athens, and international oil companies, from drilling for 
gas there� Meanwhile, Turkish warships are protecting Turkish oil companies as 
they illegally explore and drill in Cypriot waters�10
The Turkish navy traditionally has been the most powerful in the region� 
However, Cypriot interests in confronting Turkey over access to offshore gas have 
aligned Cyprus with powerful regional and international actors� Israel and Egypt 
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currently are exploiting large offshore gas fields in their EEZs� Like Turkey, Israel 
is not a signatory to UNCLOS, but, unlike Turkey, Israel abides by UNCLOS defi-
nitions of territorial seas and EEZs� The UNCLOS interpretation of these matters 
is the basis for agreements that Israel has signed with its maritime neighbors 
over the past decade� Offshore gas could prove transformative to the Israeli and 
Egyptian economies if the countries can export it to European markets� The most 
obvious, and cost-effective, way to do so is through a pipeline that runs through 
Turkey� However, both countries have rocky relationships with Ankara and do 
not feel comfortable tying their economic interests to a Turkish pipeline� As an 
alternative, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece want to establish an undersea pipeline that 
would run from the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean through Crete and up 
through Italy to supply the European continent�
The combination of shared energy interests and animosity toward Turkey 
has pulled Israel, Cyprus, and Greece into a close political alliance over the past 
decade�11 From the beginning, this alliance, sometimes termed the “Energy Tri-
angle,” has had a military component� In 2011 and 2012, Israel sent its air force to 
Cyprus in a show of force meant to support its new ally� Israeli jets buzzed Turk-
ish ships and entered what the Turks claim to be Northern Cyprus’s airspace� This 
caused Turkey to scramble its own air force to interdict Israeli aircraft�12 Israel 
and Greece also have begun to hold high-profile naval exercises in the region—a 
clear warning to the Turks�13 Increasingly, Turkish actions have pushed Egypt and 
Italy into the alliance with Israel, Cyprus, and Greece� Newly discovered Egyptian 
gas fields are adjacent to Cypriot and Israeli fields, so the three states have been 
cooperating closely, and together they formed a high-profile East Mediterra-
nean Gas Forum in Cairo in January 2020�14 Turkish interference in the area has 
disrupted Egyptian gas operations and pushed Egypt even closer to Cyprus and 
Israel� In response to negotiations between Cairo and Nicosia on using liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) to avoid the Turkish pipeline in February 2018, the Turkish 
navy blockaded ships from the Italian energy company ENI from reaching their 
drilling site in Cypriot waters� The effect of the Turkish action was the opposite of 
what Ankara had hoped for—it actually drove Cyprus and Egypt closer together� 
They rushed to sign an agreement on sending Cypriot gas to Egypt for conversion 
to LNG so it could be exported to Europe by ship rather than through a Turkish 
pipeline� Shortly afterward, Israel followed Cyprus’s lead and penned a deal with 
Egypt to do the same with its gas�15
Along with Israel, other regional actors have lined up against Turkey, espe-
cially after Ankara signed a deal with a semi-Islamist faction in the Libyan civil 
war in November 2019 to divide the central and eastern Mediterranean between 
them� In that deal, Turkey made a claim to seas that disregarded Greek islands 
and Cyprus� In defense of its European Union allies and international law, France 
46
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 H E L F O N T  4 1
deployed its aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, “to defensively stalk Turkish frig-
ates sailing near to the contested gas fields close to Cyprus” in February 2020�16 
The United Arab Emirates, which opposes Turkish regional policies, particularly 
its actions in Libya, has become a strong supporter of Greece and Cyprus� Since 
2018, it has participated in the annual Greek-led military exercise INIOCHOS, 
along with the United States, Israel, Cyprus, Italy, and Egypt�17
As these tensions mount in the region, Israel is being drawn into a setting in 
which several states are expanding their navies� Turkey has embarked on what it 
describes as a transformative expansion of its fleet—already the most powerful 
in the region, as noted� By 2023, Turkey will put twenty-four new ships to sea, 
including four frigates and its first aircraft carrier, Anadolu� Turkey also is de-
veloping its domestic submarine program, and it is retrofitting its existing ships 
and submarines with new navigation, weapons, and propulsion systems� In an 
attempt to transform itself into a true sea power, Turkey has emphasized that this 
naval construction is being accomplished by domestic Turkish industries� And, 
as other sea powers have done, Turkey is developing educational, cultural, and 
media institutions to drive public support for its anticipated emergence as a great 
power on the sea�18
The Turks will not be the first state in the region to acquire an aircraft car-
rier; that honor goes to Egypt� The Egyptian navy also has expanded its fleet 
considerably over the past decade, including by acquiring several German-built 
submarines� France had built two Mistral-class helicopter carriers for Russia but 
canceled their delivery in response to Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea� Egypt 
stepped in to buy the two ships, which it now operates as Gamal Abdel Nasser 
and Anwar el-Sadat�19
Israel also is in the process of updating its fleet, as part of its turn to the sea� 
Most importantly, it is acquiring a new class of German-built corvette, the Sa’ar 
6, which will be the most advanced surface vessel in the Israeli fleet� Israel also is 
updating its older Sa’ar 4�5 and Sa’ar 5 corvettes, and it has acquired very capable 
Dolphin 2–class submarines from Germany as well�20
On top of these local developments, several outside powers have become in-
creasingly involved in the eastern Mediterranean region� The European Union 
and the United States have criticized Turkish actions harshly and have come 
down strongly in support of the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek energy triangle as well 
as the Egyptian-led East Mediterranean Gas Forum� In the summer of 2019, 
an influential, bipartisan group of U�S� senators and representatives introduced 
the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, which 
codifies American support for Greece and Cyprus at the expense of Turkey� It 
also offers military aid to both Cyprus and Greece� Then, in October 2019, Sec-
retary of State Michael R� Pompeo flew to Greece to announce plans to expand 
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the U�S� naval presence there and to turn Greek bases into an alternative to 
Turkish bases for American operations� He also announced a deal to develop 
supply channels to NATO allies in eastern Europe that run through Greece 
rather than along the historical routes through Turkey� Pompeo made clear 
“that operations in international waters are governed by a set of rules” and that 
“[w]e’ve told the Turks that illegal drilling is unacceptable�”21 This language, along 
with the expanding American military presence in the region, can only be read 
in Ankara as a tacit threat�
On the other side, Turkey is not the only country that is being cut out of the 
new gas deals� Russia has its own pipelines, through which it supplies over 50 
percent of most European Union states’ gas needs� Thereby Russia can hold Eu-
ropean energy markets hostage, and in the past Moscow has used these pipelines 
to exert political influence on the continent�22 Any eastern Mediterranean gas 
deals that cut out Turkey and Russia not only would hurt those two countries 
financially but would threaten their geopolitical positions� Unsurprisingly, the 
gas deals have pushed the two countries closer together and facilitated already- 
budding defense cooperation between them� Some analysts have begun to specu-
late that Russia might back Turkey not only politically but militarily in the grow-
ing regional disputes, including over gas in the eastern Mediterranean�23
Finally, Iran has sought to establish a corridor to the Mediterranean to sup-
port its allies and proxies in Syria and Lebanon� The most important Iranian asset 
in the Levant is Lebanese Hezbollah, which looks to Tehran for both religious 
and political guidance� Lebanon, which is increasingly dominated by Hezbollah, 
hopes to discover its own gas fields in its EEZ� Lebanon has an unresolved mari-
time border dispute with Israel; although this does not affect Israel’s proven gas 
fields, it would affect future exploration� Hezbollah, for which Iran is helping to 
build irregular naval capabilities in the eastern Mediterranean, rejects Israel’s 
existence and has threatened Israel’s offshore gas infrastructure�24 As the civil war 
in Syria winds down, both Iran and Russia are likely to use their gains in Syria to 
play a larger role at sea in the eastern Mediterranean� This almost certainly will 
raise regional tensions�
In sum, the stakes for Israel in the eastern Mediterranean are high� The dis-
covery of gas has reconfigured geopolitical alignments, pitting Israel, Cyprus, 
Greece, Egypt, the European Union, and the United States against Turkey, Russia, 
Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah� The rising tensions already have been militarized, and 
unresolved disputes over waters with billions of dollars of gas under them easily 
could turn into open conflict�25 Israel possesses one of the most powerful mili-
taries in the region, but traditionally it has not been a sea power� Whether it can 
and will turn to the sea will have important implications for this highly volatile 
region� Yet, if history is a judge, Israel will need to do more than buy new naval 
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platforms; a true turn to the sea will require a major shift in Israel’s national and 
strategic culture�
SEA POWER AND CULTURE
The relationship between culture and sea power is not new, and it is not limited 
to Israel� Over a century ago, the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan 
famously laid out six elements of sea power� Most of those elements dealt with 
ports, population size, geography (Switzerland will never be a sea power), and 
the willingness of the government to support a navy� However, one of Mahan’s 
elements (number five on his list) dealt with a more amorphous subject: “national 
character�” As Mahan argued, a state can have all the attributes of a sea power, 
but if its people lack a certain national character that pushes them toward the sea, 
that state will have difficulty achieving its interests in that domain�26 It would be 
easy to dismiss this aspect of Mahanian sea power as rooted in racial and racist 
ideas of the later nineteenth century; indeed, Mahan’s contemporaries openly 
discussed certain races as being inherently better suited for the sea�27 It is unclear 
to what extent these racial notions influenced Mahan, but even if they did they 
are not the only way to interpret his concept of national character�
National character just as easily can be viewed through the lens of culture, 
and more-recent sea-power theorists have done just that� Geoffrey Till points 
out that, since ancient times, seafaring communities have developed a distinc-
tive culture—one that can be found across both time and space all over the 
world� He gives an example of the Vikings having it in their “spirit of adventure, 
enterprise, curiosity, and greed�”28 Likewise, the retired USN admiral turned 
sea-power intellectual James G� Stavridis describes the “uncertainty and sense of 
adventure” that “sailors have felt going back two thousand years or more�”29 These 
sentiments are remarkably similar to the “healthy excitement of exploration and 
adventure” that Mahan argued is an important element of the national character 
needed for sea power�30 Andrew Lambert, one of the most accomplished naval 
historians currently active, goes even further; in fact, he criticizes Mahan for not 
putting enough emphasis on the cultural aspects of sea power� He argues that 
sea power requires “actively constructing a cultural identity focused on the sea�” 
Historically, sea powers not only built ships and ports but infused their cultures 
with nautical themes� Their art, architecture, and public spaces highlighted the 
role of the sea in the national character, and, as Lambert shows, eventually “this 
consciously crafted identity spread beyond elites and interested parties: it flowed 
into popular culture, pottery, coins, graffiti, books, printed images, and, by the 
1930s, cinema�”31
In some sense, sea-power culture is a necessary but artificial social construct 
for states that want to dominate the water� It is necessary because most people 
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are not naturally inclined to focus on the sea; after all, they live on the land, and 
their most immediate interests—and their military objectives in times of war—
most often are on land rather than at sea�32 Moreover, navies are expensive and 
take considerable time to build� Sea powers require not only ships and sailors but 
shipyards, ports, and skilled engineers� At best, these requirements take decades 
to produce� Navies also require manpower that is more technically skilled than 
what armies require, which means it is more difficult for a navy to rely on reserve 
forces or a draft to fill its ranks� As a result, it is much more difficult to create and 
maintain navies than ground forces�
Leaders promoting sea power, therefore, need to spend considerable effort to 
convince their people that they should invest limited resources in a sea service� 
For example, when Theodore Roosevelt, who was heavily influenced by Mahan, 
wanted to build American sea power, he spent considerable time and effort rais-
ing public support for the U�S� Navy—for instance, by sending the Great White 
Fleet to circumnavigate the globe in 1907–1909�33
Roosevelt also created naval heroes onto whom the public could latch�34 In 
1905, Roosevelt had the body of the Revolutionary War sea captain John Paul 
Jones exhumed from a long-forgotten grave in Paris� Jones’s body was returned to 
the United States, where it was reinterred, with great public fanfare, in a massive 
tomb on the grounds of the U�S� Naval Academy�35 Jones was a genuine war hero, 
but after the Revolutionary War he left the United States to serve in the Russian 
navy and died in obscurity in France� As a recent biographer of Jones has argued, 
one of the reasons he was “resurrected” was that “Teddy Roosevelt needed a 
hero�”36 Roosevelt understood that creating such heroes was essential for building 
among the masses a culture of sea power that would support his naval ambitions� 
He was right; throughout history, people lacking admiration for the sea have resist-
ed government efforts to build sea power� Therefore strategies to build sea power 
often are controversial; at times they can rip apart a state’s political leadership, 
sometimes literally—in the seventeenth century, the Dutch sea-power enthusiast 
Johan de Witt was “torn to pieces in the streets of the Hague” by those who were 
tired of his focus on the sea and wanted to return to their land-based interests�37
The difficulties in building sea power for a country such as Israel are com-
pounded by the distinction between large and small navies� If a state cannot or 
will not invest enough to become a full-fledged sea power, its navy almost imme-
diately faces several problems� Seafaring requires numerous, technical skill sets, 
but if a navy has only a few ships it often is difficult for sailors to get enough time 
at sea� Even for those who do, the opportunities for career progression and senior 
leadership are limited� Thus, it becomes difficult to retain the most talented sail-
ors� Moreover, because there are only a few senior positions in small navies, the 
departure of leaders has an outsize effect�38
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Relatedly, as Till points out, “[n]avies survive and prosper partly through their 
ability to have an appreciable impact on the defence decision-making processes 
which define a country’s maritime policy�” But with few senior officers, “there 
are fewer people with the necessary professional experience to influence, even 
help shape, policy at the national level�” As a result, national policy “becomes less 
likely to serve naval purposes� Instead, the navy simply gets told what its policy 
is�”39 Such a situation clearly is not ideal for addressing predominantly maritime 
problems�
Finally, navies in non-sea-power states face problems with economies of 
scale� The fewer ships a state has, the costlier each individual ship is to produce, 
maintain, and refit and the more expensive it is to train and equip the sailors who 
man them� As a result, such states often are forced to outsource production and 
professional military education� In many cases, this reliance on other states can 
limit the strategies and policies of non–sea powers severely because their allies 
hold significant leverage over them� Moreover, non–sea powers with small navies 
often need to choose between spreading their limited resources thinly over a wide 
range of capabilities and building real competency in a limited number of areas 
while hoping that their allies will fill in the gaps� Neither approach is ideal, and 
the latter choice likewise exposes small navies to strategic constraints imposed 
by their partners�40
Almost all the problems associated with small navies and a lack of sea-power 
culture have hindered the development of the Israeli navy� These obstacles likely 
will persist in the future�
THE SEA, THE LAND, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF  
ZIONIST IMAGINATION
In contrast to the culture of sea power, the Zionist ideology on which the modern 
state of Israel was founded is rooted deeply in interests on the land� Zionists tra-
ditionally have read Jewish history through the relationship between the Jewish 
people and Eretz Yisrael (the biblical Land of Israel)� Such a reading of history 
aligns with a general perception that Jews are not a seafaring people�41
Of course, such reductive narratives are not as straightforward as their propo-
nents suggest� Over the past few decades, a stream of revisionist scholarship has 
uncovered or given new emphasis to Jewish experiences related to the sea� Jews 
have traveled, explored, and made their living on the sea from ancient times until 
the present�42 In contrast to popular perceptions of Jews as meek, city-dwelling 
scholars and merchants, there were even some swashbuckling Jewish pirates in 
the Caribbean�43
Therefore the Zionist focus on land represents a constructed identity rather 
than the articulation of an innate characteristic of the Jewish people� This does 
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not make Zionist narratives any less powerful in shaping the national ethos of 
modern Israel� To understand that ethos, and the obstacles it presents to creating 
sea power, it is necessary to detail how and why Zionist narratives about the con-
nection between Jews and the land were created�
Throughout Jewish history, one finds a longing for a return to Eretz Yisrael, 
and across the centuries numerous Jews acted on that impulse� However, modern 
forms of political and cultural Zionism have their roots in nineteenth-century 
Europe, where the place of Jews, never completely secure, became increasingly 
dire� The rise of European nationalism and Romantic ideas about a Volk rooted 
in the land threw into sharp contrast stereotypical depictions of “the wandering 
Jew,” who spoke a different language (predominantly Yiddish), ate different (ko-
sher) food, adhered to peculiar customs, and claimed roots in the Middle East� 
Some Jews sought a solution to their predicament by creating a nation-state of 
their own in what they considered to be their ancient homeland� In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, this movement became known as Zionism�
In addition to the political goal of creating a Jewish state in Jews’ perceived 
homeland, Zionism also developed a cultural component� Zionists attempted 
to fashion what they called the “new Jew,” who contrasted sharply with the 
stereotypical Diaspora Jew� Once Jews returned to their homeland, Zionists 
would work in industries such as agriculture� Toiling in the fields would develop 
physically strong bodies and root these new Jews in their land� This rootedness, 
according to Zionist ideology, would solve many of the problems Jews had faced 
as perennial outsiders in every land they had inhabited since the Roman Empire 
exiled them from Judea�44 Yet this desire for rootedness was in direct conflict 
with the veneration of wanderlust, exploration, and adventure that normally ac-
companies sea power�
Zionists’ desire to be rooted in a homeland dovetailed with their reading of 
biblical history� The heartlands of ancient Jewish kingdoms were located among 
the inland mountains and valleys of ancient Judea, Samaria, and the Galilee; the 
coastal areas largely were controlled by Philistines, Greeks, and Phoenicians� 
Thus, as one might assume, the ancient Israelites were concerned far more with 
the land than the sea�
The Bible discusses land and agriculture extensively; it is far less concerned 
with nautical matters� This focus on the land is reflected not only in biblical nar-
ratives but in the content of the ancient Hebrew language itself� Although the He-
brew Bible discusses warfare at length, it does not even provide a word for navy� 
When modern Zionists turned to ancient Jewish texts for other nautical terms, 
they struggled to find them� They had to invent terms such as ma’agan (anchor-
age), hashaka (launching a ship), saver (dock worker), and shayit (sailing)�45 By 
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contrast, biblical Hebrew is infused with vocabulary linking the ancient Israelites 
to the land� At the most basic level, the Hebrew words for land/soil (adama) and 
man (adam) are closely related� In root-based Semitic languages such as Hebrew, 
this relationship is much more meaningful than it would be in English—it sug-
gests a common essence�
Modern Zionist culture did not grow organically from a deterministic bibli-
cal past� However, when Zionists wanted to tie themselves to a land, it was not 
difficult for them to find justifications in biblical history, and as Zionism devel-
oped, politically and culturally, its proponents increasingly emphasized the links 
between Jews and the land—between adam and adama� Thus, writing in 1919, 
the influential Zionist intellectual Harry Sacher wrote, “The idea of Judaism is 
inseparable from the idea of the Jewish people, and the idea of the Jewish people 
is inseparable from the idea of the Jewish land�” He tied together religious, politi-
cal, cultural, and linguistic themes, referencing Jewish sages, and arguing, “The 
cultivation of the Hebrew tongue is as natural as the cultivation of the land�”46 The 
kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz, a collective agricultural settlement), in which the 
Zionist “new Jews” tilled the soil, featured heavily in the early Zionist literature�47 
Hebrew writers wrestled with overcoming the image of the diasporic wandering 
Jew and putting down roots in the land�48 Early Zionist art and photography dealt 
with similar themes� In 1935, the first Hebrew-language movie, Zot Hi HaAretz 
(This Is the Land), explored images of adam and adama�49 The celebration of the 
new Jew, who developed his mind and body by pouring blood and sweat into the 
soil of his homeland—making the “desert bloom”—permeated popular culture� A 
line from a folk song that later became a type of national slogan proclaimed “Anu 
banu artzah livnot ve-lehibanot bah” (We came to the Land to build and be built 
by it)�50 Similarly, a 1937 poem that, when put to music, became an “unofficial 
anthem” for Zionists’ agricultural settlements captures the emotions tied up in 
the return both to an ancient homeland and to working the land�51
Watch, look, and see
How great this day is
Fire glowing in the chest
And the plow
Again tilling the field�52
Of course, Zionist thought could not ignore the sea completely� Most Jews had 
to travel by sea to reach Eretz Yisrael, and a subset of Hebrew literature emerged 
representing that experience�53 However, as often as not the sea was simply “a barrier 
that had to be crossed before arriving at the shores of the new country”; it was not 
essential for building a new national identity�54 There were no portrayals of the sea 
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in early Zionist culture that could compete with the place of the land in the emerg-
ing national consciousness�55 As one scholar of Zionist culture put it, “The history 
of Zionist efforts to elaborate the dialectical relation between Jew and land in no 
small measure defines the entire history of the movement between 1881 and 1938�”56
ISRAEL’S REPEATED TURNS TO THE SEA
The overwhelming focus of early Zionist culture on the land rather than the sea 
did not align with the geographic realities of Jewish settlement� In the biblical pe-
riod, to which Zionists looked for inspiration, Jewish populations, as noted, were 
concentrated in the interior mountains, while non-Jewish populations were con-
centrated along the coast� By contrast, while some modern Zionist Jews settled in 
and around the Jerusalem highlands, most settlement occurred in an N-shaped 
pattern up the coast, diagonally southeast through the Galilee, and then north 
around the Sea of Galilee into the Hula Valley� The main Jewish population cen-
ters, such as Tel Aviv (founded in 1909), were on the Mediterranean coast�57 The 
gap between the imagined geography of Eretz Yisrael and the geographic reality 
of Zionist settlement created a type of cognitive dissonance� For example, a 1939 
short story written in simple Hebrew for new immigrants depicts the surprise of 
a Jewish refugee from Europe when he arrives in Tel Aviv� He was in “the land of 
the Patriarchs, the revived homeland,” but “[h]ere, on the beach � � � everything 
was so ordinary, just like in Europe�” The idea of the ancient land that he expected 
contrasted sharply with the Mediterranean reality of his new life�58
These geographic realities gradually began to impose the sea on the Zionist 
movement, and in the 1930s one finds the first claims that Zionists had turned to 
the sea� During this period, Zionists opened a Jewish-run port in Tel Aviv, devel-
oped fisheries, formed maritime leagues, inaugurated a nautical school in Haifa, 
and established private shipping companies�59 In 1938, Raphael Patai added in-
tellectual weight to this project when he published a book in Hebrew on ancient 
Jewish seafaring� The book was based on a doctoral dissertation that completed 
the first PhD that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem had awarded�60 David Ben-
Gurion, who emerged as the most important Zionist political leader at this time, 
realized that the Zionists’ almost-exclusive focus on the land was misaligned with 
the strategic imperatives of the developing Jewish state� Not only was the sea a 
geographic reality that forced itself on the Jewish settlements clustered along the 
coast, but as the surrounding Arab states emerged from colonial empires Israel 
became a geostrategic island� Thus, the sea became the only outlet Zionists had 
to the rest of the world� Ben-Gurion therefore argued, “The conquest of the soil 
by city people was the great, first adventure of our movement, of our endeavour 
in the country� A second adventure, great also, and perhaps harder than the first, 
still awaits us—the conquest of the sea�” For Ben-Gurion, the Mediterranean was 
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“the natural bridge that connects our small country with the wide world� The 
sea is an organic, economic, and political part of our country�” This being the 
case, “[t]he road to the sea is a way to expand our country, to augment our eco-
nomic base, to strengthen our national health, to enforce our political position, 
to dominate the elements�”61 At the time, Zionist leaders presented the “conquest 
of the sea” as the third pillar of Zionism, along with “redemption of the land” 
and “revival of the soul�”62 By 1945, in recognition of their geographic situation, 
the Zionists overcame considerable political challenges to establish the shipping 
company ZIM� This commercial shipping capability would prove crucial in safe-
guarding Israel’s trade in the decades ahead, and ZIM eventually developed into 
one of the world’s leading shipping lines�63 As a result of these developments, a 
historian of modern Israel has argued recently that the prestate Jewish movement 
went through a “maritime revolution” during the 1930s and 1940s�64
Yet despite this supposed turn to the sea, in 1948 a newly independent Israel 
found itself completely unprepared in terms of resources, training, equipment, 
and—just as importantly—mentality to confront the challenges it faced at sea 
during its war of independence� Following World War II, Jewish communities in 
Israel developed a naval militia called the Palyam, and Zionists—with a great deal 
of help from both Jewish and non-Jewish sympathizers abroad—smuggled Ho-
locaust survivors past a British blockade in a program known as Aliyah Bet� The 
most famous of these Aliyah Bet ships was Exodus, which the British boarded� 
They killed and injured several passengers and sent the Holocaust survivors back 
to Europe�65
As independence neared, Zionist leaders attempted to turn these initiatives 
into a national navy� As one member of the Palyam later recalled, the leadership 
brought him and other members into a meeting and “informed us that we were 
no longer the Palyam; we were now the Israeli Navy�”66 The Jews had a hundred 
miles of coast to protect, in addition to their shipping� Yet while Palyam mem-
bers were dedicated and daring, they were trained and equipped only to carry 
out small commando raids; they did not possess the technical knowledge to run 
a navy� In addition to their lack of ship-handling experience on large vessels, 
they had no experience in the command and control that is essential for naval 
operations�67 In a sign of how desperate the Israelis were for competent naval 
leadership, Ben-Gurion cabled a Zionist office in New York, asking it to send 
a twenty-six-year-old Jewish American named Paul N� Shulman� Shulman had 
graduated from the U�S� Naval Academy and had fought on a destroyer in the 
Pacific during World War II� Despite his age, Ben-Gurion wanted him to com-
mand HaSherut HaYami (the Sea Service), which is what the Israelis called it at 
the time, because they had not settled on a Hebrew word for navy yet� Shulman 
recruited several other American Jews with naval experience to take key jobs that 
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the Israelis could not fill� Jonathan Leff, who was one of Shulman’s classmates at 
Annapolis, became head of the Department of Ordnance and Gunnery of the Sea 
Service; Harold Gershenow, who had served as a ship-repair officer in the U�S� 
Navy during World War II, was brought to Israel to rebuild and operate the Bat 
Galim port at Haifa; Harold Shugar, who had served as a gunnery officer in the 
American navy and happened to be studying abroad at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem when the war broke out, was recruited to be the gunnery officer on the 
Israeli flagship�68 The head of the Palyam became Shulman’s deputy, and together 
they opened a training program at Haifa�
Yet despite the turn to the sea that supposedly had occurred over the preceding 
decade, the land-focused leadership of the Israel Defense Forces did not prioritize 
the sea and did not attempt to use it strategically� Its members derided Shulman’s 
force as “the bathtub corps�” The navy had only three real ships: two former 
Canadian corvettes and a former U�S� Coast Guard icebreaker� The icebreaker, 
renamed Eilat, became Shulman’s flagship� None of these ships was armed, so the 
Israelis mounted a 1906 French army field-artillery piece on the deck of Eilat�69
The fledgling Israeli navy had difficulty convincing the national leadership to 
provide it with resources� Of course, the new state had limited assets it could offer 
the navy, especially in wartime, but the lack of available funds only partly explains 
the failure to support the navy� Money was available, but the civilian leadership 
saw no use in spending it on the sea service� The official responsible for the 
navy at the Ministry of Defense, Gershon Zak, had a background in education 
administration� Zak rejected Shulman’s repeated requests for funds to build a 
communications station, so Shulman asked for money for a cultural center� This 
request was more aligned with Zak’s interests, and it was approved� Shulman then 
“misappropriated” the funds to build the communications station�70 This would 
not be the last time that Israeli naval leaders misled or ignored their superiors 
outside the sea service to accomplish their missions and protect the vital interests 
of the state�71
The Israeli navy did achieve a few important successes during the war� Most 
importantly, a commando raid carried out via a small boat launched from Shul-
man’s flagship sank the Egyptian flagship, Emir Farouk�72 Yet the Israeli navy 
never was used to its full potential� Many Israelis saw Shulman, who was the most 
competent naval officer, as a typical Diaspora Jew rather than the “new Jew” of 
the Zionist project� He was forced to step down following the war and largely was 
written out of Israeli history�73
Following Israeli independence, the national ethos remained firmly rooted in 
the land� In a major cultural landmark, the first play performed in the new state 
was Moshe Shamir’s highly acclaimed Hu Halakh ba-Sadot (He Walked through 
the Fields). It later was transformed into a successful Hebrew movie� As the title 
56
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 H E L F O N T  5 1
indicates, the plot revolves around life on a kibbutz, with all the resulting imagery 
of adam and adama�74 Probably the most important influence on postindepen-
dence Israeli culture has been the writings of Amos Oz, who burst onto the He-
brew literary scene in the 1960s with a collection of short stories describing life 
on a kibbutz�75 The relationship between Zionist Jews and the land permeated his 
career�76 In recent decades, agriculture and kibbutzim have lost their central role 
in Israel, but they remain an important part of the state’s founding myth, as well 
as a cultural force� For example, Oz ultimately cemented his place in Israeli liter-
ary history with a 2002 memoir about his own journey as a boy from the life of a 
city Jew in Jerusalem to a truly Zionist life on an agricultural collective� Notably, 
when he left the city and rooted himself in the land he changed his surname from 
the Yiddish Klausner to the Hebrew Oz, thus completing the Zionist transforma-
tion� The book made a tremendous impact, and in 2015 the Israeli American 
actress Natalie Portman transformed it into a Hebrew-language movie in which 
she played a central role, that of young Amos’s mother�77
As one might expect, this continued cultural affinity for the land affected the 
resources and attention that the young Israeli navy received from the state� As 
one prominent Israeli defense analyst has noted, in the first few decades of Israel’s 
statehood “[t]he [Israel Defense Forces] headquarters had little understanding of 
naval needs and was not inclined to divert scarce funds to a service considered to 
be of secondary importance�”78 In the 1950s, the Israelis attempted to build a navy 
around capital ships (mostly British destroyers) and they purchased WWII-era 
British submarines� However, the destroyers proved too expensive to man and 
run� Moreover, they failed to achieve Israeli objectives at sea� Following the 1948 
war, Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, which blocked passage 
from Israel’s southern port of Elat to the Red Sea� Egypt also prevented Israel from 
using the Suez Canal� These actions cut Israeli ties with Asia and hindered the 
development of its southern Negev region, which was a priority for Ben-Gurion�
Reopening the strait and Israel’s access to the Red Sea became one of the 
country’s main objectives when it joined Britain and France in the 1956 war 
against Egypt� Israeli forces raced down the Sinai Peninsula and captured Sharm 
al-Sheikh, which overlooks the strait� Israel then made opening of the waterway 
a key provision for handing the territory back to Egypt, and it took the oppor-
tunity to send a few Israeli navy ships through the straits to Elat� Under intense 
American and international pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai without 
clear Egyptian acquiescence to Israel’s right of passage by sea� Subsequently, only 
foreign ships were allowed through the straits; if an Israeli ship wished to pass, 
it needed to fly a false flag� The Israeli warships that transited to Elat during the 
crisis remained bottled up there until the 1967 war� Therefore the Israeli navy was 
not able to secure sea lines of communication for vital Israeli shipping (which by 
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the 1960s included much-needed oil shipments from Iran)� When Egypt decided 
to close the straits completely in 1967, Israel had no naval option to open them�79 
In such situations, states with small navies often rely on alliances with sea powers, 
and the Israelis turned to the United States� However, while the Americans were 
supportive, they were tied down in Vietnam, and they could not muster interna-
tional support to force the issue�80 To regain access to the sea, Israel was forced 
into a general war rather than a more limited naval action�
The year 1967 was a low point for the Israeli navy, for several reasons� It largely 
missed out on the celebrated actions of what Israelis call the Six-Day War in June� 
Other than some small commando raids, the only major action the Israeli navy 
took was to attack USS Liberty, an American signals-intelligence-collection plat-
form� Several dozen Americans were killed or injured in the attack� The Israelis 
insist the attack was a mistake, but it remains a contentious topic for some in the 
U�S� Navy today�81 Later in the year, the Israeli destroyer Eilat was sunk by a Soviet 
Styx missile fired from an Egyptian missile boat� Then, right after the New Year, 
an Israeli submarine on its maiden voyage from England to Israel disappeared 
along the way�82
Fortunately for the Israeli navy, brighter days were on the horizon� Israeli 
navalists understood the critical national interests Israel had at sea, yet the state 
provided them relatively few resources� Yet as the adage states, necessity is the 
mother of invention, and in the mid-1960s Israeli naval officers developed a bold 
plan to scrap Israel’s destroyers and replace them with heavily armed missile 
boats� No Western navy relied on missile boats at the time, so this was a fairly 
radical plan—even more so because when the Israeli navy decided on this course, 
it had yet to develop a surface-to-surface missile and it had no platform on which 
to put it�83
Eventually, the Israelis developed the Gabriel missile and the Germans agreed 
to build them a modified version of their Jaguar-class fast-attack craft� As theo-
rists of small navies have argued, reliance on foreign procurement can be prob-
lematic because it ties strategic assets to the whims of international politics, and 
that proved to be the case for Israel and its missile boats� The Germans worried 
that the Arabs would boycott them if it became public that they were building 
missile boats for Israel; however, the Israelis were able to convince Germany to 
allow the French to build the German boats in the port of Cherbourg� Because of 
the war in Algeria, the French were out of favor with the Arabs anyway, so they 
did not face a diplomatic threat�84
But before the boats were completed, the international political winds shifted� 
Following the French withdrawal from Algeria, President Charles de Gaulle at-
tempted to mend ties with the Arab states, and Israel was left in the lurch� The 
French imposed an embargo on arms to Israel, which meant they would not 
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permit Israel to take possession of the new missile boats on which its entire naval 
strategy depended� In a major scandal at the time, the Israelis tricked the French 
into thinking they had sold their rights to the boats to a Norwegian shipping 
company� Then, on Christmas Eve 1969, the Israelis escaped with the boats into a 
storm in the English Channel� Israeli officers and crew, many of whom had been 
hiding belowdecks in the French harbor, piloted the boats back to Haifa, refueling 
at sea from modified Israeli merchant ships and dodging the French, Soviet, and 
Egyptian navies along the way�85
Once in Israel, the boats were fitted with the Gabriel missile system� The 
Gabriel’s range was far shorter than that of the Soviet Styx missile, which the 
Egyptian and Syrian navies used� This meant that the Israeli boats would be 
shot out of the water before they fired their own missiles at their adversaries� 
Again, necessity bred innovation, and Israeli engineers developed a revolutionary 
electronic-warfare system, mostly using chaff, that was able to spoof the Styx mis-
siles and allow Israeli ships to operate within their range�86
During the 1973 war with Syria and Egypt, the Israeli missile boats performed 
beyond all expectations� In the battle of Latakia, Israeli and Syrian boats engaged 
in history’s first missile battle at sea� The Israeli boats were able to operate safely 
within the range of the Soviet missiles and they sank all five of the Syrian boats 
that took part in the battle� Later in the war, the Israelis repeated their successes 
against Egyptian missile boats in the battle of Baltīm� Over the course of the war, 
the Egyptians and Syrians fired over fifty missiles at the Israeli boats, but none 
hit their targets; by contrast, the Israelis were able to sink any Syrian or Egyptian 
vessel that ventured out of port� The Israelis used this command of the sea to 
bombard strategic targets on the Egyptian and Syrian coasts as well as to ensure 
the vital resupply of weapons by sea from the United States�87 In addition to these 
victories in the Mediterranean, Israeli naval commandos achieved important 
victories around the Sinai and the Red Sea�88 As a result, some have heralded the 
acquisition of these missile boats as a turning point for the Israeli navy�89
However, this turning point should not be misconstrued as signifying a new 
age for the Israeli defense establishment’s relationship with the sea� While the Is-
raeli navy did achieve a number of stunning successes in the war, those successes 
came despite the fact that Israel’s political and military leadership was inept at 
using the sea service� David Elazar, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, 
planned to use the navy in the war simply to “defend essential targets along the 
length of the state’s coast and to be on alert to transition quickly to attack the 
enemy on the sea and in the ports�”90 Basically, all he wanted the navy to do was 
prevent Egyptian or Syrian boats from coming close enough to launch their mis-
siles at the Israeli coast� On the first night of the war, he ordered Benjamin Telem, 
the commander of the navy, to recall a naval force that was heading north toward 
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Syria; he did not want the navy to get into a situation that would have required 
the diversion of land or air forces� Telem, in a daring—and potentially career-
ending—move, chose to ignore the order� The force in question won the battle 
of Latakia and shaped the war at sea—but it did so in defiance of Israeli military 
leadership, not because of it� Elazar later admitted, “I underestimated the navy�”91
While the more than doubling of Israel’s coastline resulting from the 1967 
war forced the state to provide the navy with more assets, even this did not occur 
without a fight� The government rejected the navy’s additional request to build a 
fleet of landing craft following the 1967 war� Israeli navalists regarded this deci-
sion as “a grave blunder,” and because of it the army faced significant difficulties 
crossing the Suez Canal during the 1973 war� As Efraim Inbar has stated, “The 
government was still ground-oriented and not inclined, either by doctrine or 
budget, to approve large amphibious operations�”92 The war exposed other prob-
lems with the navy as well� Although the Israelis controlled the Strait of Tiran, the 
Israeli navy could not prevent the Egyptians from blockading the Bab el Mandeb 
choke point at the southern end of the Red Sea, essentially cutting off Israel’s con-
nections with Asia and Africa� The Egyptians also successfully mined the Strait 
of Jubal in the Gulf of Suez� By doing so, they cut off Israeli oil supplies from Abu 
Rudeis� This highlighted the Israeli navy’s inability to minesweep�93 Moreover, it 
should not be forgotten just how close Israel was to not having its missile boats 
because of its diplomatic situation; although the Israelis managed to smuggle the 
boats out of France in the middle of the night, it was a close-run thing, and the 
operation could have been upended in numerous ways� It certainly is not a model 
to be replicated�
Nevertheless, the war did demonstrate, even to those who did not understand 
the service fully, that the Israeli navy could play a constructive role� Although 
Israeli political and military leaders have remained wary about pulling resources 
from land and air forces over the years, several optimistic navalists have argued 
repeatedly that Israel finally is turning to the sea� Such claims have come every 
decade since the 1970s� In the 1980s, Efraim Inbar argued that Israel reached 
a new phase in its relationship with the sea after the navy won a hard-fought, 
multiyear battle to enact a reform and modernization program, which included 
the purchase of American-built Sa’ar 5 corvettes, which were considerably larger 
than the missile boats on which Israel had relied since the 1960s�94 Other scholars 
argue that, although for “most of Israel’s seven-decades-long history the sea did 
not play a significant role in Israeli security, energy market, or development poli-
cies, � � � beginning in the 1990s, Israeli decision makers turned their attention to 
the sea�” These scholars state that this turn to the sea was tied to an accumulation 
of issues such as fisheries, environmental concerns, desalination, offshore energy, 
and the development of seaports; together, these and other interests created a 
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critical mass that finally pushed Israel to the sea�95 Another analyst claims that 
Israel finally began to take the sea seriously in 2006, when Hezbollah hit the Is-
raeli corvette Hanit with an Iranian-supplied cruise missile�96 And finally, there 
are the claims that, after decades of neglect, signs of Israel finally turning to the 
sea include the discovery of offshore gas fields; the new alliances with Greece and 
Cyprus; and the purchase of a new, larger class of Sa’ar 6 corvettes from Germany�
Arguments supporting Israel’s various supposed turns to the sea have high-
lighted the very real progress the Israeli navy has made over the past few decades� 
However, each step forward has been a struggle, and despite some advances 
Israel has not resolved its strategic maritime issues� A 2018 report on the Israeli 
navy argues that “[t]he Israeli Navy currently has far fewer corvettes and fast at-
tack craft than it requires, and almost all of these have never been fully outfitted 
with their designed number of fire-control systems�” In addition, limited missile 
reloads for Israel’s otherwise very capable submarines limit their ability to act as 
a deterrent�97
Moreover, while Israel has developed its naval shipbuilding industry, the Israe-
li navy continues to rely on foreign sources for its capital ships and submarines, 
which means its future fleet relies on a favorable diplomatic landscape�98 Support 
for Israel remains controversial in many states� Recently, even in the United 
States—which traditionally has been Israel’s greatest supporter—some political 
factions have questioned the American relationship with the Jewish state� Until 
Israel resolves the Palestinian issue, it likely will face continued international 
political opposition that easily could hinder its procurement of future platforms 
or limit its strategic options at critical times� Until Israel develops the capability 
to produce, maintain, and man a large fleet independently, these strategic con-
straints will continue to hinder its attempts to become a sea power�
Then there is the fact that the Israeli defense establishment, as well as its politi-
cal leadership, still is dominated by officials who have limited knowledge of the 
sea or naval operations� In October 2019, this land-focused defense establish-
ment proposed canceling part of Israel’s naval buildup and reallocating the funds 
to ground forces and air defense�99 As these examples show, planned expansions 
to, or even maintenance of, the existing Israeli navy will continue to be a struggle�
As a high-profile 2016 report states, “It is � � � impossible to overstate Israel’s 
interests in maritime security� Yet, surprisingly, the maritime domain is almost 
absent from public discourse in Israel, a nation not known for its maritime cul-
ture or history�”100 Classic sea-power theory would argue that it will be difficult 
for Israel to provide the sustained resources necessary to secure its maritime 
interests under those circumstances� If Israeli leaders are serious about building 
sea power, they probably need more than a few new ships� To build the national 
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expertise and devote the resources required for creating sea power, Israel will 
need to develop popular support for such projects� To do so, it will need to infuse 
Israeli society with maritime culture� Considering Israel’s history, that will not be 
an easy task�
If history is a judge, the Israeli navy will have difficulty meeting the challenges 
it faces� While Israel may be devoting more resources to its navy, others are too—
the eastern Mediterranean currently is in the midst of a naval arms race� The 
Egyptian and Turkish navies already dwarf Israel’s in terms of size� Not only are 
they both rapidly expanding quantitatively, but they are moving toward aircraft 
carrier–based fleets� The Russian navy also has shown an increasing interest in 
the area�
Additionally, if Israel weds its energy interests to an undersea pipeline running 
to Italy and beyond or to LNG shipments from Egypt to Europe, Israel’s critical 
maritime interests will extend hundreds of miles from its shore; this will be a 
major change for a navy that so far has been concerned with defense of Israel’s 
two-hundred-mile EEZ�
Thus, even an Israeli navy that can meet today’s challenges likely will be inade-
quate in the near future� Israel will need to devote even more resources to its fleet�
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THE 1988 BLUES
Admirals, Activists, and the Development of the Chinese  
Maritime Identity
Andrew Rhodes
 The year 1988 marked a critical moment in China’s emergence as a maritime power� The seven months from February to August 1988 saw not only a major 
naval campaign in the Spratly Islands but also the startling cultural phenomenon 
of 河殇 (Heshang, or River Elegy), a multiepisode television documentary that 
called on China to turn away from tradition to embrace a maritime identity�1 
The prodemocracy creators of Heshang and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
Navy (PLAN) leadership had little in common in terms of how they thought 
China should be governed, but there is a surprising overlap in the way the two 
groups were “selling the sea,” or seeking to forge a more maritime future for Chi-
na�2 These two parallel stories highlight an important but overlooked historical 
moment in the evolution of China’s maritime identity and its commitment to 
maritime power�
In China in 1988, several trends were building to a dramatic, and ultimately 
violent, crescendo, with major implications for Chinese society and China’s place 
in the world� A decade after the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, 
the movement that sought democratic political reforms and a new Chinese cul-
ture was developing powerful momentum and ties to the outside world—only to 
meet tragic suppression a year later at Tiananmen 
Square� At the same time, the PLA, and the PLAN 
in particular, was in the midst of its own reform 
and new engagement on the global stage� Consid-
eration of the intersection of the cultural and po-
litical history of 1988 with the military and naval 
history of 1988 has focused—understandably—on 
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the path to June 1989� But there are intriguing parallels, beyond mere coinci-
dence, in the cultural and naval events of the spring and summer of 1988 that 
provide a new lens for viewing the relationship between Chinese culture and 
Chinese sea power�
Thirty-two years is not long in the grand sweep of naval history or Chinese 
history, but the rapid pace of PLAN development in the twenty-first century 
makes 1988 seem rather like the ancient past� The late 1980s are within the liv-
ing memory of many scholars and strategists, but too few remember the events 
of 1988 and the global, regional, and national context in which they took place� 
For most Americans, the China of 1988 hides behind two veils—the Tiananmen 
Square massacre and the end of the Cold War—that obscure our view of impor-
tant historical trends� Many of the key trends the world confronts today grew 
from seeds that already were germinating, in very recognizable ways, in 1988� 
A closer examination of 1988 suggests, for example, that the campaign begun in 
2014 to build artificial islands in the Spratly Islands had unprecedented scope 
but emerged from actions driven by the “maritime mentality” and specific naval 
actions of 1988�3 Revisiting Heshang reveals how PLA leaders in the Xi Jinping 
era have echoed the language of 1988’s prodemocracy activists� The PLAN com-
mander in 2014 wrote that China had suffered in the past because it “clung to the 
traditional thinking of valuing the land and neglecting the sea,” while the 2015 
defense white paper called for China to abandon the “traditional mentality that 
land outweighs sea�”4
The next section of this article briefly will review key concepts in the literature 
on maritime identity and sea power, and will suggest taking a nuanced view of 
China’s evolution from a continental power to a more maritime power� Following 
this theory section, the two subsequent sections will explore the cultural dimen-
sions and historical context in which Heshang emerged and the strategic context 
of the 1988 naval campaign� The final portions of the article will examine the 
interaction of these cultural and naval events, and how such a consideration en-
riches our understanding of China’s maritime identity� The article will conclude 
by arguing that the events of 1988 offer clear evidence that China’s commitment 
to sea power has been well under way for more than three decades, and has built 
on a surprisingly diverse basis of support over that period�
CONCEPTS OF MARITIME IDENTITY AND  
THE PURSUIT OF SEA POWER
The approach of examining 1988 through both cultural and strategic lenses rests 
on a strong foundation in the literature on the nature of sea power� Theorists of 
sea power broadly agree that a nation’s geographic, political, economic, and cul-
tural contexts shape its relationship with the sea and sea power� As Geoffrey Till 
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writes, “seapower is the product of an amalgam of interconnected constituents 
that are difficult to tease apart�”5 However, some theorists have emphasized the 
nation’s innate characteristics and values that lead to its acquisition and mainte-
nance of sea power, while others have put more weight on the conscious policy 
decisions of governments to promote and develop sea power�
The argument that sea power emerges directly from national character has 
been compelling to writers from Thucydides to Mahan and has been well argued 
more recently by Peter Padfield and Andrew Lambert� In a series of books, Pad-
field contends that there is a close link between the ability of peoples “ascendant 
at sea” to prevail over those “with a territorial power base,” on the one hand, 
and the “system of beliefs and of government associated with supreme maritime 
power,” on the other� In such a system, merchant wealth leads to “merchant val-
ues” and political structures with “dispersed power and open, consultative rule�” 
In this sense, the impressive voyages of Ming China in the fifteenth century did 
not represent true maritime power, because they were not profit-driven enter-
prises but instead merely prestige projects “financed by the imperial treasury�” 
Padfield also underscores the links between the progressive or disruptive culture 
of new media and maritime power�6 Padfield focuses on the innovative media of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the novel and the daily newspaper) 
that promoted the values of the merchant class, producing contrasting bases 
for maritime power in France, England, and the Netherlands�7 In 1980s China, 
television was a similarly new medium that was adapted readily for disruptive 
cultural arguments�
More recently, Lambert’s 2018 book argues that there are no pure “seapowers” 
in the world today, and history has seen only a small number of true sea powers� 
Lambert’s study of how a nation creates a “seapower identity” makes plain that 
sea power is a function of cultural factors far more than political, economic, or 
military ones� In this very broad cultural argument, Lambert states emphatically 
that the real “soul of seapower” must be sought in the culture of a state, and he 
chooses to invoke art historians and critics, such as Jacob Burckhardt and John 
Ruskin, as being more relevant to the matter than Mahan’s elements of sea power, 
which, Lambert argues, address “only the strategic surface�”8
Jakub Grygiel also considers many centuries of the history of sea power, but in 
studying ancient China he finds conclusions different from those of Lambert and 
Padfield� Grygiel’s analysis of the Ming dynasty leads him to argue that the Ming 
retreat from the sea after the voyages of Zheng He “was not a product of deeply 
embedded cultural values peculiar and eternal to China� Rather it was a histori-
cally specific policy that proved to be a costly mistake�”9 In considering modern 
Chinese grand strategy and the country’s ambitions as a rising power, Chinese 
and foreign scholars have investigated the influence of Mahanian maritime 
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thinking in China and debated whether a continental orientation—sometimes 
associated with the geopolitical theory of Halford Mackinder—holds more 
explanatory power�10 James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara find clear evidence of 
Mahanian tendencies in Chinese leaders since Deng and even some appreciation 
for naval power in Mao Zedong� But Holmes and Yoshihara also argue that “sea 
power is a conscious political choice,” and they dedicate a chapter of Red Star over 
the Pacific to China’s “strategic will to the sea�”11 Several recent Chinese authors, 
some of them PLAN officers, have pointed to a lack of 海洋意识 (maritime con-
sciousness) or insufficient 海权意识 (awareness of sea power) for China’s past 
defeats, such as in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95�12
These theorists offer useful frameworks for thinking about the connection be-
tween Chinese culture and sea power in 1988, but simplistic cultural arguments 
fall short where they underappreciate the dynamism of China’s national character 
in the 1980s and how much China’s leaders and people willed the nation toward 
a more maritime future� Lambert may set too high a bar for qualification as a sea 
power, but his articulation of the ideal serves as a useful reminder that most states 
exist somewhere on a spectrum between continental and maritime power� Bruce 
Swanson wrote in the early 1980s that “Chinese naval history over the past mil-
lennium has been characterized between two great cultural entities: continental, 
Confucianist China and maritime China�”13 Indeed, as we will see below, this 
dichotomy is a central theme of Heshang�
However, Lambert is far too dismissive in his assessment that China never will 
be a true sea power, that its “attitudes towards the sea remain profoundly nega-
tive,” and that its construction of artificial islands reflects a “Great Wall” mental-
ity that is “the antithesis of seapower identity�”14 Although China was not about 
to become another Venice in 1988, key cultural and naval moments of mid-1988 
challenge Lambert’s argument� Heshang shows clearly that the prodemocracy ac-
tivists of 1988 shared Padfield’s vision of a close link between democracy and the 
sea: that Chinese maritime power indeed was “driven by merchant mariners for 
profit” and not driven by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or “by the court 
for prestige, luxury, and sheer curiosity�”15 Holmes and Yoshihara are right to note 
Mahanian tendencies among China’s leaders, although the 1988 case suggests 
that this has more to do with Mahan’s advocacy for the conscious buildup of naval 
power than his emphasis on the economic basis of sea power�
The concept of strategic culture knits together the role of national culture 
and the specific choices a nation makes in pursuit of a strategic goal such as the 
development of sea power� There are various definitions for strategic culture and 
a healthy debate over the explanatory power of the concept, but thinking about 
the Chinese strategic culture of 1988—as a “system of symbols” or “modes of 
thought and action” derived from the “national historical experience”—enriches 
70
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 R H O D E S  6 5
our understanding of China’s choices and behavior in 1988 and the decades that 
followed�16 Of particular note for thinking about 1988, Alastair Iain Johnston de-
scribes the value of “cultural artifacts” such as those from the fields of cinema and 
literature as lenses for examining the roots of strategic behavior and decisions�17 
Heshang is just such a cultural artifact; it creates new ways of understanding 1988 
as an essential moment in China’s long-term development of a maritime identity 
and its pursuit of sea power�
THE DECADE LEADING TO HESHANG
As a cultural artifact, an explicitly prodemocracy documentary on a Chinese 
state–run television network did not occur in a vacuum; it was the result of a 
decade of increasing openness in Chinese cultural and political discourse� This 
spirit had precedent in Chinese history, and many of the intellectuals calling for 
continued reform in 1988 explicitly invoked earlier moments of openness and 
forward thinking, such as the Self-Strengthening Movement of the late Qing 
dynasty� This movement sought to capture foreign knowledge and technology, 
and leading Qing officials, such as Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, sought to 
break Western domination of China’s maritime economy by importing Western 
maritime know-how and establishing a Chinese shipping industry�18 Reformers 
in the 1980s also harked back to the 1919 May Fourth Movement, which not 
only launched the modern era of Chinese politics but opened a period “marked 
by cosmopolitanism and a desperate thirst for things new and foreign�” The 
1980s saw a similar cosmopolitan thirst� Despite several periods of “conservative 
backlash”—in 1981, 1983, and 1987—that thirst grew more powerful each time�19
Writing just prior to Tiananmen, Ralph Crozier described the dominant 
cultural theme of China from 1985 to 1988 as “going to the world,” as Chinese 
artists adapted Western artistic forms and sought to create a new Chinese mod-
ernism, rather than just recycling traditional Chinese art�20 The national leader-
ship echoed this external focus in its designation of 1988 as an “International 
Year of Tourism�”21 The 1987 film 红高粱 (Hong Gaoliang, or Red Sorghum), 
which features themes of rejecting the backward and feudal countryside, enjoyed 
domestic success and became the first Chinese film to win major international 
prizes�22 The hands-off approach of the CCP leadership in declining to pass 
judgment on the artistic merits of this film that became a cultural sensation was 
notable� More shocking was the late-1988 opening of a controversial but success-
ful exhibit of nude paintings at Beijing’s National Gallery of Art�23 Not only was 
this the first mainstream exhibit of nudes in the history of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), but the paintings were created by teachers at the Central Acad-
emy of Fine Arts rather than being imported from abroad� A final cross-cultural 
example from 1988, with a tie to the depiction of navies in popular culture, was 
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the staging at Beijing’s Capital Theater of an all-Chinese production of The Caine 
Mutiny, directed by Charlton Heston�24 The popularity of this World War II naval 
story in 1988—some three decades after its mainstream success in America as a 
novel, film, and play—no doubt raised interesting questions about wartime duty, 
the abstract ideals of the naval profession, and the potentially seditious notion of 
ousting an unfit leader�25
The cultural movement of the 1980s extended beyond the world of intellectu-
als and art connoisseurs� Western books of all types became widely available in 
China, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) opened its first restaurant in China at the 
end of 1987, and televisions and television stations proliferated rapidly across 
the country�26 The spread of television, in particular, was essential to allowing 
Heshang to reach a massively larger audience than any of the other 1988 high-
culture events in Beijing�
Against this background, Heshang appeared, to great acclaim and popularity, 
in June 1988� A group of young Chinese filmmakers had begun work on the series 
early that year, even as a thirty-part, apolitical documentary called Yellow River, 
on which several of them had worked, was airing�27 Concentrating so heavily 
on that river in this initial project inspired writers such as Su Xiaokang to use 
the river as a symbol in exploring provocative cultural and political messages�28 
Heshang developed into a documentary of six parts, each organized around a dif-
ferent theme� As a work of art, Heshang is subject to multiple interpretations that 
may or may not match the creators’ intent at the time, a factor intensified by the 
collaborative nature of the project� Richard Bodman, who translated Heshang and 
wrote the introduction to a guide to the series, emphasizes that the organization 
into thematic episodes and the reliance on symbolic images make any simple 
summary “interpretive,” representing “only one possible reading�”29 Nevertheless, 
there are general themes running through Heshang that speak to the debate over 
China’s relationship to the sea�
The first five parts cover various aspects of Chinese history and culture, 
highlighting the failures of many generations of Chinese leaders to keep pace 
with a world that was leaving the nation behind� These episodes question and 
attack China’s traditional identity while articulating a different patriotic, and oc-
casionally nationalistic, mood to call for a different future for China�30 Of note, 
part 2, “Destiny,” invokes the Great Wall as evidence of backward thinking and 
dismisses the fifteenth-century voyages of Zheng He as a brief vanity project that 
failed to take advantage of a historic opportunity to join the age of exploration� 
The writers of episode 2 argue that Chinese traditional culture continued to cause 
China to miss out on the opportunities created by the sea long after Zheng He, 
and that China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War had been centuries in the mak-
ing� Also notable to this discussion is part 4, “The New Era,” which contrasts the 
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failed policies of the Maoist era with the rapid but disruptive success of reforms 
under Deng Xiaoping, with a particular emphasis on the economic policies of 
Zhao Ziyang, the CCP leader in 1988 who carried forward Deng’s reforms with a 
particular focus on developing China’s coastal regions�
However, it is Heshang’s sixth episode, “Blueness,” that makes the boldest 
political statements and is the most explicitly maritime in both substance and 
symbolism� Part 6, written by Xie Xuanjun and Yuan Zhiming, opens with a 
view of Earth from space, calling Earth a blue planet, one dominated by blue seas 
from which all life emerged� A quick summary of human history then invokes 
the linked emergence of democracy and sea power in Athens; highlights the con-
nections between a maritime economy and the rise of industrial capitalism; and 
concludes that ships have carried trade, colonization, science, and democracy, 
such that “‘blueness’ came to symbolize the destiny of the modern world�”31 After 
a review of China’s humiliation in the Opium Wars, the episode explicitly links 
cultural barriers and sea power with the story of Yan Fu, a Qing dynasty scholar 
sent to study at Britain’s Royal Naval College at Greenwich from 1877 to 1879� On 
his return to China, Yan became dean of the Tianjian Naval Academy, which had 
just been established by Li Hongzhang, and Yan participated in the short-lived 
Hundred Days of Reform that began 11 June 1898 (as it happened, Heshang first 
aired on the movement’s ninetieth anniversary, 11 June 1988)�32 According to 
episode 6 of Heshang, Confucian tradition prevented Yan Fu from bringing naval 
consciousness back to China, whereas Hirobumi Ito, a Japanese student in Eng-
land at the same time, became a leading reformer in Japan, drafted the country’s 
first constitution, and was prime minister during the 1894 Sino-Japanese War�
This vignette serves the arguments in episode 6 but represents a very loose in-
terpretation of the history� The Qing dynasty was less adept at naval moderniza-
tion than were the Japanese, but it did continue substantial investment in China’s 
naval forces—particularly the modern battleships of the Beiyang Fleet—in the 
years after Yan returned from England, and there is no evidence to support the 
assertion in Heshang that Yan and Ito were classmates at Greenwich�33 Heshang’s 
take on the history of Qing naval modernization is superficial and flawed, but 
the vignette highlights again that the filmmakers were drawing on a rich and 
continuous tradition among Chinese intellectuals since the nineteenth century 
who have called for China selectively to embrace foreign ideas and technology to 
make China powerful and prosperous�34
Episode 6 continues with a full-scale attack on Confucianism and land-based 
culture, arguing that, while a continental mentality may produce nuclear weap-
ons and a space program, only blueness can “infuse the whole nation with a 
strong, civilizing vitality�” The episode then praises the post-1978 reforms, par-
ticularly the role of intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and Zhao’s coastal strategy—a 
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direct parallel to Padfield’s arguments about the tight connections among na-
tional power, intellectual freedom, and a merchant-led maritime economy� This 
section of episode 6 includes the closest connection to the PLAN’s 1988 campaign 
in the Spratlys; it calls the April 1988 elevation of Hainan Island, in the South 
China Sea, to provincial status a “historical undertaking” and states that Hainan’s 
economic success would “necessarily give a new color to China’s culture�”35
Heshang proved wildly popular when it first aired in June 1988, and audience 
demand led to a second television airing in August� The script was printed in 
newspapers nationwide, including the CCP official newspaper People’s Daily, and 
a book edition went through five printings between June and September 1988�36 
The rapid spread of Heshang’s themes sparked debate among Chinese intellectu-
als—and controversy within the Chinese leadership� In late 1988, some scholars 
tried to take a moderate course, praising parts of Heshang while holding that 
some of its messages, such as those in part 6, were extreme and unnecessarily of-
fensive to conservative leaders�37 One of these leaders was party elder Wang Zhen, 
who was enraged by the documentary’s assault on traditional culture� General 
Secretary Zhao, on the other hand, endorsed Heshang’s proreform messages�38
These deep fissures in the party leadership soon would have cataclysmic re-
sults� Within months of Heshang’s broadcast, student-led prodemocracy protests 
broke out across China, leading to the ouster of Zhao and the bloody crackdown 
at Tiananmen Square� In the months following the suppression of the protests, 
the CCP launched a full-scale propaganda assault on Heshang, formally banning 
it for allegedly fomenting unrest and promoting “bourgeois liberalism” in the 
service of “international reactionary force�”39 Su Xiaokang became the target of a 
nationwide manhunt, and the creators of Heshang, many of whom were gradu-
ate students, joined other leaders of the democracy movement on the flight into 
Images captured from extracts of Heshang posted to YouTube.
Source: 河殇 [River Elegy], aired June 1988 on China Central Television, available at www.youtube.com/.
PHOTO 1
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exile� It is perhaps only appropriate that many dissidents, including Su, reportedly 
made their escape by sea, aboard smugglers’ speedboats to Hong Kong�40
THE DECADE LEADING TO JOHNSON REEF
In the months before Heshang’s first broadcast, Sino-Vietnamese tensions 
mounted in the South China Sea, leading to the naval battle at Johnson Reef 
on 14 March 1988 and the ensuing PLA occupation of features in the Spratly 
Islands� Just as Heshang marked a pivotal moment in the cultural discourse of the 
late 1980s, the Johnson Reef battle occurred within the broad context of China’s 
emergence as a maritime power� Geopolitical, commercial, and operational con-
cerns steadily increased Beijing’s focus on the South China Sea throughout the 
1980s�
Other scholars have covered amply the scope of China’s economic growth in 
the 1980s as the country participated more and more in the international trad-
ing system� It is important to remember, however, that energy dependence was 
not yet a primary concern for Beijing in the 1980s; the country remained a net 
exporter of oil throughout the decade� Even though China’s merchant marine had 
grown rapidly and already was a major part of the global shipping industry by 
1988, discussions of the economic importance of the sea did not yet emphasize 
commerce protection, defense of sea lines of communication, or the security of 
Chinese-flag ships�41
Beijing was, however, very concerned about ocean resources, including fish, 
offshore petroleum, and seabed minerals (and remains so today)�42 The Chinese 
fishing fleet had particular importance in this period for the development of 
nonnaval instruments of maritime power, particularly the growth of maritime-
law-enforcement and maritime-militia forces, which have become major players 
in twenty-first-century regional disputes� Maritime militias have played a role 
throughout the history of the PRC, helping to defend against coastal raids by the 
Kuomintang forces on Taiwan in the 1950s and participating in the 1974 battles 
in the Paracel Islands�43
The 1985 establishment of the Tanmen Militia, named for a fishing village 
near Qionghai, is directly relevant to understanding the South China Sea in the 
1980s� This militia’s founder played a central role in spreading word about the fish 
resources available in the Spratly Islands, and between 1985 and 1988 he orga-
nized investment in new boats and expeditions to the distant fishing grounds�44 
The efforts of the Tanmen Militia directly link China’s growing exploitation of 
resources in the South China Sea to Beijing’s efforts to assert control and juris-
diction in disputed areas and provide mutual support between the PLAN and 
paramilitary maritime forces� The ties between the PLAN and the Tanmen Mi-
litia deepened quickly, and militia forces played a direct role in the first Spratlys 
75
Naval War College: Spring 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 7 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
construction campaign, in 1988�45 The Tanmen Militia continues to be involved 
in high-profile clashes, such as the incident at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the 
Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff in 2014�46
Cold War geopolitics made the international environment of 1988 fundamen-
tally different from the current situation� During the 1980s, China and the United 
States were closely aligned against a common enemy, the Soviet Union, including 
in the form of U�S� arms sales to the PLA, signals-intelligence cooperation, and 
Chinese support to arm the Afghan mujahideen�47
Immediately relevant to the South China Sea was the other common enemy 
that China and the United States then shared: Vietnam�48 Although China’s 1979 
invasion of Vietnam was short, it was bloody, and the border conflict continued 
throughout the 1980s, with occasional major battles, particularly in the Laoshan 
sector from 1984 to 1987�49 One of the last phases—and the only primarily naval 
phase—of the long limited war between China and Vietnam took place in 1988�
MAP 1
The South China Sea, shown from the perspective of mainland China, in an oblique orthographic projection.
Source: Author.
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On the other hand, the logic of shared enemies steadily deepened ties be-
tween Hanoi and Moscow through the 1970s and 1980s, and the strength of this 
relationship was clearly evident at the closest major military base to the Spratly 
Islands: Cam Ranh Bay� The United States had expanded Cam Ranh greatly 
during its war in Indochina� Afterward, the Soviets continued the expansion for 
their own benefit; by the mid-1980s, Cam Ranh Bay hosted the largest number 
Soviet air and naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 1987. 
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of Soviet warships based outside the Soviet Union, while Soviet medium-range 
bombers with antiship missiles were based at the adjacent airfield�50 Sino-Soviet 
relations improved with the rise of Gorbachev in 1985, but the PLA did not shift 
its strategic focus formally away from its northern neighbor until 1993�51
The CCP leadership had paid attention, albeit with inconsistent focus, to the 
South China Sea since the founding of the People’s Republic� The PLA conquered 
Hainan in 1950, occupied part of the Paracel Islands in 1970, and seized the rest 
of the Paracels from a collapsing South Vietnam in 1974� Indeed, the architect of 
the reform era, Deng Xiaoping, personally oversaw the 1974 operation from the 
offices of the PLA General Staff�52 Given Deng’s personal experience and Zhao’s 
focus on the new Hainan Province as a flagship reform project, in the 1980s the 
South China Sea became an important issue for the most-senior leadership�53
The PLAN of 1988 was a pale shadow of the naval force into which it has 
evolved today, but important developmental trends were well under way in the 
1980s� Several excellent studies have discussed the role of Admiral Liu Huaqing 
in creating the modern PLAN in the late 1970s and the 1980s, most of them 
derived from Liu’s published memoirs�54 The force structure of the 1980s in-
creasingly centered on a core of China’s first generation of indigenously built 
warships, such as the Type 051 destroyers and Type 035 submarines� The 1980s 
also saw important progress in developing second-generation combatants, such 
as the Type 052 destroyers and improved Type 053 frigates, that would debut in 
the 1990s and set the stage for the PLAN’s modern, twenty-first-century fleet�55
But beyond Liu’s modernizing reforms and advocacy of aircraft carriers, it is 
important to recall that Liu was the standard-bearer for a different kind of navy 
for a different kind of China� When Liu became PLAN commander in 1982, 
China was only six years removed from the peak influence of the “Gang of Four,” 
whose members represented both a radical bloc that “opposed the development 
of an oceanic navy” and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution that had stagnated 
Chinese naval and commercial maritime development�56 Following the death of 
Mao and the rise of Deng, the path was clearer for Liu to call for changing the 
PLAN’s strategy from “near-seas defense” to “offshore defense,” with a long-term 
goal of developing a blue-water navy�57 Swanson wrote, in 1982, that the five years 
since the arrest of the Gang of Four had launched a “tremendous maritime rena-
scence” for China, although Bernard Cole argues that the period of ideological 
impediments to naval modernization only fully ended with the Gang of Four’s 
trial in 1981�58 The PLAN made important early steps toward its goal in the 1980s 
with the mastery of underway replenishment and the service’s first overseas 
goodwill cruise, in 1985, to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh�59
Seen within this context, the scope of the PLAN’s operations demonstrates 
that the Spratlys occupation was not a small, isolated skirmish but actually 
78
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 R H O D E S  7 3
constituted the PLAN’s first blue-water campaign� Beijing formally approved 
the establishment of a permanent Spratlys presence at the end of 1987, and 
construction began, with heavy militia support, at Fiery Cross Reef in February 
1988�60 A major focus of the PLAN’s campaign was logistics support to outpost 
construction, but the PLAN also sustained a large presence of combat forces 
during and after the 14 March clash at Johnson Reef, which left one Vietnamese 
vessel sunk, at least one more damaged, and a number of Vietnamese sailors 
dead� In mid-1988, the PLAN deployed some forty warships over five hundred 
nautical miles from the nearest friendly harbor�61 The ships came from all three 
PLAN fleets; the deliberate use of units from across the navy is notable as a par-
allel to the PLA’s rotation of ground forces to the Vietnam border throughout the 
1980s, to distribute combat experience across the force�62 By July, construction 
was complete at Fiery Cross Reef and five other previously unoccupied features� 
In interviews, Chen Weiwen, the PLAN commander in the Johnson Reef battle, 
described efforts to fortify the newly occupied features, particularly in light of 
the threat of Vietnamese air attack� Chen, who previously had participated in the 
1974 Paracels battle, was promoted to rear admiral in September 1988, went on 
to serve in a variety of senior PLAN positions, and attended the Central Party 
School�63
The 1988 campaign was, in many ways, the operational manifestation of the 
narrative of naval power that the PLAN and the CCP leadership were building� 
Not unlike the makers of Heshang, China’s navalists were advancing a controver-
sial argument about pulling China toward a bluer future� This meant advocating 
for a more capable navy, selling its importance to national development, and 
demonstrating its effectiveness in battle�64 On one level, such advocacy was typi-
cal parochial behavior by a military bureaucracy—the costs of naval development 
can be a hard sell in all political systems� John Garver concludes that “although 
the rationale for Chinese expansion in the South China Sea during the 1980s 
shifted from primarily geostrategic to primarily economic, the operations were 
intimately related throughout the 1970s and 1980s to PLAN efforts to modernize 
and to the domestic fights over budget to finance this�”65
China continued to commit to building naval power and militarizing its 
South China Sea outposts throughout the following year; even as CCP leaders 
debated how to respond to student protests in 1989, the PLAN worked to so-
lidify its presence� The PLA in 1989 enlarged the airfield at Woody Island in the 
Paracels and “a Spratly Front Line Headquarters was established to command a 
six-month campaign of intensified construction�”66 Given the growing focus on 
ocean resources and early indications of the importance of trade, the economic 
imperatives attached to naval power were starting to become clear to Chinese 
leaders in 1988�
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THE CULTURAL AND STRATEGIC IMPETUS BEHIND  
CHINA’S MARITIME IDENTITY
Although Lambert indulges in some uncompelling caricatures of China and 
the Chinese navy, his core thesis on the centrality of culture to sea-power iden-
tity nonetheless has great value for considering the evolution of the naval and 
maritime consciousness of China from the 1980s to the present� Like Heshang, 
more-recent cultural phenomena also have given a sense of the Chinese popular 
conception of the country’s relationship to the global maritime economy and 
the PLAN’s role in the international system� The recent action blockbusters Wolf 
Warrior 2 and Operation Red Sea have nothing in common with Heshang in terms 
of tone or style, but they do share a vision of a proud, international China that 
fully participates in (and defends) the blue economy�67 They also share a perhaps 
unexpected level of popularity; Heshang and Red Sorghum became national and 
international sensations in 1988, while the 2017 and 2018 action films are two 
of the three highest-grossing Chinese films of all time and garnered tremendous 
attention abroad for the popularity of their jingoistic messages�68 A more direct 
comparison might be between Heshang and the 2006 twelve-part China Central 
Television documentary 大国崛起 (Daguo Jueqi, or The Rise of the Great Pow-
ers), which aired twice and was a “ratings miracle�” Andrew Erickson and Lyle 
Goldstein describe how Daguo Jueqi summarizes the conclusions of China’s top 
scholars who study the path to greatness of both land powers and sea powers�69 
Daguo Jueqi, like Heshang, concludes that maritime power and international mar-
kets are key to China’s future; however, unlike Heshang, Daguo Jueqi was squarely 
consistent with the party line of 2006�
Foreign analysts tend to fixate on the tactical events of the 14 March 1988 
clash at Johnson Reef and play down the larger importance of the 1988 PLAN 
campaign� At the national level, neither validating military strategy nor test-
driving Liu’s modernizing PLAN appears to have been a motivation for the 
1988 campaign, but there is a compelling argument that the clash with Vietnam 
and successful militarization of the Spratlys served as what Rebecca Lissner 
calls a “strategic crucible” that gave Beijing real-world combat experience that 
confirmed its ability to pursue a more maritime approach to grand strategy�70 
Lissner’s work discusses China in regard to the initial 1979 invasion only briefly, 
but the addition of the 1988 naval case study would support her conclusion that 
conflict with Hanoi validated the PLAN modernization program, PLA theories 
of limited conflict, and Beijing’s overall approach to expanding control steadily 
over the South China Sea� These events undoubtedly are salient in the living and 
institutional memory of the officers running the PLAN today�71 The flagship of 
the PLAN task force at Johnson Reef (the frigate Yingtan, No� 531) has been on 
display at the Qingdao Naval Museum for decades� In early 2020, a new memorial 
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hall to Chen Weiwen and the March 1988 battle was set to open in Chen’s home-
town in Guangdong Province, on the thirty-second anniversary of the battle (the 
COVID-19 pandemic delayed the event)�72
Is all this simply a matter of historical coincidence, or does a cultural artifact 
such as Heshang truly help explain the rise of Chinese sea power? Given that the 
Spratly Islands campaign was well under way when Heshang aired, would China’s 
quest to become a maritime great power have been inhibited had this documen-
tary never appeared on television? Heshang mentions naval power at several 
points but never specifically invokes the PLAN, which is somewhat surprising 
in the context of events in the South China Sea that were reported publicly at 
the time� This omission could suggest that the creators of Heshang were far more 
interested in political and cultural reform than the nature of maritime power 
within the international system� Nevertheless, Heshang’s praise for the entre-
preneurial class and the maritime economy is consistent with the “constituents 
of seapower” that build public and elite support for naval power�73 This theme 
in Heshang helps explain why the massacre of June 1989 had little effect on the 
PLAN� The PLAN played no role in suppressing student demonstrations, but it 
also suffered no political backlash for its embrace of what many in China might 
see as Western, imperialist ideas of what a navy ought to be� In a different politi-
cal era, the post-Tiananmen backlash could have sought to reel back the PLAN’s 
move toward “blueness�”
In both the political and maritime arenas, China in 1988 was destined for 
violence� The naval development under way in 1988 proved itself in combat and 
carried forward into decades of pro-PLAN policies, while the CCP crushed the 
cultural and political openness of that decade at Tiananmen Square�
That the PLAN successfully continued to promote a blue-water identity after 
1988–89 owes much to the leadership of Liu Huaqing in the 1980s and modern-
izers such as Zhang Wannian in the 1990s� But it also suggests that the creators 
of Heshang were onto something� By 1988, parts of the CCP leadership, the 
PLAN, leading commercial interests, and prodemocracy intellectuals all be-
lieved that China’s future was “blue�” This conviction is undoubtedly far greater 
now within the PLAN than it was in 1988� On this narrow but profound point, 
both the PLAN and Heshang were “selling the sea” at the same time� The 1989 
crackdown and the entrenched authoritarianism that has reached new heights 
under Xi Jinping have sought to exorcise notions of democracy and openness 
from China’s maritime identity, but otherwise China has embraced the “blue-
ness” called for in part 6 of Heshang� The experience of 1988 makes evident that 
China’s pursuit of sea power and a maritime future was well under way three 
decades ago� Heshang proved tragically wrong in terms of the prospects for 
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THE MIDDLE KINGDOM RETURNS TO THE SEA, 
WHILE AMERICA TURNS ITS BACK
How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime Industry, and 
the Implications for the World
Christopher J. McMahon
The condition of the American Merchant Marine is such as to call for 
immediate remedial action by the Congress. It is discreditable to us as a 
Nation that our merchant marine should be utterly insignificant in com-
parison to that of other nations we overtop in other forms of business. 
We should no longer submit to conditions under which only a trifling 
portion of our great commerce is carried in our own ships. To remedy 
this state of things would not merely serve to build up our shipping in-
terests, but it would also result in benefit to all who are interested in the 
permanent establishment of a wide market for American products, and 
would provide an auxiliary force for the Navy.
PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT,  
ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, 1901
Command of the marine transportation system has long acted as the 
stage on which great powers compete. . . . The infrastructure facilitating 
the transport of maritime commerce—ocean-going vessels, deep-water 
ports, high-speed railways, and fiber optic cables—descend from tech-
nologies Western powers once leveraged in the 19th and 20th centuries 
to expand their access to foreign markets. Today, the MSR [China’s 
Maritime Silk Road] mimics these strategies, for example, by building 
railways in Africa or laying transoceanic data cables. In some locations, 
new MSR projects are literally replacing colonial projects. The MSR is 
a strategic economic policy, intended to promote the Chinese workforce, 
build bilateral ties, foster dependence, and ensure near-exclusive access 
to foreign ports for Chinese controlled or affiliated vessels. . . . Through 
MSR projects, China can advance both economic and non-economic 
objectives simultaneously.
REPRESENTATIVE SEAN PATRICK MALONEY (D-NY), CHAIR,  
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND  
MARINE TRANSPORTATION, 17 OCTOBER 2019
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 Since the founding of the United States during the Revolutionary War, nearly every president has recognized and called for congressional support of a strong 
U�S� maritime industry�1 As the United States supposedly is a maritime nation 
with a massive international trading economy, it seems obvious that control of, 
or at least strong influence over, America’s seagoing supply chains is important�2 
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the U�S� Merchant Marine was 
one of the largest and most efficient of its kind in the world—partly because of 
public and political support�3 In those decades U�S�-flag clipper ships dominated 
many trades, including—ironically—the China trade� But the second half of that 
century saw the industry go into steep decline—in some measure because politi-
cal support had evaporated� For economic and strategic reasons during the first 
half of the twentieth century—specifically, immediately prior to World Wars I 
and II—Congress intervened, taking critical steps to support the industry� But 
today that past support of the industry has disappeared once again, and the U�S� 
maritime industry engaged in international trade is in a perilous state of affairs� 
This has occurred as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become, by far, the 
leading commercial maritime power in the world�
The lack of a vibrant U�S� maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade places 
the strategic and economic interests of the United States and its allies in grave 
jeopardy� This is particularly so given that the PRC now dominates most sectors 
of the world’s maritime industry, and consolidation in all sectors is occurring at a 
rapid rate that benefits the PRC� The influence and the effectiveness of the PRC’s 
political and governmental intervention and funding in all sectors of China’s 
maritime industry are causing numerous other companies in the global industry 
simply to cease operations or suffer absorption by Chinese companies� There is 
a strong prospect that within little more than a decade, or even sooner, China 
virtually will control the world’s seagoing supply chain� The consequences of this 
happening for the United States and the world as a whole are staggering� As a na-
tion dependent on maritime transportation for its economy and for the movement 
of its military forces, the United States must take decisive and immediate steps to 
promote the reestablishment of U�S�-flag shipping and further enable all sectors of 
the U�S� maritime industry to compete in a significant way in the global industry�
ONCE UPON A TIME
It was the winter of 1979–80� A buzz was going around the offices of the New 
Orleans–based Lykes Brothers Steamship Company (also known as Lykes Lines) 
and through its fleet of forty-five vessels� Word had it that SS Letitia Lykes was 
loading full and down on the West Coast of the United States with eighteen thou-
sand tons of cargo bound for Shanghai, China� Letitia would be the first U�S�-flag 
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ship to call on a mainland Chinese port since World War II� This event was the 
result of the ongoing rapprochement between the PRC and the United States that 
followed President Richard M� Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972 and follow-
on efforts by Presidents Gerald R� Ford and Jimmy Carter� The opening of this 
new market indeed was cause for celebration�4
At the time, Lykes was one of dozens of U�S�-flag ocean-shipping companies� 
With its forty-five vessels, Lykes was one of the larger U�S� companies, but not the 
largest; that honor fell to SeaLand Services Corporation, which in 1979 was by 
far the largest container-shipping company in the world� But in 1980, even with 
more than 860 merchant ships, the U�S�-flag industry operated only about 3�8 
percent of the world’s merchant vessels, which then totaled about 22,872 ships�5 
That percentage was down from a 1946 high, when the United States operated 
some 70 percent of the world’s commercial shipping�6 By 1960, this number had 
fallen to 16�9 percent of the world’s fleet� Even so, in 1980 U�S�-flag shipping still 
was significant� Plus, the U�S� maritime industry had made massive technological 
innovations that revolutionized the industry, such as the introduction of con-
tainer shipping and lighter-aboard-ship (or LASH) vessels�
SS Letitia Lykes, like all Lykes ships, had been built in a U�S� shipyard, sup-
ported by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) through the Construction 
Differential Subsidy (CDS) program� U�S�-flag shipping companies were owned 
and operated by American citizens without any foreign corporate interests in-
volved� Profits stayed in the United States� U�S� shipping companies, particularly 
SeaLand Services, owned or leased and operated dozens of container terminals 
in U�S� ports and in ports throughout the world� While the United States at the 
time was in the process of implementing a treaty to turn over operation of the 
Panama Canal to Panama, the United States still exercised significant influence 
in the canal’s affairs�7
Although in these years the United States did not possess the largest merchant 
marine in the world, the size and influence of its industry still were considerable 
in global maritime affairs, and with its large navy the United States rightfully 
could be called a maritime nation, according to the criteria of naval historian 
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, as laid out in his influential book The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660‒1783� Mahan believed that history 
demonstrated that a truly maritime nation required a sizable merchant marine 
in addition to a powerful navy�8
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.-FLAG  
SHIPPING INDUSTRY
In the decades leading to World War I, American agricultural and industrial 
exports increased dramatically and America became the leading economic 
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superpower, even as the U�S� Merchant Marine continued to decline� Americans 
and American-owned businesses were confident that inexpensive foreign-flag 
shipping would remain bountiful and readily available as needed to provide the 
seagoing logistics the nation required� This proved to be a false assumption� With 
the outbreak of war in 1914, the American economy, dependent on international 
trade, suffered from a lack of availability of commercial ships� The European na-
tions that had provided the commercial sealift for the American economy with-
drew their vessels for political reasons and for wartime purposes� This caused 
widespread disruption in trade; manufactured products piled up on American 
docks, in railcars, and in warehouses, and agricultural goods spoiled because 
they could not be brought to overseas markets� The American economy suffered 
greatly because of the lack of available commercial shipping�9
The extent of the damage to the American economy caused by the shortage of 
U�S�-flag shipping in 1914 was so serious that Congress finally decided to act, but 
this took time, and the insufficiency of commercial shipping continued to im-
peril the economy� Following numerous and lengthy hearings, Congress passed 
the Shipping Act of 1916, which created the United States Shipping Board� The 
board was designed specifically to promote and assist the U�S� Merchant Marine� 
By the time the board was fully established, however, it was apparent the United 
States would enter the war soon� This placed the board on a wartime footing� In 
October 1917, the board requisitioned the entire U�S� Merchant Marine�10
In 1917, the Shipping Board initiated a huge shipbuilding program through 
the creation of the Emergency Fleet Corporation� Eventually, the board con-
tracted for more than 1,700 merchant vessels� Despite this unprecedented effort, 
only 107 ships were delivered before the armistice was signed in November 
1918� However, the remaining vessels were completed by 1922, and it was hoped 
that U�S�-flag companies would purchase them, and some did� Following World 
War I, the United States ranked number one in the world, at least in numbers of 
potentially available merchant ships� But the country never followed through on 
this advantage�11 By the 1930s, the U�S� Merchant Marine again was in a perilous 
condition owing to political neglect� And ominously, the challenges of World War 
II were on the horizon�
Other legislation that attempted to support U�S�-flag shipping included the 
so-called Jones Act� The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Pub� L� No� 66-261) was 
sponsored by Senator Wesley L� Jones from Washington State� A major purpose 
of the act was to support the rights of American seafarers by solidifying laws 
passed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries� For example, the 
act gave seafarers the right to sue their employer for workplace (shipboard) in-
juries� A second provision of the act would establish procedures for transferring 
the U�S� government‒owned merchant vessels built in response to World War I to 
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private ownership� The lessons learned from World War I included recognition 
that the U�S� Merchant Marine was critical to national security� The preamble to 
the Jones Act included the following summary: “It is hereby declared the policy 
of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage 
the maintenance of a merchant marine � � � sufficient to carry the greater portion 
of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or na-
tional emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated by citizens of the United 
States�”12
As one way to support and maintain the U�S� Merchant Marine, the Jones Act 
also renewed cabotage legislation that Congress had established and maintained 
during the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth� The policy 
required trade between U�S� ports to be restricted to U�S�-built, U�S�-owned, U�S�-
flag, and U�S�-crewed merchant ships� (The very first piece of legislation that 
Congress passed under the Constitution, in April 1789, established a tariff on im-
ported goods to protect U�S�-flag shipping� This was followed by the Navigation 
Act of 1817, which expressly excluded foreign-flag vessels from trading between 
U�S� ports�)13 Cabotage legislation, including the Jones Act, always has ensured 
that there are U�S�-flag vessels to serve coastal, inland, and island trades, and it 
has continued to provide jobs for mariners, who then have been available to serve 
on strategic sealift vessels in times of national emergency� But this legislation was 
suspended prior to World War I because of the lack of U�S�-flag ships�
The key legislation that clearly defined support for the U�S� Merchant Marine 
in the twentieth century was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936� From the time the 
law was enacted through the next forty-five years, the U�S� Merchant Marine en-
joyed generally strong support from Congress and presidential administrations� 
The act established the U�S� Maritime Commission (later renamed the Maritime 
Administration)� It established the CDS program, which provided funds to sup-
port the construction of ships in U�S� shipyards� The act also established operat-
ing differential subsidies (ODSs), which provided funds to enable and encourage 
shipping companies to operate their ships under the U�S� flag� Finally, the act es-
tablished the U�S� Merchant Marine Academy, an institution dedicated to educat-
ing and training merchant marine officers� It is not an exaggeration to state that 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 played a pivotal role in preparing the United 
States for World War II and, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the quick con-
struction of the largest and most capable merchant marine the world had ever 
seen, despite huge losses of ships and mariners during the early years of the war�14
In an effort to support U�S�-flag shipping further, Congress passed two com-
panion bills in 1954, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
(Pub� L� No� 83-480) and the Cargo Preference Act (Pub� L� No� 83-664), which re-
quired a percentage of government-impelled cargo, such as food aid, to be carried 
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on U�S�-flag ships�15 These requirements, overseen by MARAD, have guaranteed 
cargoes for U�S�-flag ships and provided financial support for the industry�
With the support of Republican president Nixon, a Democratic Congress 
passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1970� This legislation increased the subsidies 
provided by MARAD’s CDS program, which substantially increased the con-
struction rate of new merchant ships in U�S� shipyards, yielding dozens of ships� 
As a result, relatively large numbers of new and technically innovative ships 
joined the U�S�-flag fleet in the 1970s, and the shipbuilding industry in these 
years was particularly healthy, as was the U�S� maritime industry in general�16 
Many of these same shipyards built warships for the Navy, and the large numbers 
of both commercial and Navy contracts enabled economies of scale that allowed 
shipyards to build vessels at lower per-ship costs�17
THE GLOBAL MARITIME WORLD CHANGES—THE U.S. MARITIME 
INDUSTRY TODAY
When SS Letitia Lykes departed Shanghai on the transit back to the United States 
from its historic voyage in the spring of 1980, its cargo holds were nearly empty� 
In those years, the Chinese had little to sell to a U�S� market� With only twenty-
six PRC-flag vessels in international trade, the Chinese shipping industry was 
equally insignificant�18 While Chinese shipyards built some small coastal trading 
vessels and fishing boats, they produced no large vessels� There were few or no 
Chinese companies operating in other countries, and certainly no Chinese com-
panies operating ports and terminals outside China�
What a difference forty years makes! The U�S� maritime industry has retreated 
on all fronts, whereas the Chinese industry has exploded in size to become, by 
far, the largest in the world, in nearly every category� This has been the result of 
public, corporate, and political apathy in the United States and quite the opposite 
in China; in the latter, government and industry have partnered for decades to 
implement strategic plans to grow all sectors of the industry� In the United States, 
it also is the result of a public and political lack of understanding of the role the 
maritime industry plays in the strategic and economic health of the nation� The 
U�S� maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade had been in decline since 
World War II; however, those American companies still operating ships in inter-
national trade into the 1980s entered a steep decline at that time, eventually going 
bankrupt and ceasing operations�
When the Reagan administration came into office in 1981 it almost imme-
diately eliminated the CDS shipbuilding program provided by the Merchant 
Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970� Over the next several years, this action, in turn, 
forced the closure of numerous commercial shipbuilding companies across 
America� In 1975, U�S� shipyards produced seventy deep-sea commercial ships�19 
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The Reagan administration’s abolition of the CDS program crippled the industry� 
Today no subsidies are provided to build vessels in U�S� shipyards� As a result, 
only a few shipyards remain in the United States that are capable of building 
deep-sea commercial ships, and the future financial health of these remaining 
yards is in question� The only commercial ships built after 1980 have been for 
Jones Act trades, which require ships built in U�S� shipyards�
In 2016, the number of commercial ships constructed in U�S� yards averaged 
only five vessels per year during the previous five years, in a context of a world-
wide production average of 1,408 vessels per year�20 Ironically, whereas to some 
the elimination of shipbuilding subsidies had the apparent effect of reducing 
costs to the taxpayer, the actual impact may be the opposite� Navy vessels and 
Jones Act vessels were and still are required to be built in U�S� shipyards, but 
with fewer shipyards building fewer vessels, economies of scale could not be 
realized, so the unit cost of each ship became far greater�21 Between 1987 and 
1992, an average of fewer than two commercial seagoing vessels were built per 
year; as noted, between 2010 and 2016, the average was five�22 Equally serious 
has been the loss of shipbuilding infrastructure and shipbuilding jobs, with a 
concurrent loss of shipbuilding skills and expertise� These are capabilities that 
cannot be turned on with the flick of a switch�
Since 1980, the size of the U�S�-flag fleet in international trade likewise has 
declined dramatically� In the early years of the Reagan administration, actions 
were taken to eliminate the ODS that enabled many companies to conduct opera-
tions under the U�S� flag�23 These subsidies were provided by contract, so these 
payments had to be phased out over time as contracts expired� As ODS con-
tracts were not renewed, the majority of U�S�-flag companies ceased operations 
or simply went bankrupt� This created a crisis for the military, which requires 
a capable U�S� Merchant Marine to carry equipment and supplies in the event 
of a national emergency� To remedy this situation, the Department of Defense 
spent billions of dollars to purchase and convert dozens of older, foreign-owned, 
-built, and -operated vessels, which were placed in a Ready Reserve Force (RRF) 
maintained and operated by MARAD (since 1981 part of the U�S� Department 
of Transportation)�24 In addition—and with the urging of the Defense Depart-
ment—Congress in 1996 established the Maritime Security Program (MSP), 
which MARAD manages� MSP essentially provides a subsidy for sixty U�S�-flag 
ships—notably similar to the original ODS program created by the Merchant Ma-
rine Act of 1936�25 Currently, the MSP program is funded at five million dollars 
per ship, per year�26 Considering the high cost of establishing and maintaining 
the RRF in combination with the MSP program, it is questionable whether the 
taxpayers benefited at all from the elimination of the ODS program; the reverse 
probably is true� In any case, the results have included the loss of nearly all U�S� 
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shipping companies, a great reduction in the number of U�S�-flag vessels, and the 
loss of thousands of skilled mariner jobs�
The MSP law requires that U�S�-flag vessels be owned and operated by a U�S� 
company under the management of U�S� citizens, and the sixty MSP ships indeed 
are “owned and operated” by U�S� companies registered in the United States� 
However, nearly every one of these sixty ships is owned by a U�S� company that is 
merely a subsidiary of a foreign company—and the parent companies and their 
countries may have interests different from those of the United States� Accord-
ing to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
in 2018 there were 94,169 commercial deep-sea vessels in the world, of which 
50,732 were merchant ships�27 Today, including the sixty MSP vessels, there are 
only about eighty U�S�-flag vessels operating in international trade�28
As if political reversal of support for the U�S� Merchant Marine were not 
enough to decimate the U�S�-flag industry, attacks on the cabotage provisions of 
the Jones Act—periodically vigorous—have reached a new height in the last two 
years� Spearheaded by the Cato Institute and other special-interest groups, efforts 
have been made in the form of dozens of articles, conferences, and even recent 
proposed legislation on Capitol Hill to overturn the law�29 While presenting no 
substantive and verified cost data to show that the Jones Act causes significant 
financial burdens to U�S� consumers in states, commonwealths, and territories 
served by the act compared with using foreign-flag carriers, Jones Act detractors 
fail to understand the law’s strategic importance� First, elimination of the Jones 
Act poses the possibility of causing Jones Act companies to cease operating under 
the U�S� flag, thus further reducing the number of available U�S� merchant ships� 
(This would be particularly true if foreign-flag companies, subsidized by their 
governments, were allowed to enter Jones Act—that is, domestic American—
trades�) Second, with the loss of the jobs that Jones Act companies now provide, 
the pool of qualified U�S� merchant mariners virtually would disappear� This 
would make it impossible to crew the ships of the RRF and other strategic sealift 
vessels� This in turn would cripple military logistics, which is dependent on these 
ships in a national emergency� From a security standpoint, overturning the Jones 
Act has the potential to enable foreign companies (particularly those subsidized 
by their governments) effectively to assume control of inland transportation 
in the United States, with the result that thousands of foreign nationals would 
be operating vessels inside the United States—a potential security nightmare� 
Finally, under similar laws, U�S� airlines are afforded the same protections the 
U�S� maritime industry enjoys under the Jones Act� Some airline industry profes-
sionals believe that if the Jones Act were repealed these airline protections might 
be eliminated as well, possibly causing the demise of the U�S� domestic airline 
industry, similarly to what happened to the maritime industry�30
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Regarding port ownership and operation, whereas U�S� companies such as 
SeaLand Services once operated containership ports around the world, that 
company, like many U�S�-flag shipping companies, ceased to operate when it was 
purchased by a foreign-owned company� The ports and terminals once owned by 
SeaLand now are owned or operated by foreign port operators� The only U�S� port 
operator with terminal operations outside the United States is SSA Marine, which 
operates slightly more than a dozen terminals in ports around the world, in ad-
dition to its North American terminals� However, nearly half the interests in SSA 
are held by foreign nationals�31 In a reversal from the past, numerous foreign port 
operators and interests have purchased or leased control of many ports and ter-
minals in the United States, which has caused national-security concerns�32 The 
United States no longer is involved in crucial maritime infrastructure in other 
countries� For example, there is little or no U�S� involvement in the Panama Ca-
nal; a Chinese company operates ports and terminals on both ends of the canal�33
In short, if a maritime power is defined as a nation possessing a powerful 
navy, a sizable merchant marine, and capable maritime industries such as ship-
building—a definition propounded by Alfred Thayer Mahan—then the United 
States clearly is no longer a maritime power� Instead, the United States probably 
is described better as a maritime-dependent nation, and likely is defined even 
better as a maritime nation that soon will be dependent on the Chinese maritime 
industry�
THE MIDDLE KINGDOM—HISTORICALLY A MARITIME POWER?
Understandably, given its huge terrestrial presence in Eurasia, for much of its his-
tory China primarily has been viewed as a continental nation� However, China 
also has had a strong maritime connection and has a rich maritime past� Geog-
raphy encourages China to look toward the sea, particularly in the south, where 
mountains block easy access to the interior and there are thousands of populated 
islands off the coast� For centuries, southern seaboard provinces and islands have 
had large populations, but a dearth of available land has made it difficult to sup-
port those populations locally, making the sea critical for transportation, trade, 
fishing, and communication with other Chinese regions�34
Today, China’s land border is 13,743 miles long, and the country abuts four-
teen other nations� Through its thousands of years of history, China has pursued 
countless wars of both aggression and defense against its many neighbors� Most, 
but by no means all, of these wars have been fought primarily with land forces� 
But China also has more than nine thousand miles of saltwater coastline, thou-
sands of offshore islands, and several major rivers that connect to the sea, and 
the majority of the nation’s population always has resided in coastal regions� 
Therefore China, to varying degrees, always has kept an eye on its maritime 
95
Naval War College: Spring 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 9 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
interests� Chinese naval warfare began as early as the tenth century BCE and was 
common during the Warring States period (475‒221 BCE)� One story holds that 
in 471 BCE the great Chinese philosopher Confucius sought a leadership position 
with the Kingdom of Yue but was turned down because he lacked knowledge of 
naval operations�35
Throughout most of its very long history, China has been a major manufactur-
ing power, oftentimes the world leader� For thousands of years countries across 
the Eurasian landmass have sought Chinese goods� The long, overland passage 
called the Silk Road emerged as the major east–west trading route in the fourth 
century BCE�36 Over the centuries that followed, the Silk Road continued to be a 
major trading route between China and the Middle East, and even to Europe; 
Chinese goods found their way to the Roman Empire� Eventually, the Silk Road 
expanded to include seagoing routes across the Indian Ocean to Middle East-
ern and African ports� In his book China as a Sea Power 1127‒1368, author Lo 
Jung-pang notes that “China tried to become a seapower (in centuries past); in 
particular, during the Qin and Han dynasties and later during the Sui and Tang 
dynasties�” He further notes that during the three centuries from the Southern 
Song to the early Ming period (twelfth century CE to fourteenth century CE), the 
maritime and overseas activities of the Chinese were so great that China was 
more of a sea power than a land power� It was by using its naval and maritime 
power, across many centuries, that China went abroad to trade, and even to colo-
nize other Asian lands�37
Chinese maritime power in centuries past reached its height during the 
first Ming period (1405‒33), and especially during the reign of the third Ming 
emperor, Yongle (1402‒24)� He dispatched the renowned military commander 
Zheng He (1371‒1433), known as the “Ming admiral�” From 1405 to 1433, Zheng 
completed seven extraordinary voyages, during which he sailed with as many as 
250 ships and upward of thirty thousand men to destinations in southern Asia, 
the Middle East, and East Africa�38
The main purposes of these military-oriented voyages were to expand Chinese 
influence throughout the Indian Ocean area and the Middle East, seek tribute 
for the Chinese court from local rulers, expand Chinese cultural influence, and 
improve trade� According to Naval War College professor Andrew Wilson, a key 
difference between European and Chinese efforts to seek trade during the early 
European age of exploration is that the Ming voyages did not seek trade so much 
as “the gravitational pull of the Chinese market (from these voyages) brought 
trade to [China]”—a phenomenon seemingly similar to the dynamic favoring 
China in the twenty-first century�39
During the Ming period, China’s navy and merchant marine clearly were the 
largest and most powerful in the world, and their sphere of influence expanded 
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wherever Zheng’s fleet landed� At the time, Chinese maritime technology far 
surpassed that of the Europeans� For example, the Chinese invented the compass 
and the rudder, which were huge innovations that enabled mariners to navigate 
and control vessels better on long voyages� Zheng’s fleet included ships over four 
hundred feet in length� (By comparison, Columbus’s Santa María was somewhere 
between sixty-two and eighty-five feet in length�) It is reasonable to assume that, 
had the Chinese wished to pursue ocean exploration and trade into the Atlantic 
and the Mediterranean and to Europe and even the Americas in the decades after 
Zheng’s voyages, they likely would have become the dominant maritime power 
on earth, eclipsing European efforts�40
For a complicated set of reasons, however, the Chinese abandoned their efforts 
to pursue great voyages beyond local Chinese waters after the death of Emperor 
Yongle� Following Admiral Zheng’s seventh and final voyage, the new Ming em-
peror had the fleet destroyed, after which harsh punishments were decreed and 
imposed on those who even attempted to trade beyond Chinese waters�41 One law 
imposed the death penalty for building a ship with more than two masts, and a 
later law did the same for a ship with more than one mast�42 In essence, except for 
coastal trade and fishing, the Chinese, under the second Ming dynasty, largely 
abandoned the ocean�
This happened at the time when European countries were on the cusp of the 
age of exploration that was made possible by the development of new maritime 
technologies—many of which were based on lessons learned from Chinese 
nautical technological innovations such as the compass and the rudder� As the 
Europeans came to dominate global trade in the seventeenth through nineteenth 
centuries, the Chinese would pay dearly for their lack of maritime power� Their 
navy was largely ineffective and they no longer possessed a capable merchant 
marine by which to trade with other nations� For centuries this enabled the Eu-
ropeans increasingly to impose countless demands on the Chinese and control 
Chinese seagoing trade, eventually resulting in “the century of shame” (extending 
from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century)�43 This fact has 
not been lost on the leadership of the PRC in recent times, and it helps to explain 
why the Chinese have taken such great steps to become not only a global mari-
time power but the dominant maritime power in the world today�
European control of China’s seagoing trade continued into the twentieth cen-
tury, following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in the early 1900s�44 The world 
wars, Japanese occupation in the 1930s and ’40s, and the civil war between the 
Nationalists and Communists decimated the Chinese economy� Following World 
War II, virtually all Chinese seagoing trade, both foreign and domestic, was car-
ried in foreign-owned and -flagged ships� In 1950, the PRC merchant marine 
officially consisted of only seventy-seven ships, and the majority of these were 
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either unseaworthy or lying at the bottom of rivers and ports� Through the 1950s, 
China enjoyed a rather close relationship with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets 
encouraged Polish ships to carry Chinese seagoing trade; in fact, for many years 
the Polish merchant marine was China’s primary provider of ocean transporta-
tion� During these years, there actually were no Chinese-flag ships engaged in 
international trade� As far as PRC ports and shipyards went, the picture was 
equally dismal in the 1950s� There were no shipyards capable of building ocean-
going ships, and ports were hugely inefficient and few in number�45 The Chinese 
did not own, lease, or operate any port terminals outside the mainland�
Despite the poor condition of the Chinese maritime industry in the early years 
of the PRC, the Communist Party’s leadership fully grasped the importance of 
the industry and placed great emphasis on building a capable maritime industry 
in all sectors: ships, ports, shipyards, and mariners� It was clear to Mao Zedong’s 
government that China needed a domestic maritime industry, particularly in 
coastal and river trades to compensate for the poor quality of roads and rail-
roads�46 With Soviet maritime expertise and the use of Soviet-built equipment, 
particularly engines, China began building domestic ships in the early 1960s� The 
initial building rate reached ten ships a year in 1960, but this fell to two follow-
ing the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations� The shipbuilding picture remained 
poor for many years because of the lack of Chinese technology and engineering 
capability and the inability to develop and build critical elements such as ship 
engines� In terms of ship ownership, in 1961 the state-owned China Ocean Ship-
ping Company (COSCO) was formed under the Ministry of Communications� 
COSCO owned and controlled vessels under both Chinese and foreign flags� (In 
the 1960s the PRC began relying on foreign flags to operate many Chinese-owned 
ships� At the time, this included use of the British and Somali flags�)47 The first 
voyage of a PRC-flag ship outside Asian waters was by SS Heping, which carried 
cargoes from China to the Republic of Guinea in West Africa in 1962� The Chi-
nese merchant marine continued to grow through the 1960s, reaching more than 
three hundred ships by the early 1970s� Shipbuilding during this period remained 
a very limited industry, particularly since China did not have the expertise to 
develop and build nautical equipment and engines�48
Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the PRC continued to emphasize 
the development of its maritime industries, including shipping, shipyards, and 
ports� The number of PRC ships engaged in international trade doubled during 
this period� More ships were added to the Chinese flag-of-convenience fleets, 
particularly using the Somali and eventually the Panamanian flags� During these 
years, PRC ships began “cross trading,” which involved carrying cargoes to and 
from ports other than China, and charging freight revenues in U�S� dollars, mak-
ing the practice a good source of hard currency� In 1978, the number of PRC ships 
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in international trade surpassed that of the United States, and by 1982 China’s 
merchant fleet ranked seventh in the world in size�49
Of particular note during these years was the development of China’s port and 
shipbuilding industries� Major efforts were undertaken to modernize Chinese 
shipyards, and with technical assistance from European, Japanese, and Singapor-
ean shipbuilders the Chinese began building ships for domestic and export mar-
kets� Costs per ship were so low and demand was so high that Chinese yards had 
to suspend order books until shipbuilding capacity could be increased� During 
this period, ports also radically improved in capacity and capability� From 1959 
to 1979, there was a 3,750 percent increase in cargo throughput in Chinese ports, 
but dock capacity had increased by only 30 percent� Given this serious situation, 
major efforts were undertaken to develop and build port infrastructure, includ-
ing the introduction of container-handling equipment�50 Through the next three 
decades, Chinese leaders continued to increase the capability and capacity of 
their maritime industries dramatically, in ship ownership, shipbuilding, port de-
velopment, and a multitude of related industries� Today, China’s maritime indus-
try, in all sectors, is the largest in the world by far, and it still is growing rapidly�
THE CHINESE MARITIME INDUSTRY TODAY
The PRC government’s decades-long support of the Chinese maritime industry 
has included substantial, even aggressive, financial subsidies, laws, and poli-
cies designed to enable all sectors of the industry to grow at phenomenal rates� 
Currently, with more than 5,500 merchant ships engaged in international trade, 
Chinese companies (including Hong Kong‒based companies) own more ships 
than those of any other nation on earth�51 Chinese container-shipping companies 
combined carry more containers than the world’s number one carrier, Maersk 
Line� This represents nearly 20 percent of all the containers carried by the top 
twenty carriers�52
Chinese companies own or operate more ports and terminals around the 
world than those of any other country�53 These Chinese companies include 
Hutchison Ports, COSCO Ports, China Merchants Ports, Shanghai International 
Port Group, and Qingdao Port International�54 In fact, by 2015 “two-thirds of 
the world’s top fifty container ports had some degree of Chinese investment 
in them, if not majority ownership and control, and this number is growing�” 
These ports handle 67 percent of the world’s shipping containers�55 Chinese port 
companies in all ports around the world handle 39 percent of the total volume 
of containers—nearly double the share of the next largest port operator, which 
is headquartered in Singapore�56 Of the top twenty ports in the world by cargo 
throughput (2016‒17), fourteen are located in China�57 Almost “under the radar,” 
Chinese port companies acquired 49 percent ownership in France’s CMA CGM 
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port operations, which has given Chinese companies operational control of 
Houston’s Terminal Link port and South Florida Container Terminal in Miami�58 
COSCO has long-term lease/operations stakes in the ports of Los Angeles and 
Seattle as well�59
By 2017, China was the number one shipbuilder in the world, as measured by 
the number of ships completed, new orders, and pending orders� Over 40 percent 
of the world’s commercial ships now are built in China, and this percentage is 
growing as shipyards in other countries no longer can compete and are shut-
tered�60 (Notably—and troubling from a USN perspective—during a mere eight-
year period, from 2009 to 2017, the Chinese developed and built eighty-three 
warships for the Chinese navy, which now is the second-largest navy in the world, 
and within a few decades or less is expected to be the largest�)61 With 150 modern 
cutters and hundreds of other vessels, the China Coast Guard is the largest such 
service in the world�62 Numbered at more than two hundred thousand vessels, 
China’s fishing fleet also is the largest in the world�63
One of the secrets of Chinese successes in the incredible growth of the nation’s 
maritime sector is the Chinese emphasis on maritime education—in nautical sci-
ence, marine engineering, and maritime business� More than 115,000 students 
attend the several Chinese maritime universities and colleges�64 Finally, China is a 
global leader in ship finance, providing funds for international shipping companies 
seeking to buy, build, or lease ships, particularly those from Chinese shipyards� In 
2008, no Chinese bank was listed in the top ten of the world’s shipbuilding-loan 
institutions; a decade later, the top two banks were Chinese—both state-owned 
institutions�65 By 2025, it is projected that Chinese banks will provide 50 percent 
of all shipbuilding loans�66 This means that, although China may not own or 
operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it will have influence, if 
not control, over a majority of the world’s merchant fleet, because it will hold the 
mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned by companies in other countries�
China has made no attempt to hide its aspirations to influence, if not domi-
nate, the world’s maritime industry� In 2015, the Shanghai International Shipping 
Institute, a state-owned research institute, released a report, “China Shipping 
Development Outlook 2030�” The report offers several conclusions� First, “China 
will remain the largest cargo trader in the world and will take a dominant role 
in global container shipping�” Second, China will double its shipping engaged in 
worldwide trade and control at least 15 percent of that trade� To do this, China 
will become the number one shipowner in the world� (It already is�) Ship op-
erators will evolve to become “global logistics providers” (much like other large 
containership operators, such as Maersk)� The report notes that privately owned 
Chinese shipping companies will account for “over 70% of China owned ships�” 
(However, this runs contrary to the current trend in China of state ownership, 
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which does not allow private-sector companies into the industry�) The report 
suggests that Chinese foreign-flag fleets will comprise upward of 90 percent of 
Chinese-owned ships� With regard to ports, the report notes that “throughput at 
Chinese ports will reach 505 million TEUs [twenty-foot-equivalent containers] 
by 2030�” Without providing specific metrics, the report indicates that “Chinese 
enterprises will build port networks around the globe, especially investing in 
port networks in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and 
other developing countries with strategic cooperation with China�” Finally, the 
report emphasizes China’s role as a global leader in ship financing and marine 
insurance�67
HOW CHINA IS REALIZING ITS MARITIME AMBITIONS: CHINESE 
MARITIME STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
China’s Qing dynasty ruled the country from 1636 to 1912, a period of gradual 
but persistent incursion by Europeans, and eventually by the Japanese, into 
Chinese trade and influence� The Opium Wars with the British in the mid-
nineteenth century saw Chinese military forces destroyed by the British, who 
then forced the Chinese to allow the British Empire to import opium into China 
in exchange for Chinese goods� Thus began “the century of shame,” during which 
Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan essentially carved China up into 
spheres of influence�68
Following the civil war in China that ended in 1949 with the defeat of Nation-
alist forces by Communist forces on the mainland and the establishment of the 
PRC, China’s economy was in complete shambles� For the next several decades, 
under the absolute rule of Chairman Mao, China essentially pursued a policy of 
isolationism and self-reliance under which the Chinese people were expected to 
produce agricultural and manufactured goods without the influence or assistance 
of outside nations�69 Mao’s policies further destroyed the Chinese economy and 
caused the death of untold millions of people by starvation�
Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came to power and relent-
lessly pursued a policy of opening up China to the rest of the world by boldly 
seeking foreign investment and trade� Knowing that he could not abandon the 
façade of communist/socialist ideology, but likely knowing the failures of pure 
communism and socialism, Deng adhered to a strict policy of pursuing what he 
called “socialism with Chinese characteristics�”70 The Chinese Communist Party 
continues to use the phrase today� It is purposefully imprecise, but in broad terms 
it refers to an economy that the state essentially controls while allowing varying 
degrees of private investment and ownership�
Under Mao’s leadership, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were established in 
all sectors of the economy� These SOEs essentially operate as companies owned 
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by the state� SOEs, in China, typically are managed at a provincial or even mu-
nicipal level� Others are managed at the central government level by the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)�71 The 
problem—as is typical of many government organizations worldwide—is that 
SOEs, lacking financial incentives, are inherently inefficient and often become 
bloated with choking bureaucracies and unproductive workers�
Deng knew this, and therefore introduced market-based reforms, including 
the potential for private investment and ownership� Notably, Deng focused on 
commercial shipbuilding as a critical industry, and under his leadership in 1982 
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) SOE was established� In 1999, 
a second SOE was formed out of CSSC: the China Shipbuilding Industry Corpo-
ration (CSIC)� These two SOEs dominated shipbuilding in China�72 In 2019, they 
were reunited into one larger SOE�73
Over the decades since Deng, the role of SOEs has continued, with them ex-
ercising control over certain sectors of the Chinese economy but with private in-
vestment in SOEs being introduced to varying degrees and with varying success� 
(Of Chinese SOEs, 66 percent are listed on the Chinese stock exchange�) Today, 
privately owned companies actually employ more workers than SOEs, and these 
privately owned companies account for the majority of China’s gross domestic 
product (GDP)�74 However, in certain sectors SOEs maintain absolute control� 
One such sector is the maritime industry, which China views as a strategic in-
dustry vital to the interests of the nation�75 Despite statements in 2015 from Jin 
Jiachen, a director at the Shanghai International Shipping Institute, that Chinese 
ocean-shipping companies would privatize to a large degree, there is little evi-
dence this has happened or will do so�76 Furthermore, under Chinese president 
Xi Jinping there is new emphasis on and support of SOEs and less interest in 
privatizing many industries, including Chinese maritime industries�77
COSCO is an SOE� The company operates a fleet of well over fifteen hundred 
vessels calling on over a thousand ports worldwide� The COSCO fleet includes 
most types of merchant ships, such as tankers, bulk ships, roll-on/roll-off (RO/
RO) vessels, and containerships� In 2015, COSCO merged with the SOE China 
Shipping Group, retaining the name of China COSCO Shipping Corporation�78 
COSCO expanded further in 2017 with the government-funded $6�7 billion 
acquisition of Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL), a public company 
formerly based in Hong Kong� COSCO now is the third-largest containership 
operator in the world�79 Even before its acquisition of OOCL in 2017, COSCO for 
a time had taken the lead as the number one container-shipping company in the 
world� With its acquisition of OOCL and its continued aggressive expansion poli-
cies, it is quite possible that COSCO will take the number one spot in container 
shipping permanently�80
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For years, the global trend in the container-shipping business has been in-
creasing consolidation, leaving fewer and fewer container-shipping companies� 
China has taken full advantage of this trend, using the power of COSCO� A 
United Nations think tank associated with UNCTAD contends that there are now 
too few container-shipping companies left to ensure adequate competition�81 By 
mid-2018, the top ten container-shipping companies carried 75 percent of the 
world’s shipping containers, with COSCO as the number three carrier, carrying 
over 12 percent of the world’s containers� The UNCTAD report notes that the 
top container companies have formed three alliances that effectively are cartels� 
On the positive side, these alliances potentially reduce costs and rationalize ser-
vice, which can lower freight rates; on the other hand, according to UNCTAD, 
they instead can create a serious risk of establishing corporate oligopolies that 
will reduce competition and constrain service�82 The Ocean Alliance consists 
of COSCO and CMA CGM (of France); the 2M Alliance links Maersk (of Den-
mark) and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC, of Switzerland); THE Alli-
ance combines Hapag-Lloyd (of Germany), Yang Ming (of Taiwan), and ONE (of 
Japan)� An effort by Maersk, MSC, and CMA CGM in 2014 to form an alliance 
to be known as the P3 Alliance was blocked by the Chinese government—a clear 
example of governmental intervention designed to support COSCO� Notably, in 
2015 the Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) agreed to provide a billion dol-
lars in loans or credit to the French CMA CGM to build new ships—in Chinese 
shipyards� Since that time, Chinese ties between COSCO and CMA CGM have 
continued to deepen�83
As noted earlier, in the port sector China is the global leader in owning, leas-
ing, and operating ports and terminals around the world� Most Chinese compa-
nies in the port and terminal business are SOEs; these include COSCO, Shanghai 
International Port Group, China Overseas Port Holdings, and China Shipping 
Group� China Merchants Holdings and Hutchison Port Holdings are additional 
Chinese companies engaged in global port ownership and operation that os-
tensibly are private companies but have Chinese government investment and 
oversight�84 In 2013, China Merchants purchased a 49 percent share of France’s 
CMA CGM’s Terminal Link, which operates in many countries, including the 
United States� Of particular note, reports in September 2019 indicated that China 
Merchants Holdings was in discussion with CMA CGM to invest further in that 
company’s port assets� These actions give rise to speculation, if not concern, 
regarding how much more of CMA CGM’s shipping and port operations the 
Chinese will purchase�85
China’s shipyard sector grew from the 1980s through the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, with some 1,647 shipyards built in China� By 2010, China 
had become the number one shipbuilder in the world�86 As noted earlier, the 
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largest Chinese SOEs in the shipbuilding business were CSSC and CSIC; they 
merged in 2019� Following the financial downturn in 2008, many Chinese 
private-sector shipyards went bankrupt, while the shipbuilding SOEs received 
massive government loans and subsidies� By 2014, three-quarters of all new or-
ders went to Chinese SOE shipyards�87
Despite possible, if not probable, inefficiencies within maritime SOEs, they 
enjoy numerous advantages over private-sector companies� They have easy access 
to huge loans and subsidies from the central government� In 2017, for example, 
the Chinese government announced it would invest $26 billion in COSCO over 
the five-year period ending in 2022� Given that COSCO already is number 
three in container shipping, an investment of $26 billion easily could propel the 
company into the number one spot, possibly leaving in its wake the bankruptcy 
of other major container-shipping lines, which already are becoming fewer in 
number each year owing to ongoing consolidation�88 In addition to the possible 
infusion of substantial state funds to help SOEs compete with private-sector Chi-
nese and international companies, SOEs also enjoy blanket protection in times of 
fiscal downturns and uncertainty, as well as huge preferences in terms of govern-
ment policies and regulatory treatment�
China can use its substantial market power in shipping to achieve dominance 
over its competitors� A classic example of this involves the Brazilian corporation 
Vale SA� Vale is a large iron-ore mining company based in Brazil� As a major 
consumer of iron ore, China has been a crucial customer of Vale for many years� 
No doubt to save transportation costs and better manage logistics to China, late 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century Vale’s leadership made the decision 
to build ultralarge iron-ore bulk carriers instead of chartering vessels to carry 
the company’s iron ore to China�89 Vale chose Chinese shipyards to build these 
vessels� However, when the vessels were completed and began carrying iron ore 
to China, Chinese officials would not let the Vale bulk ships enter Chinese ports, 
citing their immense size as a “safety issue�” Vale was forced to sell the vessels to 
COSCO, which in turn leased them back to Vale on long-term charter�90 Presum-
ably this somehow must have made the ships safer, because they then were al-
lowed to enter Chinese ports� This is a clear example of protectionism; COSCO’s 
leverage as an SOE prevented Vale from entering the trade except on terms that 
COSCO accepted�
Chinese government banking entities clearly support the Chinese maritime 
industry in all sectors, including shipping, ports, and shipbuilding� Huge sums 
of capital have been made available to the industry for projects that promote 
Chinese geostrategic goals, not merely normal business investment� The $26 
billion that Chinese banks provided to COSCO, mentioned earlier, is a good 
example of this� In 2017, the chairman of SASAC noted “the importance of SOEs 
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as a mechanism for the government to direct the economy and achieve political 
objectives�”91
THE “NEW SILK ROAD,” THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE— 
PART OF CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY
China has been an economic and manufacturing powerhouse for much of its 
very long history� Since ancient times, Chinese goods have found their way west 
via the overland Silk Road through Central Asia, and eventually they traveled 
across maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean that were established by 
Arab traders� As noted earlier, over the period from the fifteenth century into 
the twentieth century Europeans gradually eclipsed Arab traders as European 
countries and companies took virtual control of all Chinese imports and exports, 
resulting in the “century of shame�” When the PRC was established in 1949, this 
clearly was a situation its government was determined to change� It has done so 
slowly but steadily through the decades since 1949�
At the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in 
2012, China for the first time “elevated the construction of a strong maritime 
country” to the level of a national goal�92 By 2013, China had become the world’s 
dominant commercial maritime industry leader� But far from being content with 
the country’s maritime achievements, President Xi announced in 2013 that the 
PRC would establish a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, later called the One 
Belt, One Road initiative, and eventually the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)�93 The 
vast majority of BRI funding comes from Chinese policy banks (SOEs), such as 
the Chinese Development Bank and CEXIM, as well as large Chinese financial 
institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Devel-
opment Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, 
the China Construction Bank, and the Silk Road Fund� These institutions are 
state owned, or at least state controlled� To date, these Chinese financial institu-
tions have invested, or committed to do so, nearly one trillion dollars in loans for 
ports and terminals, railroads, power plants and grids, and other transportation-
related infrastructure�94 With little exaggeration, the BRI can be called the most 
expansive, aggressive, and costly transportation and infrastructure scheme ever 
developed in human history� Currently, thousands of BRI infrastructure projects 
already have been built, are under construction, or are in the planning stages�95
The Chinese have indicated that the BRI ultimately will involve a total of 
eight trillion dollars in investments in sixty-eight countries that are home to 65 
percent of the world’s population�96 Its two major initiatives are the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, an overland route to Europe via railroads and roads, and the Silk 
Road Maritime Road, an east–west route via the sea� While the BRI has both land 
and sea components, the maritime aspect is the dominant one by far� In 2016, 
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for example, 1,700 trains carried cargo from China to Europe via land corridors 
through Central Asia, carrying an estimated 150,000 containers� With BRI in-
vestments in these corridors, the Chinese estimate that in 2020 the number of 
containers carried by BRI roads and railroads will have risen to five hundred 
thousand� By comparison, the maritime sea routes from China to Europe in 
2014 alone carried some twenty-two million containers, and BRI investments 
along the Maritime Silk Road are projected to increase this number greatly in 
the years ahead�97 According to the Chinese government, there are three “blue 
passages,” or BRI maritime routes, one of which runs “from China to Africa 
and the Mediterranean, another to Oceania [in the Pacific] and South Pacific, 
and a third through the Arctic to Europe�”98 The BRI also includes projects in 
Latin America and the Caribbean� Another major BRI initiative is known as the 
Digital Silk Road�99
President Xi has thrown the full weight of his leadership and reputation be-
hind the BRI, and it is hard to overemphasize the full implications of this mas-
sive initiative� The BRI may be an outgrowth of former Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin’s Going Out policy; however, it is much more prodigious in scale� At the 
Nineteenth Party Congress, in 2017, Xi projected that “by 2050, China will have 
become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international 
influence�” The BRI is a major factor enabling this evolution to happen at present, 
and that will continue to be so� Currently, China’s maritime industry—its “blue 
economy”—already represents 10 percent of the country’s GDP, and this number 
will increase as maritime BRI projects reach fruition�100
China’s public statements on the BRI note “that BRI will greatly benefit hu-
mankind and create a new era of world trade and globalization�”101 According to 
the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, the purpose of the BRI is to “promote 
policy coordination (between countries), connectivity of infrastructure, unim-
peded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds�” Xinhua goes 
further to suggest that, among other things, the BRI “will improve the marine 
environment, promote development and eradicate poverty, enhance cooperation 
on marine resource utilization, upgrade marine industry cooperation, facilitate 
maritime transport, strengthen connectivity of information and networks, im-
prove security and search and rescue, and create innovative growth�”102 These are 
lofty goals, and it can be argued that there is some truth in many of these claims�
It is important to understand, however, that from a Chinese perspective the 
BRI has many additional advantages� Successful efforts under the BRI will in-
crease export markets for China, which means more money and jobs in China� 
BRI projects themselves provide jobs for Chinese construction companies and 
tens of thousands of Chinese construction workers, since one of the prerequisites 
for a country to accept BRI funding is to employ Chinese construction companies 
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and allow Chinese workers to build the targeted infrastructure in whatever 
country receives the BRI loans�103 In BRI port projects, Chinese companies 
and workers provide everything: finance, design, construction, operation, even 
dredging�104 The Chinese construction companies that build BRI infrastructure 
are almost all SOEs, such as the China Communications Construction Com-
pany, the China Harbor Engineering Company, and the China Road and Bridge 
Corporation�105
However, there are many drawbacks and concerns regarding BRI� Some ana-
lysts conclude that in many cases BRI is nothing more than a “debt trap�” Poorer 
nations that accept BRI infrastructure funding eventually become unable to 
fulfill debt payments, resulting in Chinese takeover of the infrastructure� A 2018 
study completed by the Center for Global Development noted that “twenty-three 
countries are at risk of debt distress as a result of BRI loans from China�”106 The 
port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is a clear example of this� The Sri Lankan gov-
ernment received a Chinese BRI loan of one billion dollars to build a new port� 
By 2017, Sri Lanka was unable to repay the loan� This resulted in China obtaining 
a ninety-nine-year lease to control the port completely�107 In another instance, in 
October 2019 the following was noted in testimony before the U�S� Congress: “In 
2019, the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation reported it had obtained a leaked copy 
of the agreement between China and Kenya for the construction [under BRI] of 
the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway Project� According to Kenyan 
media, the contract states that China could take possession of the port of Mom-
basa should the Kenyan National Railway Corporation default on its $2�2 billion 
repayments to China’s Exim Bank�”108
Chinese loans often are provided at a higher interest rate than comparable 
loans from other countries and sources� The Chinese SOE banks are successful 
in securing these loans at the higher rates because, in most cases, for a variety of 
reasons, funds would not be available from any other source� In some cases, Chi-
nese loans are sought because they do not come with the specific requirements 
(“strings”) attached that other sources, such as the World Bank, often impose 
on those seeking a loan� In the case of the port of Hambantota, for example, no 
competitors were interested in providing Sri Lanka a loan�109
There are also real fears (and examples) of BRI funding leading to local cor-
ruption� Chinese companies involved in BRI projects have been “accused of 
corruption and collusion with local politicians in Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia, 
and Bangladesh, among many other countries�”110 The BRI SOE China Com-
munications Construction Company and all its subsidiaries have been shown, 
in multiple instances, to have used bribes to officials and their families in many 
countries where the company and its subsidiaries had business or planned to 
conduct business�111
107
Naval War College: Spring 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 1 0 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Perhaps most troubling are the political influence and favors that Chinese 
authorities demand in exchange for BRI funding�112 Via such funding in 2016, 
China’s SOE COSCO obtained a controlling interest (51 percent) in the port of 
Piraeus in Greece; this proportion was due to increase to 67 percent in 2020�113 It 
comes as little surprise that in 2017 Greece and Hungary (also a recipient of BRI 
funding) vetoed a “joint EU [European Union] statement criticizing China based 
on human rights�” The year before, both countries had refused to sign a joint EU 
statement that criticized China’s actions in the South China Sea�114
In some cases, BRI projects have failed to produce tangible benefits for coun-
tries even while at the same time saddling them with debt� Vanuatu is a case in 
point� Under the BRI, the Chinese constructed a new cruise-ship pier in the coun-
try, at a cost of one hundred million dollars� Once completed, however, the new fa-
cility failed to meet expectations and adversely affected the country’s economy�115
As Forbes notes, “there are often some key differences between how Chinese 
maritime companies operate internationally and what their projects look and 
feel like� � � � While China’s new array of port holdings are fundamentally eco-
nomically motivated projects, there is a glaring political dimension as well�” By 
controlling major ports in key countries, China maintains more control over its 
import and export supply chains� Through investment and ownership, China 
in many cases can exercise political influence over other countries and help en-
sure that these countries stay friendly to Chinese interests� According to Forbes, 
“China is creating a new paradigm in the twenty-first century where economic 
leverage is the key�”116 In African countries, through loans and BRI investments, 
China has gained considerable political leverage� In Djibouti, for example, China 
holds over 80 percent of the nation’s debt� In Zambia, it is reported that China will 
take over the power grid because of the country’s inability to pay back Chinese 
loans�117 Following the 2008 financial crisis, Iceland was in serious financial peril 
as a result of banking failures� In response to this, and in the absence of EU and 
U�S� support, Iceland accepted Chinese loans and investments that stabilized the 
economy� Since that time, Chinese-Icelandic relations have blossomed, which 
provides support for China’s BRI efforts in the Arctic�118
SUMMING UP THE THREATS FROM CHINESE  
MARITIME DOMINANCE
In all respects, China is a global power, and the United States and other countries 
can expect it to assert its interests, as is normal� However, as numerous observers 
have noted, in some industries China has acted in a particularly aggressive man-
ner, with a determination to dominate those industries globally� This certainly 
is the case with the maritime industry� While Chinese SOEs in the maritime 
industry certainly seek to make money, they also serve the political interests of 
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the Chinese state, and in some instances they take actions that result in expected 
financial losses because those actions serve the policy goals of the Chinese gov-
ernment� While it is true that Chinese initiatives such as the BRI stand to benefit 
dozens of countries and their populations in some ways, Chinese BRI funding 
and the related maritime dominance give China sizable political leverage and 
influence� According to Carolyn Bartholomew, chairman of the U�S�-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, a “major goal of BRI [and the concur-
rent dominance of China’s maritime shipping industry] is to open more markets 
for Chinese goods, displacing goods and services currently provided by the U�S� 
and other countries�”119 Since the United States has retreated almost completely 
from the global maritime industry through a lack of interest in U�S�-flag shipping 
and international port ownership and operation, Chinese goals of controlling ac-
cess to overseas markets have become ever easier to achieve�
As China’s maritime dominance in shipping, global port ownership, maritime 
finance, and shipbuilding continues to grow—as is expected and detailed in 
Chinese strategic plans and documents—China concurrently will gain politi-
cal power and influence� It would be naive to think this will not affect nations 
around the world, including the United States and members of the EU� One 
only need consider the recent debacle that occurred during the summer of 2019 
when a National Basketball Association (NBA) general manager expressed sup-
port for protesters in Hong Kong� The government in Beijing was outraged and 
demanded an apology� The situation threatened the NBA’s multibillion-dollar 
business in China� The result: the NBA backpedaled� The association released a 
statement in English that “affirmed both Beijing’s concerns and the league’s sup-
port for individuals educating themselves and sharing their views on matters of 
importance to them�” But—unbeknownst to most people—the NBA also issued 
a different statement in Mandarin that stated, “We are extremely disappointed in 
the inappropriate comments by the General Manager�”120 Similarly, a flight atten-
dant working for a subsidiary of Cathay Pacific, an airline based in Hong Kong, 
voiced her support for the Hong Kong protesters� The PRC government ordered 
the airline to dismiss the flight attendant, and it did so�121 While these events 
were relatively minor, one only can imagine the demands that China could make 
on countries, including the United States, given further dominance in the global 
maritime industry� In 2016, for example, the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia, which 
greatly displeased the Chinese� So China closed its border with Mongolia—which 
is landlocked� This severely affected Mongolia’s economy�122 In yet another ex-
ample of Chinese bullying, a November 2019 New York Times article noted that 
Chinese officials recently had been outraged with the Czech Republic� Develop-
ing relations between the two countries and massive Chinese “investment, trade, 
and business deals” had prompted the Czech president to declare that “the Czech 
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Republic would become China’s gateway to Europe�” All was well until various 
events caused Czech leaders to question the commitment their country had made 
to the “one China” policy, and even to venture to demonstrate support for Taiwan� 
The result was soured relations with the Chinese, who then backed away from 
PRC-Czech business deals� China even implemented a policy restricting Chinese 
tourists from visiting Prague�123 Recent history is replete with other examples of 
China bullying countries and companies, including firms in the United States, 
into complying with its wishes—“or else�” Increasing dominance in the global 
maritime industry through ship and port ownership, maritime financing, and 
BRI funding will ensure the Chinese have ever-increasing leverage to do the 
same in the decades ahead� Meanwhile, the United States stands idly by� As far as 
international shipping and port operations are concerned, the United States has 
absolutely no leverage at all� What is worse is that lack of action on the part of the 
United States clearly threatens America’s global trade�
Chinese control in the global maritime industry is the result of aggressive stra-
tegic planning coupled with favorable government policies backed by the power 
of SOEs and subsidies and other forms of government funding� There simply is 
no way for private-sector companies in the global industry to compete with this 
on their own� No matter what the economic conditions, SOEs have access to 
massive capital that the private sector simply cannot marshal� Further, to protect 
SOEs, the Chinese government can restrict outsiders’ ability to compete and can 
enact laws and implement other policies that benefit its SOEs—and it has done 
so� The Chinese have shown themselves to be masters at this as they developed 
and promoted their maritime industries over decades�
A major concern is that the global maritime industry has been consolidating 
in all sectors, meaning that with each passing year there are fewer and fewer com-
panies in all sectors of the industry� This is true in shipbuilding, ship operation, 
and port ownership and operation, despite the fact that the industry continues to 
grow as the global economy becomes more integrated�
Container shipping is but one powerful example of this� Forty years ago, 
it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the ocean ship-
ping companies that operated freight vessels carrying global trade; there were 
hundreds of such concerns, including dozens of U�S�-flag companies� Today, 
container-shipping companies carry some 60 percent of all seagoing trade, and 
there are many more and larger vessels carrying freight (now mostly in shipping 
containers)� But the number of companies has been reduced drastically through 
acquisitions and mergers� In early 2018, the top fifteen containership operators 
carried 70 percent of the global trade; just six months later the number had been 
reduced to ten companies carrying the same portion of the trade�124 In 2019, the top 
five companies carried the majority of shipping containers�125 In order by size, these 
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were A�P� Moller / Maersk (Danish), Mediterranean Shipping Company (Swiss), 
COSCO (Chinese), CMA CGM (French, with an association with COSCO), and 
Hapag-Lloyd (German)� The existence of fewer and fewer companies restricts 
competition and can affect service� As noted in an earlier section, UNCTAD 
contends that too few container-shipping companies remain to ensure adequate 
competition�126
To make matters worse, the companies noted above operate within only three 
shipping alliances, which also include smaller companies� These shipping alliances 
are essentially cartels, thereby further restricting competition� These alliances—
the 2M Alliance, the Ocean Alliance, and THE Alliance—together control 91 
percent of global container shipping�127 The large numbers of megacontainerships 
built over the past few years or on order have created overcapacity that will linger 
for many years� This has resulted, and for the foreseeable future will continue to 
result, in lower freight rates, which could force other companies out of business, 
spurring even more consolidation in the industry�128 The largest of the container-
ship operators, Maersk, even has suggested that severe competition will result in 
only three large companies carrying the vast majority of global trade in contain-
ers—no doubt with China’s COSCO being one of those three, if not number one�129
The presence of fewer and fewer companies in any industry tends to result in 
higher costs to consumers and poorer service� As COSCO takes more control 
over the world’s container shipping, the Chinese government will gain more and 
more political leverage over countries that rely on its container-shipping services 
and port ownership and operation for their international trade� Economic theory 
suggests that if there are too few companies in an industry, such that service and 
pricing affect consumers adversely, new companies will form to enter the indus-
try, improve competition, and positively affect costs and service�
Unfortunately, this will not happen in the ocean shipping industry—unless 
host governments subsidize the new companies� Entering the global shipping 
industry, particularly container shipping, requires billions of dollars and many 
years to build vessels, establish service, and obtain port and intermodal con-
nections� It would take years to receive positive returns on investment, and the 
likelihood of positive returns would be questionable in any case� In other words, 
the likelihood of attracting investors to form new container-shipping companies 
is poor, given the economics and time considerations involved�
Still another concern is the current profit margins in container shipping� One 
of the reasons the industry has consolidated is that in trying to compete and in 
building large fleets of megacontainerships, freight rates have been driven down, 
which has pushed companies and investors out of the industry, fueling ongoing 
mergers and acquisitions that have reduced the number of companies drastically� 
Naturally, investors are motivated by profits, and if profits are lacking there is an 
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understandable desire to sell unprofitable assets and move on to greener pastures� 
With the power of subsidies and other forms of government financing as well 
as favorable legislation and policy assistance, Chinese SOEs in shipping and the 
maritime industry at large can weather financial storms and economic down-
turns� They further have the funding and capability to buy out private-sector 
companies during economic downturns� Yes, Chinese SOEs, like private-sector 
companies, are motivated by profit, but they also are motivated by Chinese gov-
ernment policy and political ambitions�
This all makes for a potentially dangerous situation as far as the global 
container-shipping industry is concerned� For example, A�P� Moller / Maersk is a 
public company owned largely by the Maersk family and other investors; MSC is 
completely privately owned, by a Swiss family; and CMA CGM is a public com-
pany owned by investors, as is Hapag-Lloyd� What will happen if global container 
rates, already depressed, reach a point at which shipping families and investors 
grow tired of poor profit margins and decide to withdraw from the business to 
put their funds into more-profitable ventures? In December 2018, Moody’s cut 
Maersk’s credit rating—already not the best—from Baa2 to Baa3, “which is at 
the bottom of the investment grade bond rating�”130 In the fall of 2019, CMA 
CGM reported a second straight quarterly loss and, as was noted earlier, previ-
ously had sold 49 percent of its global port-operations entity, Terminal Link, to 
a Chinese company to reduce its debt� (There are no data on the second-largest 
container-shipping company, MSC, because it is entirely privately owned by a 
Swiss family�) In total, container shipping worldwide is on shaky ground, and 
further consolidation is likely� This author speculates that the Chinese govern-
ment, through COSCO and other Chinese companies, will be more than happy 
to purchase any containership companies that fail� This happened as recently as 
2017, when COSCO purchased the 150-year-old OOCL� So further consolida-
tion in the container-shipping industry is possible, with China benefiting and 
COSCO taking even more dominant control of the global industry, which will 
result in greater leverage, political and otherwise, for the Chinese government�
Throughout, this article has referred numerous times to how the Chinese 
government subsidizes the country’s maritime industries in every sector, and the 
degree to which it does so� This is despite the fact that in 2001 China became a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)� WTO rules expressly pro-
hibit government subsidies�131 In the maritime sector, the Chinese simply ignore 
these WTO rules, and apparently the rest of the world acquiesces� One Harvard 
study indicated that in the shipbuilding industry alone China subsidized ship-
yard costs by between 13 and 20 percent from 2006 through 2016�132 It is clear 
that vast Chinese government funding has been provided to ocean-shipping gi-
ant COSCO as well� Given the implied acceptance of this by the rest of the world 
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and on the basis of past performance, there is no reason to expect the Chinese to 
stop subsidizing their maritime industries� One might argue that Chinese gov-
ernment subsidies of the country’s maritime industry benefit other nations and 
people by providing lower-cost shipping, but subsidies distort the market and 
ultimately can result in the creation of oligopolies or even monopolies, which 
then can dictate service and costs, and in the case of China can exert political 
influence as well�
While China merely is poised to dominate the world’s container shipping, 
it already dominates shipbuilding and global port ownership and operation� 
For decades, the top three shipbuilding countries in the world have been Japan, 
Korea, and China� Over 40 percent of the world’s commercial ships now are 
built in China, and this percentage is growing as shipyards in other countries no 
longer can compete and so cease to operate�133 China is the global leader in ship 
finance by providing funds for international shipping companies seeking to buy 
and build ships, particularly in Chinese shipyards�134 This means that, although 
China may not own or operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it 
has influence, if not control, over more than just Chinese-owned ships, because 
it holds the mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned or operated by com-
panies throughout the world� In 2017, for example, Chinese SOE banks provided 
ship-construction loans of over twenty billion dollars, primarily for construction 
in Chinese shipyards� Chinese strategic plans call for China to increase its leader-
ship in ship-construction financing in the decades ahead�135
From a military point of view, in 2015 the Chinese government issued new 
guidelines to Chinese shipping companies and shipyards, Technical Standards for 
New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements. These guidelines 
lay out construction and equipment requirements to ensure that Chinese ships 
can support the forces of the People’s Liberation Army, including the People’s Lib-
eration Army Navy (PLAN)� These guidelines pertain to containerships, RO/RO 
vessels, bulk ships, and general-cargo ships�136 These measures will give China—as 
the number one shipowner in the world, with thousands of ships under its con-
trol—unparalleled strategic sealift capabilities, if not greater overt military power�
Also a matter of concern is the possibility that ports that China constructs or 
operates under a BRI initiative ultimately may be used by its military, particularly 
the PLAN� The Chinese already have constructed and are using a PLAN base 
in Djibouti� In July 2019, the Chinese defense minister commented that “China 
is willing to deepen military exchanges and cooperation with the Caribbean 
countries and Pacific island countries under the framework of OBOR [BRI]�” 
Chinese laws compel Chinese companies and SOEs to comply with requests and 
demands from Chinese security and intelligence organizations and the military� 
This enables these agencies to have global and easy access to intelligence in 
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the sixty-eight countries receiving BRI funding and throughout the thousands 
of other maritime and BRI projects� Chinese intelligence agencies will benefit 
further as BRI funds are made available to install Huawei 5G equipment in BRI 
ports and terminals throughout the world�137 When COSCO gained ownership 
and control in the Greek port of Piraeus, for example, the company replaced the 
network infrastructure with all-Huawei equipment�138
Senior U�S� military personnel and members of Congress have raised the con-
cern that Chinese dominance in the port industry around the world ultimately 
could restrict access to critical ports the U�S� Navy needs� Chinese intelligence 
agencies’ obvious penetration into these ports will affect U�S� military interests 
and security adversely�139 Might China, through its BRI funding or through 
bribes, demand that foreign governments deny access to the U�S� military? It is a 
very real possibility� Djibouti, for example, has been a recipient of BRI funding, 
and China holds the majority of Djibouti’s debt� As noted, the country now has a 
PLAN military base� Djibouti also happens to be an important logistics hub for 
the U�S� Navy and the U�S� Central Command� Might the Djiboutian government 
restrict or deny USN access to this base as a result of Chinese influence, funding, 
or bribes?140 Might this same tactic be used in other regions of the world where 
the U�S� Navy and other elements of the U�S� military operate?
In 2015, Michael P� Pillsbury, the director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at 
the Hudson Institute, authored a book, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s 
Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower� The title supplies 
the book’s thesis� The author is not only a China expert but a fluent speaker and 
writer of Mandarin, which gives him particular insights into what the Chinese 
really are thinking� As he frequently notes in the book, the Chinese often say 
one thing in an English text but something completely different in the Chinese 
version of the same text� With this approach, the Chinese often are able to fool 
Western scholars, journalists, and political leaders who do not read and write 
Mandarin about what their true motives are� In fact, Pillsbury notes that one of 
the main strategies the Chinese have used throughout their history has been to 
deceive others about their true intentions� The ancient Chinese military thinker 
Sun-tzu, for example, emphasized the importance of deception more than any 
other military doctrine�141
Yet as the Chinese have become the world leader in all aspects of the global 
maritime industry, including ship ownership, port and terminal ownership 
and operations, shipbuilding, ship finance, and maritime education, they have 
demonstrated plainly their intention to use the maritime industry to further the 
strategic, economic, and political goals of the PRC� Dominance in the maritime 
industry, along with concurrent multitrillion-dollar efforts through the BRI, 
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will give China truly unparalleled power� The Chinese clearly are trying to sell a 
positive message—that these efforts are designed “to kindle a new era of global-
ization, a golden age of commerce that will benefit all� � � � As Western countries 
move backwards by erecting walls, China is contriving to build bridges, both 
literal and metaphorical�”142 And to be sure, there are positive aspects to what the 
Chinese are doing� China’s decades-long dominance in manufacturing has pro-
vided the world with a plethora of consumer goods at moderate prices, which has 
raised the standard of living for people around the world� Not surprisingly, the 
Chinese are pursuing maritime ambitions as a source of revenue, trade, and jobs 
for the Chinese people as well� These alone are not nefarious actions� Still, huge 
Chinese maritime SOEs with access to massive government funds and subsidies 
and the protection of Chinese laws and policies give the Chinese government 
astonishing political leverage and control—on a scale potentially greater than 
anything seen in human history�
There are those in the EU and the United States who have expressed concerns 
over BRI and the global dominance of the Chinese maritime industry� But these 
voices are too few and too often essentially have been ignored, leaving a lack 
of action by Western governments� If the Chinese are not “secretly planning to 
replace the U�S� as the global superpower,” as Pillsbury suggests, they seemingly 
are attempting something very close to it� Their actions prove this, and the West’s 
inaction makes their success more possible every day� The time is long overdue 
for the United States to reinvigorate its maritime industries and challenge the 
Chinese in the same game by using the very same techniques the Chinese have 
used to gain dominance in the global maritime industry� The private-sector 
maritime industry cannot do this alone—the U�S� maritime industry simply can-
not compete against the power of the Chinese state� The United States and allied 
governments must bring to bear substantial and sustained political action, poli-
cies, and financial support� To do anything less is to cede control of the world’s 
maritime industry and global supply chains to China, and perhaps to force the 
United States and its allies to enter their own “century of shame�”
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ONE APPROACH, TWO RESULTS
The French Army, the U.S. Marines, and the Frontal Assault  
during the World Wars
Ethan S. Rafuse
 In the past few decades, students of military affairs have looked repeatedly to the first half of the twentieth century, and the efforts of military organizations 
to adapt to the changing tools of war during and between the two world wars, 
to understand why some military organizations are successful on the battlefield 
and others are not� It is safe to say that few, if any, military organizations have 
fared worse at the hands of students of the interwar period than the French army� 
This is not surprising� The disastrous 1940 campaign seemed to offer a compel-
ling verdict on the contrasting approaches that French military institutions and 
their German counterparts took to develop uses for the military tools that were 
introduced in the previous war� In contrast, the U�S� Marine Corps traditionally 
has received high marks for its efforts during the interwar period� This, too, is 
not surprising, as its solution to the problem of how to make a successful opposed 
amphibious landing was a key contribution to the U�S� victory over imperial 
Japan�1
What follows is another look at the innovation efforts that the French army 
and the U�S� Marines made during the interwar period and the methods they 
brought to the World War II battlefield and the particular problems they faced� 
There is little doubt that there were significant dif-
ferences both in their organizational approaches to 
these problems and in the results those approaches 
achieved on the battlefield� To be sure, the starting 
point for assessing any military organization must 
be its effectiveness on the battlefield� Yet closer 
examination of the problems each faced and the 
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answers they developed reveals more in common between the French army and 
the Marines than the operational results they achieved suggest, and offers a com-
pelling reminder when studying the past to heed Sir Michael Howard’s famous 
admonition to do so in width, depth, and context�2 It is not the intent of this ar-
ticle either to deny the Marines their well-merited laurels by association with the 
defeated French army, or to ignore the serious issues with the latter that make it 
a useful subject for considering undesirable qualities in a military organization� 
Still, there is a danger that making battlefield outcomes the sole determinant of 
how we assess military organizations can lead to insufficient appreciation of con-
text, contingency, and detail, and thus an incomplete understanding�
BREAKING THROUGH THE TRENCHES
Of course, the military organizations that prepared for and fought the Second 
World War did so with the Great War’s oppressively heavy shadow cast over near-
ly everything they did� The problems illustrated by the tactical and operational 
stalemate that prevailed on the western front for most of the war, and its eventual 
resolution, weighed most heavily� When the western front consolidated at the end 
of the dramatic maneuvers of 1914, the French army and its British and Belgian 
allies had fended off defeat but faced what proved to be a formidable task—that 
is, driving the German army off the soil of France and Belgium before the strain 
and hardship of their societies’ near-complete mobilization for the war became 
unsustainable�3 With the German flanks effectively secured by the mountainous 
Swiss border and the English Channel, turning movements and envelopments 
were unfeasible� Consequently, the French had to figure out how to conduct suc-
cessful frontal assaults on fortified enemy positions that would create a tactical 
penetration deep and broad enough to be exploited operationally� The means 
available to French commanders were effectively limited to artillery and infantry; 
new technologies such as the tank and airplane were too immature to play more 
than a supporting role� This simplified their operational problem considerably 
and made the solution rather obvious: use artillery to smash the enemy’s lines, 
then send foot soldiers “over the top” to cross the deadly ground and attack the 
enemy’s lines� They hoped that the artillery bombardment would weaken the de-
fenders sufficiently that the attackers could find a hole in the line or, with effort, 
create one that was large enough for a complete penetration to be accomplished, 
which would set the stage for a full tactical and operational exploitation�4
If the concept was simple enough, successful execution was another thing 
altogether� The problem was not that artillery was incapable of creating condi-
tions for a tactical penetration� From the time the method first was applied, the 
French and their allies demonstrated that, while crossing no-man’s-land was 
costly, afterward infantry usually could find the enemy sufficiently weakened 
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by the preliminary bombardment to achieve a tactical penetration—a “break-
in” that gave the Allies possession of part of the enemy line� The problem was 
sustaining the assault’s momentum to turn the penetration into a breakthrough� 
In essence, once a penetration had been created, the two sides found themselves 
in a race� With the assault force exhausted and bloodied by the effort of creating 
the penetration, the tactical commander then had to send reserves up in the right 
place to exploit the breach before the tactical defender could bring up his own 
reserves to contain it and launch a counterattack� It was exceedingly difficult for 
an attacker on the western front to win this race� It invariably took more time 
for reports of a successful penetration to reach the headquarters of the attacking 
commander than it did to reach the defender’s, who also would have been alerted 
by the attacker’s bombardments to begin moving up reserves� Any penetration 
site was necessarily in range of the defender’s artillery and the high density of 
manpower and infrastructure on the western front meant that the attacker’s own 
artillery support was less effective the farther he advanced� The defender’s rear 
area also was usually better ground over which to move reserve forces than was 
the artillery-chewed expanse of no-man’s-land that attacking reserves had to 
cross�5 The French and their allies made notable improvements and refinements 
to the type and employment of their artillery, such as the development of the roll-
ing barrage, that forced the Germans to make fundamental changes to their de-
fensive tactics; however, they remained unable to turn tactical penetrations into 
tactical breakthroughs that could be exploited to achieve operational success�6
By 1916, a growing number of commanders concluded that the problems 
associated with the frontal assault in the face of modern firepower meant that 
efforts to achieve an operational breakthrough were not realistic� Even French 
commander Joseph Joffre, who had been an enthusiastic supporter of offensive 
operations early on, accepted the merit of this argument, albeit reluctantly�7 
Improvements in artillery and infantry techniques kindled hopes for a break-
through after tactical successes at the Somme and Verdun in 1916� However, the 
Germans then developed the defense-in-depth concept in response, negating 
those offensive innovations and leading to the catastrophe of the Allies’ Nivelle 
offensive in April 1917� After that failure, Philippe Pétain, who had been skeptical 
of pursuing breakthroughs since the beginning of the war, became head of the 
French army and brought, in the words of historian Douglas Porch, “a sobering 
note of reality to � � � operations�”8
Pétain advocated what some referred to as a “bite and hold” approach� Heavy 
artillery was employed as before, leveraging refinements in both tools and 
techniques, to saturate and destroy as much of the enemy front line as possible� 
Infantry then went over the top, with a rolling barrage preceding its advance� 
This necessitated a tightly planned, phased advance over a broad front, and 
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the discretion granted to lower-level commanders was circumscribed tightly to 
ensure that troop movement was coordinated with the barrage� This enabled 
enough men to reach the enemy lines to achieve a tactical penetration� Unlike 
before, though, the idea of exploitation was eschewed, so once the enemy lines 
were seized there was no “race” to expand the penetration or bring up reserves� 
In line with plans developed by higher headquarters, the infantry then would 
halt and, instead of attempting to turn the penetration into a breakthrough, 
would stay under the cover of its own artillery and repel enemy counterattacks� 
The infantry would consolidate its new position while heavy artillery was moved 
forward� “The artillery conquers the positions,” Pétain famously explained, “the 
infantry occupies them�”9
The effectiveness of these tactics was hard to dispute� By the end of 1916, 
improvements in heavy artillery enabled attackers to inflict unsustainable de-
struction on defending troops packed in forward defensive lines� This led to sig-
nificant reductions in the number of troops holding forward defensive positions, 
which made tactical penetrations all the more achievable� Under Pétain, the 
French successfully resumed offensive operations in late 1917, providing a much-
needed boost to morale in the French ranks following the mutinies that broke 
out after the failed Nivelle offensive�10 In 1918, these methods were incorporated 
into a broader offensive approach by conducting a series of limited and methodi-
cal operations at one point along the German line before moving on to another� 
While tanks and aircraft played a role in these operations, it was improvements 
in the efficiency and effectiveness of artillery, and its liberal use, that were “the 
true artisan of victory,” in Hew Strachan’s words� In the process of methodically 
pushing the enemy back—while also conserving French manpower—these op-
erations imposed enough casualties on an exhausted German army that its lead-
ers had no choice but to throw in the towel in November 1918� Thus, the French 
were able to claim victory at the end of the war, not through the dramatic blows 
on the battlefield envisioned at its start, but by exhausting the enemy through the 
accumulation of numerous limited tactical gains over time�11
INTERWAR DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT IN  
FRANCE AND GERMANY
Despite their success in World War I, there were significant issues with France’s 
methodical tactics� First, these methods do not produce quick, dramatic, or deci-
sive battlefield results� Consequently, they could not be employed by a belligerent 
whose strategic and operational situation required a quick battlefield decision� 
The differences in the broader strategic contexts in which France and Germany 
found themselves thus drove divergent doctrine development models in the lead-
up to the next war�
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France Commits to the Bataille Conduit
As Robert A� Doughty and other historians have chronicled, France’s methods 
also contained the seeds of a problematic military culture and a faulty approach 
to innovation during the interwar period that translated into disaster for the 
French in 1940� During the 1920s, French doctrine anchored itself to “the bataille 
conduit, or methodical battle,” which “resembled the methods used in World War 
I, but it represented an intensification of those methods,” “a step-by-step battle 
in which units obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly 
scheduled timetables� � � � [A]rtillery provided the momentum and the rhythm 
for the attack�” Infantry was expected to make only relatively shallow advances “to 
remain under the umbrella of artillery protection�”12 Whatever the merits of these 
tactics, there is no dispute that they had significant ramifications for the culture 
of the army that adopted them� By their nature, they required a very top-down 
approach to tactical planning and battlefield execution, as the employment of 
infantry and artillery had to be tightly coordinated, and plans had to be followed 
as close to the letter as possible, leaving little room for lower-level initiative�13
In service of this doctrine, French leaders systematically purged the aggres-
sive and audacious spirit of Napoléon from the minds of their officers in favor of 
“rigid centralization and strict obedience,” and thereby undermined their ability 
to respond effectively to unexpected developments on the battlefield�14 It also 
led the French to take flawed approaches to the study of World War I and the 
possible employment of armor� Focusing almost exclusively on operations that 
validated the methodical battle doctrine, they failed to recognize new possibili-
ties suggested by the war and improvements in air and armor technology� They 
tied tanks and infantry to the use of firepower rather than empowering them to 
exploit tactical penetrations dynamically and aggressively on their own� Further-
more, the hierarchical, top-down culture fostered by the methodical battle doc-
trine had the effect of discouraging open discussion of new ideas and concepts, 
especially in the country’s institutions of professional military education, which 
became little more than inculcators of doctrine� This precluded the sort of hon-
est, realistic consideration of doctrine and organizational agility that might have 
enabled the French army to recognize and address problems in its planning and 
execution of operations in 1940 more quickly� “France committed the glaring 
mistake,” Doughty concludes, “of trying to impose her way of war on the enemy 
without having suitable recourse should this attempt fail� � � � The notion of a care-
fully controlled and tightly centralized battle belonged to another era�”15
Germany’s Dynamic Response
Further damaging “bite and hold” tactics in the eyes of historians is the contrasting 
and more dramatic approach that the German army took to tactical innovation 
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during and after World War I� By late 1917, German resources had been exhausted 
to the point that it was impractical for army leaders to follow the French approach 
of relying on large amounts of heavy artillery and methodical operations� More-
over, the need for a dramatic victory before American matériel and manpower 
irreversibly tipped the scales against them on the western front meant that any 
approach that could not achieve a tactical and operational breakthrough was 
inadequate to Germany’s strategic needs� The result of German efforts to address 
the problem was the infiltration tactics of 1918, which also laid the foundation for 
the army’s doctrinal and organizational development during the interwar period 
and were directly connected to the victory of 1940�16
The fundamental issue, as noted earlier, was how to employ artillery and 
infantry to enable the attacker not just to achieve a penetration but to win the 
race between his effort to exploit and the defender’s effort to contain that tacti-
cal penetration� Instead of following the French massed artillery and infantry 
approach to wear down the enemy, the Germans applied speed and maneuver to 
the problem� Rather than pursuing destruction of enemy positions through heavy 
bombardments, German doctrine used short, concentrated bombardments 
with the objective of neutralizing defenders through disruption� This would 
be followed quickly by probes to identify weak points in the enemy defenses� 
Sturmtruppen (storm trooper—also called Stoßtruppen) assault units then would 
come up to maintain momentum against the assault’s preeminent objective 
and bypass strongpoints and pockets of resistance, push deep into the enemy 
position, and attack headquarters and rear areas� Sustaining the momentum of 
the advance and focusing more on the depth of attack than on maintaining a 
continuous line, in combination with the high tempo of the German advance, 
frustrated the ability of defenders to bring up reserves to contain penetrations by 
disrupting command and control� With command broken down and Germans in 
their rear, bypassed positions would be taken not through attritional battles but 
by the defenders concluding that further resistance was pointless and giving up 
the fight�17 In contrast with French methods, in which the artillery dictated the 
pace of advance, which produced an “entire system � � � designed to be propelled 
forward by pressure from above, rather than by being pulled from below,” the 
German tactical system dictated that the pace and direction of the battle be de-
termined by the efforts of the frontline infantry, with junior officers encouraged, 
indeed required, to exercise tactical initiative aggressively�18
The results of these methods when applied in the initial German offensives of 
1918 were impressive� With remarkable speed, German attacks achieved dramat-
ic penetrations of the enemy line and reached depths in Allied positions that had 
not been seen on the western front since the beginning of the war� Unfortunately 
for the Germans, while they had figured out how to break through the enemy 
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position fast enough to win the tactical race between the offense and defense, 
this simply meant that the race then shifted to the operational level, where they 
were less prepared� The Germans did not have the means to win this race, as the 
Allies were able to slow down and contain breakthroughs owing to their ability to 
bring up operational reserves and to the exhaustion of the German attack troops� 
The German effort was undermined further by the high command’s desire to 
maximize lower-level initiative at the expense of adequate planning to connect 
tactical successes to a larger operational framework�19
Although they ultimately failed to achieve a favorable operational or strategic 
decision in World War I, imperial Germany’s tactics have won praise from stu-
dents of military affairs, who believe they seeded Germany’s successful interwar 
innovation, which produced decisive victories in the opening campaigns of 
World War II and sustained high combat effectiveness throughout the war� The 
fact that they offered a qualitative approach and solution to the problem, in con-
trast to the more quantitative French methods, also contributed to their appeal 
to students of war, who generally have viewed strategies of attrition negatively, 
especially those in the United States who faced the challenge of countering Soviet 
mass on potential Cold War battlefields�20
Moreover, just as appealing as the tactical methods themselves is the process 
that the Germans used to approach the problem and how it shaped, and was 
shaped by, German military culture� In the process of developing doctrine dur-
ing the war and continuing to develop it afterward, the Germans demonstrated 
a salutary and impressive openness to ideas (even those that were not their own, 
as illustrated by their debt to concepts proposed by French junior officer André 
Laffargue)� The German approach was characterized by a willingness to listen 
to frontline commanders, engage them in the process of doctrinal development, 
and encourage them to exercise aggressiveness and initiative on the battlefield� 
Thus, the Germany army went into the interwar period with a dynamic approach 
to doctrine, as well as an offensive mind-set that translated into a commitment to 
maneuver and the ruthless exploitation of battlefield opportunities, in contrast to 
the French, whom one scholar described as “frozen in time somewhere between 
Verdun and the autumn offensive of 1918�” Altogether, the German army’s ag-
gressive mind-set, in Williamson Murray’s words, “provided a solid framework 
for thinking” about the problems of the modern battlefield� This translated into 
the doctrine and organizational ethos that proved so deadly in 1939 and 1940�21 
Although infiltration tactics did not deliver operational or strategic victory in 
1918, the methods and the process by which the Germans developed and built on 
them during the interwar period and the dramatic results they produced on the 
battlefield have been lauded as manifestations of a “genius for war” that contrast-
ed conspicuously with their more insular and hidebound French counterparts�22
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THE AMPHIBIOUS PROBLEM AGAINST JAPAN
Western Europe was not the only place where the first half of the twentieth 
century saw militaries confronting the challenge of figuring out how to use the 
modern tools of industrial warfare effectively� As the United States contemplated 
the prospect of a military contest for the western Pacific—something strategists 
had been doing for decades by the time Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in Decem-
ber 1941—it was clear that it faced compelling and challenging problems� For a 
United States that sought to restrain and contain Japanese power in Asia, it was 
a question of how to project combat power across the world’s largest ocean� Of 
particular concern in this context was the task of securing possession of small is-
lands between Hawaii and mainland Asia so they could be used to support a drive 
across the Pacific by the U�S� Navy’s capital ships� The U�S� Marine Corps, partly 
as an act of organizational self-preservation, took up the challenge of figuring out 
a solution to one of the critical military problems confronting American strate-
gists: how to conduct successful amphibious attacks that would enable American 
forces to wrest control of those islands from the Japanese�
Few challenges appeared as formidable in the interwar period as making an 
opposed amphibious landing� If conducting a successful frontal assault on con-
tinental Europe seemed daunting in light of the experience of World War I, an 
opposed landing in the face of modern firepower to seize the small islands that the 
United States would need to defeat Japan seemed so hazardous that few were eager 
to take up the challenge� Although the first few decades of the twentieth century 
saw Western militaries conduct several successful amphibious operations, these 
largely validated, in historian Allan R� Millett’s words, “a similar basic concept for 
successful landings: land where there is no opposition from ground forces�” Mean-
while, the miserable, unsuccessful effort of the British and French at Gallipoli in 
1915 cast a dark shadow over the question of how to conduct amphibious opera-
tions against a beach defended by a belligerent equipped with modern firepower�23
However, the operational and strategic objective that amphibious operations 
were to serve—securing western Pacific islands to support the U�S� Navy’s of-
fensive drive toward Japan—was critical to American prospects for success� Of 
particular interest were islands that could serve as air bases to support the U�S� 
Navy’s capital ships against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the course of a grand 
naval offensive across the western Pacific toward Japan—islands that otherwise 
the Japanese would use to support their resistance against the American ad-
vance�24 The problem, of course, was that, while there were many islands between 
Hawaii and Japan, the need for islands that could support airfields narrowed the 
geographic options significantly, and it could be assumed safely that islands the 
American planners identified as operationally desirable also would be obvious to 
Japanese planners� Thus, the possibility that there would be islands of strategic 
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and operational value that remained unoccupied appeared slim� Moreover, many 
of these islands would be small enough, and offer so few practicable landing sites, 
that the most effective approach to amphibious operations—namely, landing 
where there will be no resistance—would not be available�
There were, to be sure, many problems unique to the opposed amphibious 
assault� “Moving men and equipment across open water in the face of carefully 
calculated fire is an extremely dangerous proposition,” historian Jerold E� Brown 
laconically notes� “Furthermore, the defender has the advantage of time and space 
� � � and he often has time to prepare his defenses�”25 On top of this were the head-
aches associated with coordinating land, sea, and air elements� In addition, since the 
United States would be conducting these operations as part of a massive strategic 
and operational exercise in power projection across the world’s greatest ocean, there 
were a host of logistical issues that were incomparable in both scale and character 
to what those charged with developing doctrine for the battlefields of Europe faced�
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that, in contrast to the travails of 
the French army, the story of how the U�S� Marine Corps solved the problems of 
opposed amphibious operations in the Pacific often has been cited by students 
of innovation as a great example of institutional effectiveness� In line with the 
concept for a war with Japan laid out in War Plan ORANGE, the visionary Marine 
commandant John A� Lejeune entrusted a young, somewhat eccentric, lieuten-
ant colonel named Earl “Pete” Ellis with the task of studying the theater of op-
erations� Ellis’s observations, laid out in Operation Plan 712 along with careful 
study of maneuvers conducted during the 1920s, then were incorporated into an 
effort to think critically about and develop doctrine—in contrast to the French 
schools, where the mission was to inculcate doctrine and “school solutions”—in 
which vital work was done by students and faculty at the Marine Corps schools 
at Quantico� Throughout, the Marines demonstrated the sort of commitment 
to rigorous professional military education; to entrusting critical tasks to junior 
officers such as Ellis and Majors Charles Barrett and DeWitt Peck; and to open, 
honest discussion of problems that was absent in the French army� The product 
of these efforts—more remarkable because the Marines simultaneously were 
analyzing their ongoing operations in the “Banana Wars,” producing the Small 
Wars Manual, which remains an invaluable work on the subject to this day—was 
the 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations�26
This document, officially adopted as doctrine by the U�S� Navy and distrib-
uted as Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP 167) in 1938, laid out the conceptual 
framework for addressing the problems of amphibious landings� After continu-
ing to refine the implementation of its concepts using the results of landing ex-
ercises, the Marine Corps took its amphibious doctrine to war� The first tests, at 
Guadalcanal and Tarawa in 1942 and 1943, although bloodier and tougher than 
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initially expected, validated the doctrine� They also validated the organizational 
approach and culture that produced that doctrine, especially the Marines’ pro-
cess of continual refinement as they conducted the grueling offensives that put 
American forces into position to bring about the total defeat of imperial Japan�27
Contributing to the contrast between history’s glowing judgment of the Marines 
and that of the French army is that, while there were many differences in the specif-
ics (French commanders did not have to devote attention to the merits of rubber 
landing craft or the construction of wharves, for instance), the fundamental prob-
lem the Marine Corps faced and addressed so successfully was in essence the same 
as the one the French army faced in Europe� Like the French and the Germans in 
World War I and during the interwar period, the Marines had to figure out how 
to combine fire and maneuver successfully to assault defenders equipped with 
modern firepower� The Marines’ success, of course, demonstrates the methods and 
qualities we associate with military organizations that innovate effectively, so one 
must think that surely their solution more closely followed the Germans’ aggressive 
maneuver doctrine than the French preference for mass, right?
Wrong� If the Marines demonstrated a more commendable (and Germanic) 
organizational ethos in the process of innovation, their solution to the amphibi-
ous assault problem was in fact more Gallic than Teutonic� Like the French doc-
trine of methodical battle, Marine doctrine placed heavy emphasis on firepower� 
In line with historical experience (not to mention common sense), FTP 167 
posited that, in light of the difficulties associated with landings, “superiority of 
force, particularly at the point of landing, is essential to success,” and that conse-
quently “[b]eaches strongly organized for defense should be avoided if possible�” 
In the event that an opposed landing could not be avoided, once an island had 
been selected for assault the U�S� Navy would endeavor to isolate it, to prevent the 
enemy from reinforcing it before, during, or in the aftermath of the assault� The 
“attacking force,” consisting of “two elements of major importance, namely—The 
landing force [and] Naval gunfire,” then would go to work�28
First, naval gunfire would pound the island� In its treatment of the effect 
sought, FTP 167 made a distinction between neutralization (“by short bursts of 
fire of great density to secure the advantage and effect of shock and surprise”) 
and destruction� The manual expressed a decided preference for the former, 
declaring, “Destruction should only be attempted under favorable conditions�” 
Once firepower had done its job, Marine infantry would make a frontal assault to 
break through the enemy’s defenses—not on a narrow front, with an eye toward 
infiltration and deep penetration, as in the German system, but on “a wide front 
in order to increase the speed of the landing,” avoid exposed flanks, and facilitate 
coordination with suppressive fire support ahead of the advancing infantry� Ma-
rine infantry would seize the enemy frontline positions that had been neutralized 
130
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 R A F U S E  1 2 5
by fire and then push far enough inland to secure the beach, while staying within 
the range of naval fire support� FTP 167 advised that “initial assault echelons 
are particularly apt to become disorganized during and immediately after the 
landing, and they cannot be expected to make deep penetrations against strong 
opposition,” which made it “often desirable � � � to have leading assault units se-
cure a limited objective�”29 On a small enough island, such as those that would be 
encountered initially in the drive across the Pacific from Pearl Harbor, anything 
beyond that would be unnecessary�
The Marines then would consolidate the positions they had gained, fighting 
off any enemy counterattacks attempting to dislodge them� Then, once the island 
or islands capable of supporting airfields were secured, the Navy would continue 
its westward advance to the next island chain� This way, U�S� forces would work 
their way methodically toward victory much as the Allies had on the western 
front in 1918� They would leverage superior resources to attack and seize one 
island chain, then another, attriting the Japanese armed forces as part of a larger 
strategy that, in cooperation with allies, also cut Japanese access to resources� 
Then, if the decisive naval engagement envisioned in both Japan’s “interception-
attrition” strategy and Plan ORANGE took place, the Japanese would be at a grave 
disadvantage� If not, the Japanese war effort in the western Pacific would collapse 
from the exhaustion of matériel and manpower�30
Of course, it is a truism that no plan, no matter how commendable the effort 
to produce it may be, survives first contact with the enemy, necessitating modi-
fication of the initial assumptions and plans� This was certainly the case for the 
Marines and their doctrine for an opposed amphibious landing, which first was 
tested truly in November 1943 in Operation GALVANIC, targeting the Gilbert Is-
lands� Planners identified wresting possession of Betio Island, the main island in 
the Tarawa atoll, from its five thousand Japanese defenders as the most important 
objective� For the most part, the Marines’ doctrine and the process that developed 
it were proved to be generally sound; however, the operation also demonstrated 
that they needed some modifications—ones that pushed Marine doctrine further 
in a Gallic direction�
As noted, the fire-support doctrine in FTP 167 preferred neutralization over 
destruction� Yet, as one Marine who landed at Tarawa later explained to an in-
terviewer for the World at War series, this was not what the landing teams were 
told to expect� “They thought they would level the island and completely demol-
ish everything,” he recalled, “[t]hat there wouldn’t be a living soul on the island�” 
Unfortunately, the Marines who made the initial assault found that, contrary to 
the boasts of some naval officers, this was not the case at all�31 Setting aside the 
stated preference in FTP 167 for neutralization over destruction, Colonel Merritt 
Edson, the Second Marine Division chief of staff, and Lieutenant Colonel David 
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Shoup, the commander of the initial assault force, developed a plan in which the 
assault on Betio would be preceded by several days of preparatory air and naval 
bombardment� Naval planners, however—afraid of leaving their vessels exposed 
in the event of an appearance by a significant Japanese naval force (as had hap-
pened in August 1942 at Guadalcanal, producing an embarrassing defeat at Savo 
Island)—refused to provide it� Instead, although there would be air and naval 
strikes for a few days before the actual attack, for the real work on the day of the 
assault warships would provide only a three-hour bombardment�32
Those who presumed that the use of artillery in a short bombardment for 
“neutralization,” along the lines of the German tactic, would be sufficient were 
badly mistaken�33 As the Marines began their assault, they were greeted with 
ferocious Japanese artillery and small-arms fire� The ordeal was made worse by 
the inability of the Higgins boats that many were using for the assault to cross the 
reef in front of the landing beaches, which compelled Marines to wade forward 
about six hundred yards under fire� Ultimately, enough Marines were able to 
reach shore to win the battle and secure the island—one that was not even three 
miles long and at no point was more than eight hundred yards across� However, 
even with a three-to-one manpower advantage it took American forces three days 
of brutal combat to eliminate Japanese resistance and claim victory—at a cost of 
over one thousand dead and more than two thousand wounded�34 Not surpris-
ingly, the heavy casualties suffered and the fact that the fight for Betio had been 
much, much tougher than expected provoked considerable discussion among 
Marine and Navy officers about how to improve their performance�35
“[N]ot the least” of the lessons learned, historians Benis Frank and Henry 
Shaw declare, “was the importance of naval gunfire�” Marine planners who had 
chafed at the limits the Navy had imposed on naval gunfire prior to the assault 
on Betio had been proved correct, and in the future it was accepted that “the 
preliminary bombardment had to be heavier and sustained for a longer period�”36 
If the difficulties at Tarawa were not to recur in future assaults and casualties 
were to be kept to an acceptable level, a few hours’ bombardment with an eye 
toward neutralization was not enough� “One of the great lessons learned about 
naval gunfire,” James Stockman observes in a 1947 study for the Marine Corps 
Historical Section, “was the need for destruction rather than neutralization� � � � 
[P]reparatory bombardment and shelling to be delivered on enemy-defended 
islands similar to Betio would have to be increased in duration and weight, all 
of this with an eye toward � � � total destruction�” After Tarawa, writes Joseph H� 
Alexander, perhaps the foremost modern scholar of Marine amphibious opera-
tions in the Pacific War, “[t]he duration and effectiveness of preliminary shell-
ing improved � � � but the Marines always wanted more�”37 That this lesson had 
been absorbed fully would be evident a few months later� When the Marines 
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conducted Operation FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands in early 1944, bombard-
ments would be longer (two days for the landing at Kwajalein Atoll, as compared 
with three hours at Tarawa) and heavier, with the effect that the landings were 
accomplished handily and the operation’s objectives attained much quicker than 
initial plans had anticipated�38
SIMILAR CONCEPTS, DIFFERENT RESULTS
Why were the Marines so “French” in their approach to assault tactics? The 
answer is, obviously, the similarity of the specific problems they faced� Wil-
liamson Murray identifies specificity—by which he means “the presence of a 
specific military problem the solution of which offered significant advantages to 
furthering the achievement of national strategy”—as one of the critical factors 
that contributed to success or failure in innovation during the interwar period�39 
First, like the French in their approach to the German problem, the U�S� Marine 
Corps did not have a compelling need to bring about a quick strategic decision 
in its contest with the Japanese� Both the French and the Marines faced an enemy 
that was inferior in resources—at least if the French fought as part of a coalition, 
which they correctly presumed would be the case� The presumption of matériel 
superiority would translate naturally into the ability to bring heavy firepower 
to the battlefield� In addition, unlike the Germans, for the French and the U�S� 
Marines a successful frontal assault was a tactically sufficient and satisfactory 
accomplishment, whereas the Germans needed tactical assaults to set the stage 
for operational exploitation�40 The small size of the islands the Marines first had 
to take in the drive across the Pacific envisioned by Plan ORANGE effectively 
eliminated the requirement for operational exploitation by the assault force�41 
Once the Marines seized the wrecked enemy front lines—and with the small size 
of those islands precluding the Japanese from using defense in depth to preserve 
manpower—they effectively had control of the island� The French army, bearing 
heavy scars from repeated failed efforts to translate tactical success into opera-
tional opportunity on the western front, and confident in its ability to prevail in 
a war of exhaustion, sought to deliver victory without the extraordinary costs 
that exploiting tactical penetrations produced� For all the success that the Ger-
man army’s infiltration tactics achieved in terms of territory gained, it came at a 
heavy price�
Interestingly, in a replay of what happened on the western front, improve-
ments in the fire support provided by the Marines and Navy for amphibious 
landings caused the Japanese to alter their tactics as the operational geography 
changed� As the fighting reached closer to the Asian mainland, the islands that 
the Marines needed to assault were much larger than the small atolls of the cen-
tral Pacific� Eschewing their earlier notion that the “enemy will be destroyed at 
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the beach,” and having been crushed under the weight of American firepower 
in the Marshalls, Japanese commanders took advantage of the larger islands on 
which they now were fighting to abandon the method of defending forward on 
the beach, where their men could not hope to maintain combat effectiveness un-
der the weight of USN gunfire�42 Instead, echoing the German shift to defense in 
depth after 1916, Japanese commanders at Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa pulled 
back from forward positions on the beaches to concentrate their defenses inland� 
Consequently, American forces found themselves facing limited resistance to 
their initial landings, only to face a murderous task as they pushed beyond the 
beaches� True to the pseudo-French methods they adopted, the Marines did not 
approach this task by aping German tactics, which relied heavily on an assump-
tion that disrupted defenders would surrender out of shock rather than fight to 
the death, and thus were ill suited for use against Japanese forces that were will-
ing to fight to the death� Instead, they relied on heavy firepower and methodical 
advances to grind down the Japanese defenders in grueling, murderous battles of 
attrition�43 Had such methods been briefed in 1934, it is not hard to imagine a far 
more friendly reception from a French audience than a German one�
Comparing the French army’s and U�S� Marines’ approaches to doctrinal develop-
ment offers a compelling reminder that the ultimate test for assessing military 
organizations’ approach to tactical problems is how well suited they were to the 
specific problem that particular military faced� It also underlines the need to be 
skeptical of overly simplistic conclusions about linear cause-and-effect relation-
ships among innovation, methods, and battlefield results� As Carl von Clausewitz 
noted when discussing the value of historical examples to guide how to think about 
problems, “If anyone lists a dozen defeats in which the losing side attacked with di-
vided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that very tactic was employed�” 
Unfortunately, he laments, a tendency to search for simple prescriptive lessons that 
results in insufficient attention to both the broader and the deeper contexts that 
shaped past events often has led to “superficial, irresponsible handling of history” 
that then produced “hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing�”44
Industrial-age firepower presented the military organizations that fought the 
world wars with the daunting challenge of figuring out how to employ firepower 
in ways that made it possible for offensive maneuver to secure tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic objectives at an acceptable cost� In assessing how well they 
addressed this problem, paying attention to context is critical� To paraphrase 
Clausewitz, while one can point to the French experience in 1940 as one case in 
which methodical, firepower-heavy tactics produced failure, one also can point to 
the experience of the Marines in the Pacific as an example where it produced suc-
cess� For that matter, General Matthew Ridgway successfully employed firepower 
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and methodical advances in Korea to attrit and exhaust the enemy rather than 
achieve a quick, decisive battlefield victory—the same strategic context in which 
the French and Marines developed their doctrines�45
France’s and Germany’s efforts to address the frontal-assault problem led them 
down different paths, to be sure, with the latter’s approach seeming to have re-
ceived unimpeachable validation in 1940� Yet looking at these organizations and 
their operations by comparing them with the efforts of the Marines complicates 
the picture, as does considering them in depth, as historians Robert Doughty 
and Williamson Murray have� Although critical in their assessments of French 
doctrine and institutions, in their accounts of the 1940 campaign Doughty and 
Murray identify an array of other factors—errors in operational planning, the 
by no means predetermined outcome of specific tactical events, and even plain 
luck—that must be weighed just as heavily as, if not more so than, doctrinal and 
institutional issues to explain the campaign’s course and outcome� In the process, 
they offer a strong reminder to be cautious in identifying cause-and-effect rela-
tionships when assessing innovation, since but for a different break here or there, 
firepower-heavy methodical operations may well have received validation from 
operations in both Europe and the Pacific�46
Of course, they did not� Nonetheless, while giving due weight to battlefield out-
comes, we must take care, to borrow from Dennis Showalter, not to approach the 
study of the military past in the spirit of Calvinist theology, “interpreting victory 
and defeat as judgments on the military righteous,” and assume that our task is 
merely to validate and catalog the virtues of the blessed and the sins of the fallen�47 
It is important not to let this all-too-frequent bias, or the understandable desire to 
identify concrete cause-and-effect relationships that can be applied to the process 
of innovation today, prevent us from taking full account of contingency, specific-
ity, and context in studying the past� After all, it is in considering and taking full 
account of all the factors that shape the course and outcomes of the efforts of 
military organizations in the past that Clausewitz places our best hope of avoiding 
“wrong ideas and bogus theorizing”—and their consequences—in the future�48
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 The United Kingdom (U�K�) and the United States cooperated successfully to help end the Iran-Iraq War, but national-level differences over how to 
protect reflagged Kuwaiti tankers revealed surmountable fissures in coordinat-
ing operations between the two navies, judging from recently declassified docu-
ments�1 Mutually committed to a cease-fire, freedom of navigation, and a halt to 
attacks on commercial shipping, the two nations were poised to maintain their 
rich history of national-level policy coordination and naval cooperation when 
the American effort to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers—Operation EARNEST 
WILL—began in July 1987�2 Throughout the operation, Royal Navy (RN) units 
continued operations in the southern Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, passing 
exercises with USN ships, and joint meetings with USN staffs� However, London’s 
suspicions about the risks and viability of EARNEST WILL hindered Britain’s abil-
ity to fulfill all of Washington’s “asks,” despite a largely successful record of co-
operation� Perhaps anticipating notional U�S� accusations of free riding, London 
rightly argued privately and publicly that it already was doing its fair share for the 
protection of shipping in the Gulf and continued 
to insist on national sovereignty� The benefits of 
the relationship fully justified the friction encoun-
tered in attempting to coordinate naval strategies�
American leaders repeatedly thanked their U�K� 
counterparts for Britain’s diplomatic and naval 
support during the U�S� Navy’s effort to escort 
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reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf starting in 1987, but hundreds of 
recently declassified British records reveal London’s misgivings about the effort�3 
In particular, the sources provide background to London’s efforts to distance 
the Royal Navy from U�S� control in the Persian Gulf and additional evidence 
about the United Kingdom’s initial rebuff of American requests to send mine 
countermeasure (MCM) vessels (MCMVs) to the Persian Gulf in mid-1987�4 Un-
fortunately, some of these issues—notably, London’s initial reluctance to deploy 
MCMVs to the Gulf—also became public, and probably gave Tehran a heartening 
perception of disarray in the Western camp�5
The British archival documents illustrate the challenges of coalition warfare 
even under good circumstances� They also provide material for an early case 
study about these challenges in the Middle East, in this case coalition warfare 
with a close partner, one with whom the United States enjoyed excellent com-
munications at all levels of the chain of command, agreed on long-term strategic 
objectives and perceptions of the adversary, and shared a rich history of naval 
cooperation� This article relies primarily on the archival material, with some cor-
roboration from memoirs and published histories of the Iran-Iraq War�
The trove of evidence includes summaries of cabinet meetings and leader-
ship exchanges with senior U�S� officials, talking papers supporting such events, 
written correspondence between U�S� and British national leaders, and message 
traffic between London and its embassies involved in monitoring the Persian 
Gulf� Topically the documents address assessments of U�S� naval strategy and 
reliability, the costs (to Britain) of the operation, and preferable courses of action, 
as shared among British leaders, including Prime Minister Margaret H� Thatcher, 
Defence Minister George K� H� Younger, Foreign Secretary Sir R� E� Geoffrey 
Howe, and Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir John D� E� Fieldhouse� They 
were informed by frequent sharing of information among working-level British 
embassy staffs and members of the U�S� National Security Council, Department 
of Defense, and State Department, as well as at higher levels�
CONTEXT FOR EARNEST WILL
EARNEST WILL was an American response to Kuwait’s request for maritime 
protection during the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that by 1987 was stalemated� Iraq 
had expanded the war to the Gulf in 1984 to force Iran to accept a cease-fire and 
hinder Tehran’s ability to export oil, the latter country’s primary source of foreign 
exchange� Iran, unwilling to accept a cease-fire, reciprocated; generally, however, 
it responded to Iraqi ship attacks on a tit-for-tat basis while preferring to confine 
the war to land, where it enjoyed significant advantages�6
The two countries’ approaches to conducting ship attacks differed consid-
erably� The Iraqi air force typically attacked merchant ships that were in the 
Iranian-declared exclusion zone by launching Exocet antiship cruise missiles 
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(ASCMs) at suspected but not positively identified targets in or near the zone—
an imprecise targeting technique that contributed to Iraq’s inadvertent attack on 
USS Stark (FFG 31) in May 1987�7 (See “Key Events” sidebar for a chronology of 
events through mid-1987�)
In contrast, Iran often was more selective in choosing its victims, in an attempt 
to dissuade Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from supporting Iraq, 
and to attempt to alter oil prices� In particular, Iran attacked ships associated in 
trade with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because of those countries’ significant finan-
cial and logistical support to Iraq� Tehran typically would identify the target using 
maritime-patrol aircraft or its own warships, and the U�S� Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) (according to declassified CIA analytic products) assessed that 
Iranian intelligence could identify which ships transiting the Gulf were associated 
with the United States and that Iran’s navies could identify these ships for attack�8
Both sides occasionally laid mines (of different types) even before EARNEST 
WILL started, a practice that Tehran employed to blame Baghdad for the Iranian 
minelaying campaign� Iran and Iraq also deployed different variants of the HY-2 
ASCM, the so-called Silkworm, with Iraqi B-6D bombers using one version while 
Iranian shore batteries used another—a similarity that Iran, again, used to try to 
blame Iraq for missiles that Iranian forces fired�
These dynamics changed in 1987� Following Iran’s September 1986 boarding of 
a Soviet ship, the Soviet navy began escorting Soviet merchant ships in the Gulf�9 
To protect against an increasing number of ship attacks, Kuwait asked for Soviet 
and U�S� assistance in March 1987� The Soviets were prepared to reflag or lease 
all the tankers Kuwait required and provide for their protection—a move that 
spurred U�S� interest in reflagging Kuwaiti tankers�10 Kuwait ultimately chartered 
three Soviet tankers�11 A Soviet combatant—typically a minesweeper drawn from 
the USSR’s small Indian Ocean squadron—escorted each tanker� It was a relatively 
low-profile operation—at least compared with EARNEST WILL�12 Three Soviet 
minesweepers routinely operated in the Persian Gulf, while a cruiser and a frigate 
joined their parent squadron, which also included several support ships�13
The costs of not aiding Kuwait would have been high for the United States, ac-
cording to a State Department assessment published in July 1987� Had the United 
States refused to aid Kuwait, the Soviet Union would have seized the opportunity 
to increase further its presence and role in the Gulf, likely including gaining ac-
cess to area port facilities it would need to maintain any substantial protection 
commitment over the long run�14
Iran perceived Kuwait to be a near cobelligerent with Iraq, given the eco-
nomic aid Kuwait was providing and its willingness to allow its ports to be used 
as primary arms transshipment conduits to Iraq�15 Tehran viewed American 
assistance to Kuwait City as a step that would widen the war, tilt the balance 
toward Baghdad, and sharply increase the U�S� naval presence in the Gulf—all 
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Key Events in 1987 before U.K. Decision to Deploy MCMVs to 
Persian Gulf
25 March United Kingdom is aware of U.S. decision to reflaga
17 May Iraqi air force inadvertently attacks USS Stark
4 June President Reagan requests enhanced U.K. naval cooperationb
8–10 June Seven Power Economic Summit takes place in Venicec
9 June Britain holds bilateral meeting with U.S. Secretary of State 
Shultzd
17 July Prime Minister Thatcher meets with President Reagane
20 July UN passes UNSCR 598 in attempt to end Iran-Iraq War
24 July Bridgeton strikes mine
25 July Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff requests that United  
Kingdom prestage MCMVsf
27 July Senior British cabinet officials formally oppose deployment of 
MCMVs to Gulfg
30 July U.S. ambassador delivers request for U.K. minesweeping  
assistanceh
30 July Prime minister agrees that Britain should not send minesweep-
ers to Gulf i
31 July Secretary of Defense Weinberger also requests that Britain stage 
MCMVsj
31 July Assistant Secretary of State Murphy discusses MCM support with 
U.K. ambassadork
3 August National Security Advisor Carlucci meets with U.K. leadershipl
 a. Private secretary (FCO), “Protection of Shipping in the Gulf.”
 b. FCO, “Venice Economic Summit: 8–10 June 1987”; private secretary (FCO) to private 
secretary (prime minister), memorandum, “Venice Summit: Shipping in the Gulf,” 
8 June 1987, Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files, box FCO 8/6816, 
UKNA.
 c. FCO Research Department, “Iran Annual Review, 1987.”
 d. FCO MED, “Venice Economic Summit: Secretary of State’s Bilateral with Mr. Shultz.”
 e. Private secretary to Galsworthy, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington: Meeting with 
President Reagan.”
 f. FCO to U.K. embassy Washington, “Shipping in the Gulf: Possible US Approach 
on Minesweepers”; defence minister and foreign minister, “Shipping in the Gulf”; 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chief of Defence Staff, message, 25 July 1987.
 g. Private secretary (MOD) to principal staff officer (Chief of Defence Staff), memoran-
dum, “The Gulf: Minesweeping,” 29 July 1987, Defence Ministry: Private Office: 
Registered Files, box DEFE 13/2390, UKNA.
 h. Private secretary (FCO) to private secretary (prime minister), “Shipping in the Gulf: 
US Request for Minesweeping Assistance.”
 i. Private secretary (prime minister) to Lyn Parker (FCO), memorandum, “The Gulf,” 11 
August 1987, Defence Ministry: Private Office: Registered Files, box 13/2390, UKNA; 
Moseley, “Minesweeper Request Rejected”; DeYoung, “Britain Rejects U.S. Plea.”
 j. Ambassador Price letter. 
 k. U.K. embassy Washington to FCO, “Shipping in the Gulf: US Approach on  
Minesweepers.”
 l. FCO, “Call by Mr. Carlucci.”
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developments it was determined to avoid� Its attitudes toward Moscow were 
more tolerant—probably a reflection of Soviet efforts to improve diplomatic 
relations with Tehran and an Iranian desire to avoid confronting two super-
powers simultaneously�
Perceiving such threats to Kuwait City, London urged diplomatic steps to help 
the United Kingdom lower the Royal Navy’s profile in the Gulf�16 Nevertheless, 
the Reagan administration was willing to protect the tankers, probably as an out-
growth of the Cold War and owing to a commitment to freedom of navigation and 
a desire to buttress its credentials with American allies in the GCC after the Iran-
Contra affair in 1986 revealed that Washington had provided weapons to Tehran�17
After bitter congressional debate, EARNEST WILL started with a bang in July 
1987 when Bridgeton, a reflagged Kuwaiti tanker, struck a mine near Farsi Island 
in the northern Persian Gulf while proceeding in the first EARNEST WILL con-
voy� Rather than constituting a single dramatic event, however, the escort regime 
evolved into a series of incidents, some occurring without warning, and intermit-
tent American and British responses�
EXTENSIVE NATIONAL AND NAVAL COOPERATION  
IN THE GULF . . .
The United Kingdom and the United States worked closely at the national 
level while maintaining extensive naval ties in the Gulf� They pursued an 
overarching diplomatic strategy to help end the Iran-Iraq War and persuade 
the belligerents to halt attacks against neutral shipping, at least temporarily�18 
Before and during EARNEST WILL both maintained combatants in theater to 
protect national shipping, shared operational intelligence, and worked on 
naval interoperability�
London and Washington perceived that ship attacks that had been oc-
curring in the Gulf since 1984 were an outgrowth of the Iran-Iraq War and 
pursued separate but coordinated measures to stop the war writ large and 
attacks against commercial shipping in particular� The two nations worked 
in concert to persuade the other members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) to endorse unanimously a resolution—UNSCR 598—that 
called for a cease-fire to end the war� The council passed the resolution in July 
1987, a decision that Baghdad welcomed and Tehran, surprisingly, did not 
reject� UNSCR 598 called for Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate cease-
fire and withdraw all forces to internationally recognized borders; requested 
that the secretary general explore the question of charging an impartial body 
to inquire into responsibility for the conflict; and prescribed that the UNSC 
would meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance 
with the resolution�19
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Iran, however, consistently rebuffed attempts to end the war and refused to 
accept a cease-fire� Given its unwillingness to comply with UNSCR 598, Wash-
ington and London pursued a second resolution that might impose sanctions 
against Tehran for refusing to comply; but while doing so they needed to appear 
to be neutral actors, to persuade the widest audience to support the problematic 
follow-on resolution�
Both Britain and the United States worked successfully to achieve temporary 
halts in ship attacks against merchant ships� London and Washington also agreed 
that the “Tanker War” might be paused if Baghdad could be persuaded to stop 
maritime attacks against Iranian interests� They judged that Iran’s approach to 
the Tanker War operations was generally retaliatory; Tehran’s ship attacks tended 
to follow Iraqi maritime air strikes� Both the United Kingdom and the United 
States judged that Iran might halt its ship attacks if Iraq did so�20 The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in November 1987 reminded its posts of the need 
to maintain pressure on Iraq to stop air attacks, “which fuel the tanker war and 
obscure the issue of compliance�”21
Consequently, Washington and London repeatedly agreed to pressure Bagh-
dad directly or via its GCC allies to halt ship attacks in the hope that Tehran 
would do likewise�22 In fact, the cabinet concluded on 23 July 1987 that the most 
important requirement in the immediate future was to end the ship attacks� The 
record of that meeting states as follows: “The government was doing everything 
possible to mobilize pressure for this on Iraq and Iran� There was hope that the 
message might have some effect�”23 Iraq reluctantly agreed to halt ship attacks; 
there was a hiatus in the Tanker War for much of August 1987� Then Baghdad 
resumed air strikes against tankers and oil installations on 29 August, and Tehran 
resumed ship attacks two days later�24
The Royal Navy and U�S� Navy both operated in the Gulf to protect national 
shipping and cooperated in the operational and logistics spheres, although the 
United Kingdom, to maintain its image as a neutral player in the Gulf, preferred 
not to publicize some of this activity�
• Logistics: U�K� tankers supplied fuel to U�S� units in the Gulf of Oman, 
according to a Ministry of Defence (MOD) memo written in May 1987�25 
Prime Minister Thatcher instructed senior British officials in July 1987 to 
remind the Americans of the help the United Kingdom already was provid-
ing them through Diego Garcia, its base in the Indian Ocean�26 At U�S� re-
quest, London in July 1987 allowed Washington to use Diego Garcia to move 
American minesweeping helicopters into the region�27
• Armilla patrol: London established the Armilla patrol in 1980, using two 
combatants to protect U�K�-flag and -registered ships transiting the Strait of 
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Hormuz and portions of the Persian Gulf extending as far as Bahrain�28 Brit-
ish officials wrote that the patrol, with its deliberately low profile, had been 
broadly successful in protecting British shipping�29 Proud of the Armilla pa-
trol’s record, they wrote in June 1987 that the United Kingdom “protects far 
more ships and has a far greater proportion of its resources in the Gulf than 
the U�S�”30—an assertion that the U�S� State Department seconded� Britain 
announced then that the patrol had escorted a hundred British vessels in the 
area over the previous year�31
• Expanded RN presence: Britain added a third combatant to its Armilla 
patrol in spring 1987 to enable more-frequent patrols in the Persian Gulf and 
to allow RN units to be near most British merchant ships passing through 
the Strait of Hormuz�32 After initially turning down Washington’s request, 
London also committed four Hunt-class MCMVs and a support vessel to the 
Gulf in August 1987�
• Joint operations: An MOD memo issued in May 1987 stated that the United 
Kingdom had agreed to exchange information on threat assessments, daily 
shipping movements, and force dispositions with local USN forces� The min-
istry also endorsed briefings with U�S� Middle East Force ships� Although 
praising the value of exercises with U�S� carrier strike groups outside the Gulf 
to enhance British antiair warfare capability, it discouraged RN exercises 
with USN units inside the Gulf as of May 1987—to avoid giving the impres-
sion of being “in bed with” the Americans�33
• Command, control, and communications: USN and RN ships regularly 
established secure voice communications with each other� The United States 
also provided assistance to Britain in accessing the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (i�e�, AWACS) downlink in the Gulf�34 
Given this background of a long-term naval presence and existing cooperation 
with the United States, London was sensitive to potential insinuations of free rid-
ing and pressures from Washington for it to contribute more to a naval coalition 
to execute EARNEST WILL� In talking points prepared for the foreign minister in 
June 1987, his subordinates wrote that congressional pressure following Iraq’s 
accidental attack on USS Stark in May 1987 had led to American pressure on 
allies for more burden sharing, “preferably in a U�S�-led integrated naval force�” 
Although London was attempting to help the U�S� government get through its 
temporary period of pressure, the drafters wrote that “we are already playing our 
full part,” given the Armilla patrol’s activities�35
The FCO offered similar arguments to its embassies that month: “[Y]ou can 
confirm that we appreciate the pressures on the American administration at pres-
ent but believe we are already playing our full part in the protection of shipping�” 
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The FCO wrote that it had provided to the United States—notably, Secretary of 
Defense Caspar W� Weinberger—a statement on the Armilla patrol to give the ad-
ministration ammunition with which to “overcome the American public’s almost 
total ignorance of what we are doing in the Gulf�”36
The foreign secretary and defence minister in July 1987 jointly reflected 
similar concerns about possible blowback from a British refusal to deploy mine-
sweepers in response to a hypothetical U�S� request� Acknowledging the U�S� 
Navy’s limited MCM capability, they wrote that the United States was turning to 
NATO and other friends for help in the Gulf, and suggested that “refusal could 
fuel U�S� criticism that the Europeans are unwilling to pull their own weight�”37 
However, they also judged that there were strong counterarguments, which are 
addressed in the next section�
. . . DESPITE RESERVATIONS ABOUT SENDING MCMVS TO  
THE GULF
Despite Britain’s close naval cooperation with the U�S� Navy, however, its foreign 
and military policy throughout EARNEST WILL consistently also called for its 
warships to fall under national control, stay neutral, and pursue a de-escalatory 
policy in the Gulf while enabling a diplomatic solution to the war and protecting 
U�K�-flag shipping� For example, a draft negative response to a request from Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral William J� Crowe Jr� for the United King-
dom to deploy MCMVs to the Gulf stated that the “long term policy of keeping 
U�K� and U�S� policies in the Middle East separate[—]and both our governments 
have reaffirmed this separateness[—]is in our mutual regional interest�”38
These broad objectives of British policy would prove problematic for the 
United States, which was interested in creating a joint naval command structure 
in the Gulf; sought additional, visible international support for EARNEST WILL; 
and had a lower threshold for engaging in contingency operations against Iran 
than did the United Kingdom� Several contentious issues arose from these differ-
ent tactical approaches:
• Risks of escalation resulting from unpredictable Iranian challenges and po-
tential preemptive or disproportionate U�S� responses
• How to maintain neutrality—a status both countries claimed regarding the 
war
• Size, number, type, and potential operational areas (OPAREAs) of ships the 
Royal Navy might send to the Gulf
• Frequency of and publicity accorded to joint training with the U�S� Navy in 
the Persian Gulf
• Naval command-and-control relationships in the Gulf
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• Zones of responsibility
• U�K� responses to U�S� rules of engagement to facilitate a policy of “distress 
assistance” in 1988
Although subject to increasing U�S� pressure after the Stark and Bridgeton in-
cidents, the United Kingdom’s national leadership initially refused to send more 
ships to the Gulf� Ultimately it would be actions by Tehran—not pressure from 
Washington—that provided the catalyst for Thatcher to commit British MCMVs 
to the Persian Gulf in mid-August 1987�
Before that happened, changes in U�S� national-security policy and the war it-
self forced London to review repeatedly key elements of Britain’s Gulf naval strat-
egy between March and July 1987� Even in early 1987, London understood that 
Washington was considering a reflag venture with Kuwait City and was interested 
in forming a joint naval command in the Persian Gulf to protect shipping more 
efficiently�39 Through that spring and early summer, American requests—albeit 
remaining informal—became more focused and urgent, particularly after rising 
tensions in the region made the issue of allies and burden sharing more salient 
in U�S� domestic debates over EARNEST WILL� American requests—perceived or 
delivered in 1987—included the following:
• The foreign minister’s private secretary wrote on 25 March that the United 
States would want Britain and other countries to participate in joint naval 
operations in the Gulf as an outgrowth of the reflag effort� He summarized, 
“[T]hey remain keen on multilateral naval activity in almost any combination 
of participants�”40
• The British ambassador in Washington reported on 29 May that the U�S� Na-
tional Security Planning Group had confirmed recommendations for action 
regarding EARNEST WILL� Although Washington was not then asking London 
to increase the U�K� naval presence, it sought London’s help in persuading 
other countries to make at least token contributions�41
• According to an FCO briefing, President Reagan wrote to Prime Minis-
ter Thatcher in early June to see whether the United Kingdom would find 
occasions to affirm publicly the importance of the region and highlight 
publicly what it was doing to further Western interests there� He also asked 
Britain to undertake “visible naval exercises with our ships”42—a request 
that the FCO interpreted as a proposal to increase the number of passing 
exercises in the Gulf and publicity accorded to them�43 A message from the 
FCO to its posts on 8 June called for a guarded response, telling them that it 
had advised U�S� officials that the United Kingdom would consider issuing 
“further statements as requested and, perhaps, slightly enhanced passing 
exercises in the Gulf�”44
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• CNO Admiral Crowe wrote to ask the U�K� chief of defence staff on 25 July—
the day after the Bridgeton mine strike—whether Britain would consider 
moving MCMVs closer to the Persian Gulf to reduce potential response 
time�45
• U�S� ambassador Charles H� Price II on 30 July met with the foreign secretary 
to request RN minesweeping in the Gulf�46
• Secretary of Defense Weinberger wrote to his U�K� counterpart on 31 July to 
request that Britain preposition mine-clearing assets in or near the Gulf�47
• On 31 July, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs Richard Murphy and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs Richard Armitage noted U�K� reluctance to deploy MCMVs in 
their discussions with the British ambassador in Washington� Armitage said 
that the Pentagon would want to have further discussions about how to achieve 
de-escalation in the Gulf without leaving Russia in a dominant position�48
• Frank C� Carlucci III, the assistant to the president for national security af-
fairs (i�e�, national security advisor), met with several senior U�K� officials, 
including the prime minister, on 3 August�49 Acknowledging that London was 
reluctant to send additional ships to the Gulf, he told the cabinet secretary, 
Sir Robert T� Armstrong, that Washington was anxious for a tangible mani-
festation of U�S�/U�K� collaboration in the Gulf and asked him for suggestions 
about how that might be achieved�50 
London thoroughly debated these requests during the spring and identified 
potential ways to help Reagan through his administration’s “domestic political 
difficulty” (in the words of an FCO overview) without compromising Britain’s 
independent national-security strategy�51 Just before the United States began 
lobbying for international support for freedom of navigation in the Gulf in June 
1987, the FCO notified its posts that “ministers are travelling to Venice in a mood 
to help the Americans over a period of increased congressional and public scru-
tiny of their protection of shipping in the Gulf�”52 The FCO wrote then that the 
United Kingdom was “willing to help the United States while not compromising 
our basic posture of not provoking the Iranians, compromising our impartiality 
in the conflict, or being sucked into an unpredictable conflict through integrated 
operations�”53 In talking points prepared for a bilateral meeting with Secretary of 
State George P� Shultz in the same conference, the FCO wrote that the “U�K� will 
do what we can to help weather Congressional scrutiny in the aftermath of ap-
palling USS Stark incident�”54
Given this context, the declassified documents collectively offer a complex set 
of reasons for initially demurring to repeated U�S� requests for the deployment of 
additional U�K� forces to the Gulf� A list of London’s “cons” about EARNEST WILL 
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and deploying MCMVs to the Gulf probably would include the following argu-
ments, judging from the raw reporting�
EARNEST WILL Was a Flawed, Escalatory Operation
Talking points prepared for Thatcher on 15 July 1987 warned that the reflag 
decision carried risks of superpower competition and a counterproductive con-
frontation with Iran�55 The foreign secretary and defence minister jointly agreed 
on 27 July that it was U�S� action that had exacerbated the crisis by reflagging and 
convoying tankers� Supporting such an operation raised the risk of being drawn 
“further into involvement with U�S� policy, and into an operational crisis in the 
Gulf, which would in turn increase the risk to British vessels�”56 They subse-
quently wrote on 29 July that U�K� policy had been to avoid joint operations with 
the Americans in the Gulf because “of the likelihood that they would lead to our 
being included in a U�S� confrontation over which we had no control� Once initi-
ated, such a confrontation could last a very long time�” By joining in, the United 
Kingdom “might actually increase the risk to British shipping�”57
The two leaders concluded that Britain would have to turn down the U�S� re-
quest for MCMVs despite any strains that caused on the alliance� They acknowl-
edged that it would not be “an easy message to present to the Americans�”58 And 
yet, only thirteen days later, even after they had submitted a strongly worded 
memo against deploying MCMVs to the Gulf, the prime minister would over-
rule them�
America Might Lack the Commitment to Sustain Prolonged Operations  
against Iran
In talking points for briefing the prime minister in March 1987, the FCO warned 
that joining in the U�S� operation had potential downsides, including a potential 
replay of the Multinational Force in Lebanon experience following the October 
1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing� “We should not encourage a U�S�/Iran 
confrontation in Gulf from which U�S� might in due course need to withdraw, 
leaving Arab friends worse off than before�”59 Younger and Howe wrote in July 
1987 that “the Americans were unwise to rush into their policy of protecting Ku-
wait tankers without proper consideration how they could sustain their commit-
ment; their credibility is on the line�”60 Summarizing U�K� thinking on 30 July, the 
FCO advised its embassy in Washington as follows: “We remain doubtful about 
assuming commitments which cannot be sustained�”61 In recapping a meeting 
in October 1987 with Edward W� Gnehm Jr�, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Near East and South Asia, the FCO notified its posts that, although 
Secretary Weinberger’s trip to the Gulf had confirmed Gulf-state support for U�S� 
actions, the Arabs continued to doubt longer-term U�S� resolve�62
Perhaps aware of such doubts, when National Security Advisor Carlucci met 
with the prime minister on 3 August 1987 he attempted to reassure London of 
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Washington’s determination to execute EARNEST WILL and to protect U�S� inter-
ests� Speaking shortly after the Bridgeton mining, he opined that if there were 
further incidents directly traceable to Iran, Reagan would face considerable pres-
sure to retaliate� Carlucci judged that there was a risk that Iran could conclude er-
roneously that it could divide opinion in the United States� Given this perception, 
he averred that if there was any hostile action public opinion would rally behind 
the president; it would not be another Lebanon�63
Independence in Foreign Policy and Naval Operations Buttressed London’s  
Image as a Neutral
Throughout EARNEST WILL, the United Kingdom remained adamant that the 
Royal Navy would not conduct integrated operations under U�S� control, al-
though it allowed informal coordination among local naval commanders� When 
British officials met with Assistant Secretary of State Murphy on 5 June 1987, they 
“made it clear our non-provocative and independent policy continued and we 
had serious reservations about any more integrated operations�”64
The prime minister wrote in July 1987 that “there are formidable practical as 
well as political problems in the way of a multinational force� � � � [S]uch a force 
might in practice have a higher profile than the present arrangements�”65 She 
then directed the cabinet to prepare for discussions about bilateral coordination 
in the Gulf while making it clear that the RN presence would not include joint or 
integrated operations�66
Even when Defence Minister Younger called Defense Secretary Weinberger in 
mid-August 1987 to announce that London would deploy MCMVs to the Gulf, 
he reminded Weinberger that “Armilla’s role and AOR [area of responsibility] 
would remain unchanged�”67 Talking points prepared for the defence minister’s 
use noted that Armilla would not go into the northern Gulf because “the risks of 
integration with the United States were too high to contemplate�”68
When EARNEST WILL was well under way by March 1988, R� Rand “Randy” 
Beers, policy coordinator in State’s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, told of-
ficials in the MOD and FCO that the United States was considering extending 
protection for neutral shipping in the Gulf, an effort in which allies might be 
asked to provide more ships and integrate more closely with the U�S� Navy, or 
at least integrate more among themselves� The British responded that there was 
no likelihood the United Kingdom would alter its position on integration with 
the U�S� Navy� If the Royal Navy sent more ships to the Gulf, they would support 
U�K�-flagged/owned ships only�69
Publicizing RN Cooperation Would Undermine London’s Low-Profile Strategy
Consequently, Reagan’s request that Britain highlight its actions to promote 
Western interests and undertake more-visible operations with the United States 
in the Gulf was problematic, although talking points that the FCO prepared for a 
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meeting with Secretary of State Shultz concluded that “we can meet both of Rea-
gan’s requests presentationally without giving much of substance�”70 U�K� officials 
had written earlier that the U�S� public had “almost total ignorance” of U�K� opera-
tions in the Gulf and that more publicity might reduce congressional pressure for 
further burden sharing�71 However, the notes for the Shultz meeting continued, 
“Publicity for exercises would look like participation in a Gulf war and will need 
very careful handling�”72
EARNEST WILL Might Lead to Preemptive or Disproportionate  
U.S. Military Operations
Monitoring U�S� press and official activity, London’s staffers watched for signs of 
escalatory American military activity, such as a preemptive attack on the Silk-
worm ASCMs that had appeared in the Gulf in 1987�73 Minutes prepared for a 
briefing of the prime minister in March 1987 warned that “if naval discussions 
suggest U�S� seriously thinking of contriving to attack Silkworm sites we may 
need to express our doubts in Washington at high political level�”74 The foreign 
secretary then was willing to consider limited coordination of RN activity with 
the United States, on the strict condition that the agreed aim was to deter Iran 
and “not to contrive an excuse for, say, striking the Silkworm missiles�”75 Despite 
such willingness to cooperate, the FCO characterized the U�S� mood as being 
“aggressively anti-Iran” at the end of July 1987�76
British officials repeatedly approached their American counterparts to assess 
the risks of a preemptive U�S� attack on the Silkworms, a course of action that by 
June 1987 was not being considered seriously in Washington, according to their 
interlocutors�77 In preparing Prime Minister Thatcher for a visit to the United 
States in July, FCO officials raised the risk of a confrontation with Iran and wrote 
that they hoped the United States would be as “non-provocative as possible�”78 
When Thatcher met with Reagan on 17 July, she told him it was important not to 
escalate the conflict� Reagan agreed and said that the United States would attack 
only in self-defense against an Iranian attack�79
These agreements did not reassure the FCO after further Iranian provoca-
tions� Following Iran’s Silkworm attack on the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea 
Isle City on 16 October 1987 and the U�S� retaliatory attack on two Iranian oil 
platforms in the Persian Gulf three days later, the FCO prepared talking points 
for use with the prime minister; they warned of a “continuing need to counsel 
restraint and proportionality in response to Americans—wise counsels may not 
always prevail�”80
In the subsequent cabinet meeting, the foreign secretary opined that the 
Gulf had become tenser than ever before� He commented that it might become 
increasingly difficult for the United States to respond to Iranian actions in ways 
that were both “constrained and effective�”81 Such doubts led Britain to seek early 
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notifications of U�S� contingency operations in the Gulf, a consideration repeat-
edly accorded to the United Kingdom�82
Such concerns, repeated British requests, and the Royal Navy’s presence in 
the Persian Gulf may have contributed to Washington’s willingness to share 
with London the broad outlines of U�S� military planning and to warn London 
and U�K� forces in the Gulf of impending military operations� U�S� officials 
assured their counterparts that the United States intended to provide such 
warning, and the British seemed satisfied that the system was working�83 For 
example, as the United States was planning Operation PRAYING MANTIS to re-
taliate for the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) on 14 April 1988, the 
British embassy in Washington reported that “U�S� officials have assured us that 
we will be informed in advance of any operation, as on previous occasions�”84 
CNO Crowe telephoned Chief of the Defence Staff Fieldhouse shortly before 
the operation started�85 General Colin L� Powell, the national security advisor, 
the next day updated Thatcher’s personal secretary on U�S� thinking regarding 
next military steps�86
Minesweeping Was Neither Viable nor Currently Necessary
In late July 1987, Britain’s foreign and defence ministers wrote that currently there 
was no mine threat in the Armilla OPAREA, although they acknowledged that 
could change with little warning� Moreover, in a long staff study they made a case 
against minesweeping, arguing that MCMVs could not clear a large area, would 
be confined to daylight operations at speeds not greater than eight knots, and 
would slow down merchant ships significantly if they tried to sweep ahead of a 
convoy� Additionally, Iran could reseed minefields easily� Destroying Iran’s mine 
warfare infrastructure would expand the conflict greatly�87
London preferred to use diplomacy and GCC MCM assets over deploying 
U�K� MCMVs, although the U�K� strategy for turning down the U�S� request was 
to offer technical naval counterarguments, in what its officials acknowledged 
would be a “difficult” process of declining the U�S� requests�88 In answering Ad-
miral Crowe’s request for MCMVs, Foreign Secretary Howe in July 1987 recom-
mended that the chief of defence staff should “quote technical military arguments 
demonstrating that it was not militarily sensible to use minesweepers, that they 
were too far away to do the job properly, and that a large number would be re-
quired, etc�”89
The ministers argued in July 1987 against even repositioning minesweepers to 
staging areas closer to the Gulf, as Admiral Crowe had requested� They character-
ized the measure as a “temporizing response” that would “soon become public and 
create an expectation that we would join the U�S� operation�” Staging MCMVs also 
would have costs to the United Kingdom: “It would then be virtually impossible 
not to proceed without giving the impression that our nerve had failed�”90
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Diplomacy Should Not Be Undermined by Naval Incidents
Throughout EARNEST WILL, Washington and London focused foremost on end-
ing the Iran-Iraq War by reaching a truce that, through negotiations, might yield 
a lasting peace� They reasoned that a cessation in ship attacks might support the 
broader initiative�
Seeking to create diplomatic breathing room to allow time for a cease-fire in 
ship attacks to occur in July 1987, Prime Minister Thatcher told ministers draft-
ing a response to the U�S� request for MCMVs that the West should avoid raising 
the profile of its military forces in the Gulf while a moratorium on ship attacks 
held� Her private secretary told National Security Advisor Carlucci on 1 August 
that the U�K� government “took the view that it was better not to increase the 
profile of the Western military presence at this juncture while there was a chance 
of progress on the diplomatic front towards de-escalating tension in the Gulf�”91
THATCHER REVERSES HER MCMV DECISION
Prime Minister Thatcher was attuned to threat conditions in the Persian Gulf, 
maintenance of good relations with the United States on issues such as burden 
sharing, and the importance of apparent cohesion in the Western alliance to 
enhance its diplomatic credibility and regional deterrence� These factors influ-
enced her to reconsider in early August 1987 her refusal to provide MCMVs to 
the Gulf�
In part, she was struck by the rapidly deteriorating regional security situation 
in midsummer 1987� Thousands of Iranian pilgrims rioted in Mecca on 31 July 
1987, with hundreds of people being killed�92 Attacks against the Saudi, Kuwaiti, 
and French embassies in Tehran followed on 1 August and were accompanied by 
official Iranian calls for the overthrow of the Saudi government�93
By 4 August, the prime minister concluded that Britain’s posture on Persian 
Gulf strategy needed to be “looked at afresh,” and related taskers began to flow 
to the bureaucracy�94 Iran’s mining of Texaco Caribbean in the Gulf of Oman off 
Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, on 10 August 1987 provided the immediate 
catalyst for her decision the next day to send four MCMVs and a support ship 
to the Gulf�95
Meeting with Carlucci on 3 August 1987, Thatcher expressed concern about 
developments during the past few days and the prospect that Gulf tensions would 
continue to escalate in the form of maritime guerrilla warfare and possibly direct 
attacks on U�S� ships� The chance for diplomacy to reduce tensions had dimin-
ished� She concluded that the main requirement was action by every means at the 
UN and elsewhere to isolate Iran�96
Thatcher told the cabinet on 4 August 1987 that there had been a qualitative 
change in the situation in the Persian Gulf that mandated a new look at the United 
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Kingdom’s Gulf policy� She judged that it was unrealistic to think any longer in 
terms of a window of opportunity to de-escalate by diplomatic measures� Rather, 
Iran was intent on terrorist actions against the United States and GCC and might 
engage in further mining or other attacks� Britain’s main priorities must be to take 
further diplomatic steps to isolate Iran, maintain GCC morale, and demonstrate 
the West’s unity of purpose� The prime minister also was concerned that Britain’s 
well-publicized decision not to send MCMVs to the Gulf—or even to preposition 
them—had conveyed the wrong political signal� “Our failure to meet a request 
for help from our closest ally had given an appearance of division and disunity 
among the Western governments and had probably worried the Arab states of the 
gulf� We should not think just in terms of British ships but acknowledge a wider 
duty to help uphold freedom of navigation�”97
Her taskers to the cabinet had diplomatic and military dimensions� Diplomati-
cally, the United Kingdom was to press hard and visibly for a further UNSC reso-
lution imposing an arms embargo against Iran for not following UNSCR 598, and 
Britain also should promote a resolution condemning the mining in the Gulf and 
upholding freedom of navigation� London would urge Moscow to put all possible 
pressure on Tehran to desist from mining and garner Soviet support for the arms 
embargo against Iran envisioned in the follow-on resolution to UNSCR 598�98
On the military side, the government would consider prepositioning MCMVs 
to possible holding points, including Gibraltar, Cyprus, Port Said, Djibouti, and 
Muscat� In the event they deployed, London would seek the “fullest consultation” 
with Washington about strategy in the Gulf� Early consideration would be given 
to other assets the United Kingdom might send to the region� Britain would pre-
pare for further arms requests from the Arab countries in the region�99
By 7 August 1987, Thatcher continued to weigh in to soften the United King-
dom’s initial rejection by amending the British defence minister’s draft response 
to Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s 31 July request for forward deployment 
of MCMVs� She wanted to emphasize that Britain had “certainly not” ruled out 
eventually deploying its MCMVs to the Gulf� Her private secretary summarized 
her guidance for the revised letter as follows: “We are looking afresh at all our 
contingency arrangements, so that we would be able to move the minesweepers 
as quickly as possible� We are looking at the situation very closely, on a day to 
day basis, and looking to see how we can help from the U�S� viewpoint, as well 
as our own�”100
On 11 August, Thatcher decided to deploy immediately four Hunt-class 
MCMVs and a support ship from the United Kingdom to the Persian Gulf, where 
they arrived in mid-September�101 The order reflected a British assessment that 
there was a heightened risk to the Armilla patrol following the discovery of mines 
in the southern end of and outside the Gulf during the preceding twenty-four 
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hours�102 The FCO prepared an overview that characterized the mining in the 
Gulf of Oman as a “direct threat to British ships” that led London to “send mine-
sweepers in support of British national interests�”103
Additionally, two maritime patrol aircraft were to deploy to Maşīrah, Oman, 
by 14 August as a public demonstration of commitment�104 London would send 
diplomatic notes requesting port access and logistics for the naval deployers to 
the Gulf�105 The United Kingdom also prepared to encourage Western European 
Union (WEU) participation by sending messages to the governments of France, 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands notifying them of the MCMV deployment, 
and adding that these countries would be assumed to be considering following 
suit�106
BILATERAL COOPERATION FROM SEPTEMBER 1987 TO JULY 1988
The United Kingdom cooperated with the United States during EARNEST WILL 
by providing support in the UN and elsewhere; serving as a gateway to WEU 
countries—notably, Belgium and the Netherlands—for mine countermeasures 
initiatives, particularly in the Armilla OPAREA in the southern Gulf and Strait of 
Hormuz; recovering mines and continuing the patrol’s hectic mission of accom-
panying merchant ships; and pursuing diplomacy that helped the United States, 
particularly after Operation PRAYING MANTIS in April 1988 and in the aftermath 
of the Iran Air 655 Airbus shootdown in July 1988�
Although the United States did not then achieve the formal joint naval com-
mand structure it had proposed, by October 1987 Washington was “content with 
the pragmatic coordination of minesweeping,” according to U�K� diplomatic 
reporting�107 British MCMVs contributed directly by clearing five mines off Fujai-
rah and four off Qatar by the end of November 1987, according to John Roberts’s 
history of the Royal Navy�108
The British also encouraged the Dutch and Belgian navies, with whom the 
Royal Navy had operated in a NATO context, to participate in the Gulf MCM 
effort� The Dutch in September 1987 committed two minehunters, while the Bel-
gians sent two minesweepers and a support ship, which arrived in the Gulf by late 
fall�109 As of November 1987, the Royal Navy was liaising closely with both navies 
in the Gulf, but their operations were not yet integrated�110 The three navies im-
proved cooperation by February 1988 as the United Kingdom prepared to return 
one of its four MCMVs to home waters�111 The FCO reported by April 1988 that 
“cooperation with the Dutch and Belgians (under a WEU umbrella) has worked 
well�” London also warned Washington that further U�S� pressure on its two allies 
to keep ships in the Gulf might be counterproductive�112
The Royal Navy saw the opportunity to showcase the MCM capabilities of the 
three navies in the southern Persian Gulf following the Roberts mine strike on 14 
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April 1988� The U�K� MOD directed its senior naval officer in the Gulf to encour-
age the other two navies to join British ships in clearing the minefield near the 
Roberts strike, as a good opportunity to demonstrate the usefulness of trilateral 
cooperation� However, the MOD urged that the Royal Navy be seen as taking the 
initiative� In its guidance to RN senior commanders, the ministry added that it 
wished to “avoid the suggestion that we are responding to a U�S� request or that 
we are/will be under U�S� control or guidance�”113 In discussing the ongoing trilat-
eral MCM operations on 21 April, cabinet talking points commented that the for-
tunate timing of the Roberts incident might persuade the Dutch and Belgians that 
their presence in the Persian Gulf was “useful and should not be terminated�”114 
By June 1988, the three countries had established a joint command consisting of 
a flagship, supply ship, and five minehunters under U�K� control�115
In the aftermath of PRAYING MANTIS, Washington wanted to pursue further 
initiatives in the UN and to improve coordination of naval operations in the 
theater� Even as Secretary of State Shultz notified the United Kingdom of the op-
eration on 18 April, he said that Iran’s actions “underscore the urgency of strong 
international measures in the UN to pass a followon resolution to UNSCR 598�”116 
On 22 April, Reagan wrote to Thatcher proposing a new, intensive diplomatic 
effort in the UN to end the conflict, improve coordination among Western naval 
forces in the Gulf, and enhance surveillance there to prevent mining, according 
to U�K� diplomatic reporting� The FCO advised its posts that Defence Minister 
Younger’s discussions with now–Secretary of Defense Carlucci on 27 April 1988 
had reached no firm conclusions, but at least the principals had agreed to explore 
greater coordination of MCM activity� Local commanders in the Gulf were to 
meet aboard USS Trenton (LPD 14) on 1 May to discuss the matter�117
However, the cabinet remained wary of expanding the Royal Navy’s role and 
advised a cautious response to Reagan’s letter� Concerned about the earlier U�S� 
proposal for a review of the coordination of forces in the Gulf, the foreign secre-
tary said in a late April 1988 cabinet meeting that the United Kingdom must be 
careful not to allow “responsibilities to run ahead of the resources available�”118
The president’s letter also may have been prompted by the U�S� decision by 29 
April 1988 to provide distress assistance to additional neutral merchant ships in 
the Persian Gulf�119 The Cabinet Office assessment on 3 May offered a range of 
complaints about the policy, noting that London long had urged Washington to 
be cautious about extending the rules of engagement� The new policy was an-
nounced without proper consultation with the United Kingdom� It could lead to 
pressure on Britain and other European nations to follow suit� The Royal Navy 
lacked adequate resources to support it, and the initiative might interfere with 
enhanced U�K� minesweeping coordination� Most seriously, a systematic policy 
of distress assistance was likely to lower the threshold for U�S�-Iranian clashes and 
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increase risks of Iranian attacks on shipping and offshore installations because 
of a narrowing of military options� Although the FCO wrote that it “must give 
general support [to] U�S� policy,” it began revising its response to Reagan’s letter, 
concentrating its warnings particularly on the dubious European reaction, the 
policy’s risk of lowering the threshold of conflict, and London’s concern that it 
had not been consulted adequately on this initiative�120
Despite its misgivings, in a memo dated 24 May 1988 London determined that 
British shippers would be permitted to accept distress assistance on the condi-
tion that the master of the ship requested help in each case�121 Given its residual 
concern about perceived U�S� escalatory tendencies, the cabinet noted that the 
United Kingdom had accepted the offer, but hinted clearly that London saw dis-
tress assistance primarily as a humanitarian initiative and held that its use should 
not contravene the use of minimum force only� The note continued by observing 
that several European partners harbored doubts about U�S� intentions in offering 
distress assistance, which they considered provocative to Iran� Ultimately, in June 
1988, the MOD provided British shippers with guidance on when to avail them-
selves of distress assistance, principally reminding them that such use should be 
confined to situations in which their ships were distant from the Armilla patrol�122
The United Kingdom’s public messaging and private diplomacy also endorsed 
U�S� operations during PRAYING MANTIS� U�K� officials proved to be unsym-
pathetic audiences when Iranian diplomats approached them to protest appar-
ent British endorsement of the operation in April 1988� For example, the FCO 
reported that on 25 April 1988 M� Akhondzadeh Basti, the Iranian chargé in 
London, told U�K� diplomats that the attacks had undermined Iranian attempts 
to reduce tension� His British interlocutor countered that it was instead Iranian 
provocations that had raised tensions, and that the United Kingdom applauded 
the U�S� action� He continued that Iran should expect a strong reaction to laying 
mines in international waters and dismissed as ridiculous Basti’s claim that the 
Americans themselves had laid mines recently� Referring to the chargé’s warning 
that U�K� support would threaten the Western world’s economy, he expressed the 
hope that this was not a threat�123
London also took diplomatic measures to blunt a potential Iranian-sponsored 
UN resolution against U�S� (and potentially all foreign) naval presence in the Gulf 
after USS Vincennes (CG 49) shot down an Iranian Airbus on 3 July 1988� That 
day, London issued a public statement—which Thatcher and Howe repeated—
regretting the incident but noting that it “underlines the urgent need for early 
end to the Iran/Iraq conflict including an end to all attacks on shipping�” Cabinet 
discussions on 7 July 1988 revealed that Iran had requested a full meeting of the 
Security Council and was canvassing its members regarding a draft resolution 
condemning the United States and demanding withdrawal of foreign forces from 
158
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 M O B L E Y  1 5 3
the Persian Gulf� Public comment by British officials had stressed the right of 
self-defense for U�S� naval forces in the Persian Gulf under article 51 of the UN 
Charter, a policy the FCO urged that Britain continue, given the Armilla patrol’s 
activities in the Gulf�124
Although the United Kingdom had its own reasons for supporting a naval 
presence in the Gulf, its postshootdown diplomacy might have been reinforced 
by a note from President Reagan to Thatcher on 11 July 1988� The missive argued 
that the UN should not be used as a forum “to undermine our mutual interests 
in the Gulf and the Western naval presence there, or as a means to undermine 
UNSCR 598 as the basic framework for a settlement�” While inviting Thatcher’s 
advice and support, he shared a diplomatic strategy in which the United States 
would oppose a resolution that would distract from UNSCR 598� Rather, the 
president judged that Security Council unanimity might be preserved better by a 
statement from the Security Council president that regretted the accident; called 
for an investigation; and, most importantly, urged the earliest implementation of 
resolution 598�125
Preparing for the Security Council’s meeting on 14 July 1988 to discuss the 
shootdown, the FCO advised its posts that “we are not prepared to let Iran use 
the Council selectively� It has flouted the authority of the UN over UNSCR 598 
and cannot now expect the Council to address the Airbus incident in isolation�” 
London intended to keep UNSCR 598 at the discussion’s center and to refer to 
the principles of freedom of navigation and self-defense�126 Following the debate, 
the UN on 20 July 1988 passed UNSCR 616, which expressed “deep distress” over 
the U�S� attack and “profound regret” for the loss of human lives, but also stressed 
the need to end the war�127
THE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION
The United States was fortunate to have such a good partner as the United 
Kingdom during the prolonged and risky tanker-escort regime� Although other 
countries reluctantly deployed ships to the region, none were so supportive—or 
so critical to achieving our shared diplomatic objectives for ending the Iran-Iraq 
War—as our partners in the United Kingdom� The Royal Navy worked closely 
with its U�S� counterpart despite national-level reservations and under trying cir-
cumstances that foreshadowed those encountered in the more complex coalition 
operations that followed�
A few observations about Anglo-American cooperation during EARNEST 
WILL are discussed below�
• The U�S� diplomatic record in the 1980s was not persuasive to all U�K� of-
ficials, who raised doubts about it in internal memorandums and even in 
discussions with the United States� Washington’s allies in Europe and the 
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Gulf were sensitive to issues of U�S� reliability following American arms sales 
to Iran as part of Iran-Contra and the country’s withdrawal of forces from 
Lebanon in 1984 after committing them to the Multinational Force there, 
alongside the United Kingdom, France, and Italy� The model that Ameri-
can policy makers offered—international cooperation to clear mines laid 
in the Red Sea in mid-1984—was unconvincing to the British officials, who 
pointed out that the 1984 effort was a poor analogy because countries in the 
Persian Gulf either distrusted Western presence and commitment or were 
active enemies, unlike those along the Red Sea�128
• Under domestic pressure to create an international coalition for EARNEST 
WILL, U�S� officials at times appeared to be tone-deaf and insensitive to the 
dynamics of London’s decision-making calculus� Washington’s demands 
probably hardened London’s attitude and its responses to the United States; 
its naval strategy in the Gulf did not change, for example, until the cabinet 
concluded that the threat to U.K. interests—notably, the safety of the Armilla 
patrol and U�K� shipping—had increased rapidly�129 Repeatedly pressing an 
ally on the same issue is not necessarily effective, no matter how good the 
working relationship�
• The United States might have used a more persuasive, low-key approach in 
asking for the minesweeper deployments� When Carlucci met with the cabi-
net secretary on 3 August 1987, the national security advisor asked whether 
it would have been advantageous for the United States to take “informal 
soundings” of the British government before requesting the MCMV deploy-
ment to the Gulf� Sir Robert Armstrong responded that such informal com-
munications certainly would have been helpful, if time permitted�130
• In meeting with other British officials the same day, Carlucci told them 
that he thought the U�S� request for minesweepers—of which he and 
Reagan had been unaware—had not been handled very skillfully� Car-
lucci asked the prime minister whether a request for British naval support 
from the GCC rather than the United States would have been preferable� 
Thatcher replied that there were advantages in an appeal from the GCC 
for international cooperation to preserve freedom of navigation, but she 
doubted the GCC countries collectively would request minesweeping� An-
other possibility would have been to call for international action to remove 
mines, but she opined that that step would have been an invitation to the 
Russians to get involved�131
• A low-key discussion about potential U�K� minesweeper deployments 
earlier and at a much higher level might have been more effective� Instead, 
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President Reagan started with a relatively undemanding request for ad-
ditional bilateral exercises and more publicity about the U�K� naval com-
mitment to the region, but then as regional tensions rose subordinates 
requested more� As leaks occurred, both the U�S� request for MCMVs and 
the U�K� rebuff received press coverage—to the detriment of both parties�
• British officials were aware of U�S� domestic politics and privy to internal 
U�S� debates on EARNEST WILL�132 The sophistication of British policy mak-
ers probably contributed to their skepticism about some U�S� argumenta-
tion, since the United Kingdom apparently perceived American domestic 
politics to be as much a driver of U�S� behavior as an increasingly threaten-
ing Iran�
• Both Washington and London encouraged cooperation among local com-
manders in the Gulf� This allowed de facto coordination, even though at the 
time the United States never achieved its original objective of establishing a 
formal multinational naval command under its control� In other words, there 
were theater-level work-arounds within national constraints�
• Focused as Washington was on the maritime domain of war in a relatively 
small arena against a weak adversary, it probably would have found facili-
tating international cooperation during EARNEST WILL to be a relatively 
simple effort compared with planning for an intense, multidomain conflict 
against a more robust enemy in the future—conditions that would be found 
in many scenarios envisioned, and later encountered, by the United States 
and its allies� 
Britain’s collaboration with the United States demonstrated the benefits of having 
sophisticated, capable partners, but it also reveals the challenges of working in 
coalitions, even under the best conditions� To get the most out of such alliances, 
U�S� policy makers need to develop as sophisticated an understanding of their 
allies as they try to develop of their adversaries�
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BOOK REVIEWS
WAR WITHIN AND WITHOUT
Scratch One Flattop: The First Carrier Air Campaign and the Battle of the Coral Sea, by Robert C� Stern� 
Bloomington: Indiana Univ� Press, 2019� 328 pages� $44�99�
The Battle of the Coral Sea often gets 
overlooked in history, taking place 
as it did a month before the much 
more dramatic Battle of Midway and 
its exceptionally lopsided outcome� 
Coral Sea, though, was the first battle 
between aircraft carriers� It also was a 
much more even contest than Midway, 
with both the Americans and Japanese 
losing one carrier� Robert C� Stern sets 
out to correct this historical imbalance 
with Scratch One Flattop. His book is an 
impressive undertaking and certainly will 
stand out as one of the more important 
books on the Pacific naval campaigns for 
a decade or two—or maybe even three�
Stern brings a good deal of experience 
to the task, having written numerous 
books on World War II naval history in 
both the Atlantic and the Pacific� More 
importantly, he develops the Japanese 
side of this engagement, using the 
official Japanese history, the 102-volume 
Senshi Sōsho (War History Series)� Such 
books often are more a compilation of 
military documents than an analytical 
or narrative account; nonetheless, Stern 
is able to develop the Japanese side 
of this engagement relatively well�
As a result, Stern does a good job of 
showing the interaction between the 
two opposing task forces� What one did 
affected what the other could do� He 
also understands and shows, without 
confusing his readers, that both the 
Americans and the Japanese were 
operating with incomplete and often 
inaccurate information� Other factors got 
in the way as well, including sea condi-
tions and other weather-related aspects�
The coverage ranges from the tactical 
to the strategic� The stories of indi-
vidual pilots on both sides often are 
quite compelling—sometimes better 
than anything Hollywood could create� 
Major themes include how technology 
often failed the Americans and how the 
Japanese failed to anticipate the losses of 
personnel that are inevitable in combat 
or to plan for their replacement�
Stern rejects the judgment of Samuel 
Eliot Morison that Rear Admiral Frank 
Jack Fletcher lost the battle at the 
tactical level� Fletcher, Stern argues, had 
more-achievable orders than his Japanese 
counterparts, Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi 
and Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara� Stern 
sees Fletcher as cautious, inconsistent, 
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and unsure of himself—but also lucky, 
in that he made fewer mistakes than 
Takagi and Hara� More importantly, 
the Japanese needed to maintain their 
momentum, and that required an 
outright victory� Much of Japan’s strategic 
failure was the fault of Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto, the fleet commander, who 
did not give his men in the field enough 
carriers to overwhelm the Americans 
at a time when it was still possible for 
the Japanese to do so; instead, it was an 
even fight� “It had been his best (and 
would prove to be his last) chance to 
achieve an easy strategic victory over the 
Americans, and he simply overlooked 
it� Simply stated, this was a battle the 
Japanese could have and should have 
won, but chose not to; the opportunity 
would not come again” (p� 282)�
The book is not unblemished� For 
example, Stern seems overly fond of 
military acronyms� However, most of 
its faults lie with the publisher rather 
than the author� At forty-five dollars, 
Scratch One Flattop seems to be priced 
too high� Moreover, the quality of 
maps, photos, and diagrams leaves 
something to be desired� Still, all told, 
Stern offers an intriguing and valuable 
read that will be of interest and use to 
students of World War II at all levels�
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
Artificial Intelligence and Global Security: Future 
Trends, Threats and Considerations, ed� Yvonne 
R� Masakowski� Bingley, U�K�: Emerald Publish-
ing, 2020� 187 pages� $99�99�
Grappling with the technological, 
policy, planning, and ethical issues 
attendant to the emergence of artificial 
intelligence (AI) is a daunting task 
and, given the complex nature of 
this interdisciplinary science, a 
challenge that can boggle the mind 
(pun intended)� Artificial Intelligence 
and Global Security is a trim volume 
of interrelated chapters, skillfully 
edited by Dr� Yvonne Masakowski, 
that provides a timely primer on the 
moral, ethical, and policy implications 
associated with AI� While ostensibly 
a book about technology, this is not 
a technological book� Rather, Masa-
kowski and the contributing authors 
serve up thought-provoking and 
relevant discussions that will challenge 
the reader’s notions about AI when 
juxtaposed against theories of just 
war doctrine, individual and societal 
morality, and the ethical constraints 
and opportunities within the context 
of the global security environment�
With her education and experience in 
psychology and philosophy, and her 
recent professorship in the College 
of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval 
War College, Masakowski is uniquely 
suited as editor of this volume� She 
has assembled a clowder of established 
scholars who are predominantly 
trained in ethics and philosophy and 
has interspersed a brace of program-
matic and technical experts� Together, 
these chapter authors examine a broad 
swath of philosophical and ethical 
issues, including in individual chapters 
on the ethical dilemmas of AI and pri-
vacy, AI and moral reasoning, and the 
particular challenges of AI and space 
warfare, as well as several discussions 
of future considerations for AI from 
both ethical and policy perspectives�
Among the book’s most engaging 
chapters, William Casebeer’s discusses 
the building of an artificial conscience 
and the prospects for a morally 
170
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
 B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 6 5
autonomous AI� Currently a senior 
researcher in human-machine systems 
in the private sector, Casebeer’s central 
question is whether AI can be used to 
develop systems capable of reasoning 
through moral issues� He makes an 
argument for why we need to build this 
artificial conscience soon, given that 
AI already is being used in multiple 
domains, then goes on to present a 
rough blueprint for how to build one� 
He describes how a machine with 
an ethically grounded and morally 
driven conscience may be coming to a 
battlefield near you soon—no longer 
bearing the tincture of science fiction�
The fulcrum chapter of the book, au-
thored by John Shook, Tibor Solymosi, 
and James Giordano on the ethical 
constraints and contexts of AI use in 
national security and warfare, is likely 
to be of keen interest to readers of the 
Naval War College Review. This chapter 
describes a continuum from “soft” 
to “hard” AI based on structural and 
functional complexity that is useful in 
determining attribution of actions—an 
especially critical consideration for 
the use of AI in warfare� The authors 
contend that with soft AI, the human 
fingerprint is evident and attribution is 
readily detected, but as AI moves along 
the continuum toward harder systems 
that are autonomous and capable 
of developing intelligence beyond 
initial programming, attribution will 
become far more problematic� Here, 
a HAL 9000–like machine developing 
actions and outcomes not intended 
by human programmers and resistant 
to “exogenous attempts at constraint, 
imposition, and control” is the elixir 
of science fiction� The value of this 
chapter is in understanding the 
essential characteristics of AI across 
the continuum and in determining 
the bespoke development, application, 
and constraints of all forms of AI�
The penultimate chapter of the book, 
by Gina Granados Palmer, an interdis-
ciplinary scholar, harvests the detailed 
work in the preceding chapters and 
develops a comprehensive summary of 
the book’s themes� Here Palmer pro-
vides a thoughtful assessment of AI’s 
overall security landscape and develops 
four key considerations relating to 
(1) the evolution of near-Turing-test 
ethics in the human-machine team; (2) 
the creation of short-, intermediate-, 
and long-term strategies for ethical AI 
development and use; (3) the develop-
ment of dual-use ethics in relation 
to dual-use AI; and (4) the urgent 
need for strong ethical foundations to 
underpin AI technological advances�
The volume concludes with a forward-
looking epilogue by Dr� James Canton, 
a well-known futurist, who highlights 
the opportunities as well as the 
dangers of AI in the global security 
environment� This final chapter, like 
the future of AI itself, is simultaneously 
hopeful and frightening� As Canton 
points out, “we cannot fully fathom” 
the full potential—both bright and 
dangerous—of an AI-infused future� 
He underscores that security at both 
the local and global levels cannot be 
conceptualized without fully envision-
ing how AI will evolve—a prophetic 
and prescriptive admonition�
Artificial Intelligence and Global 
Security is not a compendium of 
information on current AI technol-
ogy and its essential tools; given the 
rapidly changing nature of AI, the 
usefulness of such a book would be 
fleeting and ephemeral� Rather, here 
readers will discover a transcendent 
and informed exploration of the 
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ethical, moral, individual, societal, 
and policy issues surrounding AI� It is 
the book’s discussion of the enduring 
nature of these issues that will be of 
value and greatest significance to 
the national-security community�
THOMAS CULORA
Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Medi-
terranean Convoy War, November 1941–March 
1942, by Vincent P� O’Hara� Annapolis, MD: Na-
val Institute Press, 2019� 322 pages� $34�95�
In his latest book, Vincent P� O’Hara 
adds to his previous works on the 
Mediterranean during World War 
II by analyzing the period between 
November 1941 and March 1942� He 
considers six decisive actions that 
changed the tide of the naval war in 
the Middle Sea, three of which went 
in favor of the British (the actions of 
Force K, the battle of Cape Bon, and the 
first battle of Sirte [Sidra]) and three 
in favor of the Italians (Alexandria, the 
loss of Force K, and second Sirte)�
The author’s detailed narrative reminds 
the reader that the Mediterranean 
war was one of naval attrition around 
the sea-lanes crossing the theater�
An essential question in Six Victories 
is the influence of intelligence on 
naval operations� According to O’Hara, 
while ULTRA provided critical data on 
many occasions, information often 
was untimely and was offset by Italian 
counterintelligence� O’Hara’s thesis is 
not entirely new; Italy’s leading scholar 
working on ULTRA, Alberto Santoni, 
reached similar conclusions in his 1981 
study Il vero traditore, which is not 
among the author’s references� O’Hara 
claims that the higher ratio of Axis 
attacks against British convoys dem-
onstrates that ULTRA did not affect the 
operations significantly� The argument 
is captious, since possessing intelligence 
does not mean necessarily that it is 
possible for one to attack; that possibility 
was reduced severely for Britain in the 
latter three of the “six victories�” How-
ever, when the British had the means, as 
during the operations of Force K, ULTRA 
allowed them to maximize the effective-
ness of their limited forces, which were 
numerically inferior to the enemy’s 
and had fewer bases available to them 
in the central Mediterranean� Finally, 
the British ratio of success for attacked 
convoys was better than that of the Axis�
Six Victories also puts great emphasis 
on the consequences of the three Italian 
victories� The destruction of Force K 
ended a nightmare period for the Italian 
convoys, while Alexandria allowed the 
Axis to achieve preeminence in the 
central Mediterranean� The pinnacle 
was the second Sirte battle, defined as an 
Italian victory—correctly reversing the 
judgment of some British naval histori-
ans� Also, according to O’Hara, the battle 
proved that the Italian surface fleet was a 
credible deterrent, discouraging further 
British attempts to resupply Malta (p� 
254)� Yet while the author’s conclusion 
that second Sirte was an Axis victory is 
persuasive as far as the destruction of the 
enemy convoy goes, it is not so with re-
spect to its consequences� The action did 
not discourage further British attempts 
to resupply Malta; instead, it encouraged 
the Royal Navy to think that light surface 
forces were sufficient to meet the Italian 
fleet, preparing the way for the disaster 
of HARPOON-VIGOROUS in June 1942�
Here the major shortcoming of 
the book becomes apparent: not 
putting the Italian actions into the 
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broader context of the Mediterranean 
naval war� If that war’s object was 
communications, the Germans 
achieved the majority of the tactical 
successes that produced operational 
and strategic consequences� Even 
according to O’Hara’s data, 82 percent 
of Allied losses during the period of 
Six Victories resulted from German 
actions (p� 259)� Second Sirte is a 
clear example of this; the delay the 
Italian surface forces imposed was 
not decisive, because it was German 
aircraft that sank the enemy ships� 
Despite this, O’Hara concludes that 
the three Italian victories led to 
Axis maritime control of the central 
Mediterranean up to November 1942, 
broken only by the coming of Ameri-
can naval reinforcements (p� 257)�
This conclusion is not convincing� 
First, it seems to confound surface 
predominance with maritime control� 
During summer–fall 1942, intelligence, 
air, and underwater predominance—
critical elements of maritime control 
during World War II—were in the 
hands of the British, enabling them to 
disrupt Axis communications despite 
enemy surface predominance� Second, 
this trend already was emerging 
during the first period considered 
by Six Victories (fall 1941)� Current 
Anglo-American and Italian scholarly 
work agrees that the increased security 
of Axis transports during early 1942 
depended on the decline of Malta as an 
operative base, itself caused by increas-
ing German air attacks� O’Hara seems 
unable to shake this argument, because 
he only identifies a chronological con-
nection in the improved situation of 
the Axis convoys after the three Italian 
victories (p� 127), possibly mistaking 
correlation for causation� Surface 
preponderance, the main result of the 
Italian victories, could not stop air and 
submarine attacks against Axis con-
voys, Britain’s primary weapons against 
enemy communications, which indeed 
regained their momentum when Ger-
man airpower shifted from the central 
Mediterranean to assist Rommel�
In conclusion, O’Hara’s book offers a 
detailed reconstruction of the naval 
actions described, deserving credit 
for proving that the effectiveness of 
the Italian navy at a tactical level was 
better than Anglo-American studies 
usually have acknowledged� Less 
convincing is the analysis of the 
operational and strategic consequences 
of the six “victories,” owing to an over-
emphasis on surface warfare, which 
was only a part—and possibly not the 
most important one—of the Mediter-
ranean naval scenario in 1941–42� 
Readers searching this book for lessons 
relevant to modern antiaccess warfare 
will need to bear this in mind�
FABIO DE NINNO
On War and Politics: The Battlefield inside Wash-
ington’s Beltway, by Arnold L� Punaro, with Da-
vid Poyer� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2016� 249 pages� $29�95�
On War and Politics is a remarkable 
autobiography� It explores the life 
and professional careers of Arnold L� 
Punaro, a U�S� Marine Corps Reserve 
(USMCR) major general and congres-
sional insider; it also is a remarkable 
portrayal of the day-to-day workings 
of Congress and the Pentagon, so it 
will appeal to a broad range of readers 
interested in national-security affairs� 
Punaro spent over thirty-five years as 
a USMCR officer and worked closely 
with the chairman of the Senate Armed 
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Services Committee, Senator Samuel A� 
Nunn Jr� (D-GA), for almost twenty-four 
years� Nunn played an important role 
in almost every major piece of defense 
legislation and understood the intrica-
cies of power politics inside the Beltway�
Punaro grew up a devout Roman 
Catholic, and as a young boy entered 
the seminary to become a priest, but 
eventually left and attended Spring Hill 
College for his undergraduate degree� 
On graduation, he started talking to 
military recruiters to avoid the draft, be-
cause his father warned him, “You don’t 
want to get drafted� You’ll go to Asia 
as an infantryman, and there’s nothing 
grand and glorious about war” (p� 18)� 
Punaro was particularly impressed by 
the sharp uniform the Marine recruiter 
wore, so he decided to join the Corps�
Punaro’s dry wit and sense of humor 
are evident throughout the book� 
Describing his experiences during 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) at 
Quantico, he writes, “After being 
shouted into a haphazard queue, I began 
my introduction to the three eternal 
truths in the military: hurry up and 
wait, endless paperwork, and constant 
changes to ‘the word�’” Punaro excelled 
at OCS and the Basic School, and after 
graduation got his “dream job”: orders to 
Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader�
Punaro’s combat tour in Vietnam shaped 
the course of his subsequent life� Punaro 
starts the book with an incident in which 
he almost died� “None of us would come 
back the same� Some wouldn’t come 
back at all, especially from my area of 
operation, which held the dubious dis-
tinction of having the most casualties of 
any in the combat zone” (p� 26)� Punaro 
learned well the leadership lessons of 
an infantry platoon leader in Vietnam� 
“We grew to respect each other, and 
my Marines gained confidence in my 
leadership for two primary reasons: 
I never got lost, and they knew that 
I wouldn’t put them in more danger 
than absolutely necessary” (p� 50)�
After nearly four months in Vietnam—
almost all in the field—Punaro was 
seriously wounded� One of his fellow 
Marines, Corporal Roy Lee Hammonds, 
attempted to help Punaro but was killed 
in the firefight� “I had no doubt that the 
bullets that had torn through his protec-
tive gear would have ripped me to shreds 
had he not thrown himself between 
me and the snipers” (p� 55)� Punaro 
was medevaced to a naval hospital in 
Okinawa� He always has remembered 
Hammonds’s actions that day�
On his return from Vietnam, Punaro 
was assigned to Marine Corps Base 
Quantico and became involved in 
planning social events for the training 
battalion� His wit and humor show 
when he describes the art of doing so 
in cooperation with officers’ wives� 
“It was an early lesson in Washington 
ways: if you don’t mind kissing some 
butts, you can go far” (p� 62)�
After leaving the active-duty Marine 
Corps, Punaro entered the University 
of Georgia’s Grady School of Journal-
ism� He excelled in his graduate 
studies and was offered a job with 
Senator Nunn� “Little did I know that 
I was signing up for a decade’s tour 
on Nunn’s personal staff, and then 
another fourteen years on the Armed 
Services Committee[—]nearly a 
quarter-century with the Senate and the 
senator, in one way or another” (p� 72)�
Punaro weaves a tapestry of crucial 
events in our nation’s history through 
different presidencies—those of Carter, 
Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush 
II—with details available only from 
a congressional insider� Moreover, 
he gives the reader a front-row seat 
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on the development of American 
national security under each of these 
presidents� “As we wrapped up eight 
years of a defense buildup and both 
positive and negative developments, 
from Iran-Contra to the Gorbachev 
era, we thought we had seen it all� But 
we could not imagine the tumult the 
next years would bring” (p� 150)�
Perhaps the best chapter is the last: 
“Lessons Learned�” Punaro provides 
a short synopsis of important lessons 
learned throughout his illustrious 
careers in the military, the Senate, 
and private business� These are 
lessons distilled after a lifetime spent 
in leadership positions and working 
with other great leaders� He writes, 
“If today’s leaders could find the 
courage to apply these, they would 
be well on their way to solving most 
of today’s legislative gridlock, finger 
pointing, and failure to act on even 
the most pressing issues” (p� 209)�
The book is much more than a col-
lection of autobiographical anecdotes� 
Punaro and his coauthor provide keen 
insights on important national-security 
issues in our nation’s history that many 
of us have never heard before, told from 
a Washington insider’s perspective� This 
book is a must-read for young military 
officers� I wholeheartedly recommend it�
THOMAS J� GIBBONS
“I Am Determined to Live or Die on Board My 
Ship”: The Life of Admiral John Inglis; An Ameri-
can in the Georgian Navy, by Jim Tildesley� Kib-
worth Beauchamp, U�K�: Matador, 2019� 561 
pages� ₤19�99�
This five-hundred-page biography 
is longer than many devoted to the 
world’s most famous admirals� One 
has to search quite carefully in the 
literature on the Royal Navy during 
the American Revolution and the 
wars of the French Revolution to find 
even a passing reference to John Inglis 
(1743–1807)� During his forty-two 
years of active naval service, Inglis 
reached the coveted rank of post captain� 
Following his retirement from active 
service in 1799, he rose by seniority up 
the ranks of “yellow” half-pay admirals, 
eventually becoming a vice admiral�
The author of this work, Jim Tildesley, 
former director of the Scottish Maritime 
Museum, has unearthed—with admi-
rable diligence, in more than twenty 
archives in England, Scotland, and 
the United States—the documentary 
evidence of Inglis’s life� The result of 
many years’ labor, Tildesley’s book 
provides a fascinating and lucid 
account that serves as a valuable case 
study of a diligent and successful naval 
officer who retired as a captain�
From other historians, we know that 
two-hundred-some captains were 
serving in the fleet during Inglis’s 
career, and only a small percentage of 
them could rise to flag rank on active 
service; then, as now, reaching the rank 
of captain meant that an officer had 
had a typical successful career� Thus, 
Inglis is part of a significant group of 
career naval officers worthy of study�
Tildesley follows Inglis’s life and career, 
seemingly using every scrap of paper 
that relates to him, his family, and his 
ships, from log- and muster books 
to municipal tax records as well as 
newspapers, estate records, letters from 
family friends and acquaintances, and 
a wide range of official reports� The 
result is a remarkably complete view 
of an ordinary naval captain’s life�
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Despite being part of a large organiza-
tion, captains have distinctive careers 
and different experiences within the 
broad range of activities that define 
naval service� From the outset, John 
Inglis was somewhat different, having 
been born in 1743 at Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, then the world’s 
third-largest English-speaking city, 
after Bristol and London� John was 
the son and namesake of a wealthy 
Philadelphia merchant, slave trader, 
and slave owner� His father was born 
in Edinburgh, Scotland, and settled in 
Pennsylvania in 1730, after a period as 
a merchant at Nevis in the West Indies�
Young John joined the Royal Navy at age 
fourteen in 1757, as an aspiring officer 
in the frigate Garland, commanded 
by the notoriously ineffective future 
admiral Captain Marriot Arbuthnot� 
Young Inglis soon deserted his ship, 
but family connections to the three 
sons of Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto in 
the Scottish Borders resurrected his 
career prospects� The eldest of the three 
Elliot brothers inherited the family’s 
Scottish estates and became a member of 
Parliament and a Lord of the Admiralty; 
the second became a wealthy merchant 
in Philadelphia and married John Inglis’s 
mother’s sister; and the third was a 
naval officer in his first command�
This last took John Inglis on board and 
rated him a master’s mate, a typical 
rating for an aspiring officer� Within a 
few weeks, Inglis saw his first fleet op-
erations as part of Admiral Sir Edward 
Hawke’s squadron in the Bay of Biscay� 
Quickly promoted to midshipman, Inglis 
remained with Elliot as he moved to a 
new command and was with him during 
his successful capture in the Irish Chan-
nel of the French privateer squadron 
under François Thurot in 1760� In 1761, 
fully trained by Elliot, Inglis took his 
examination and was commissioned 
a lieutenant, then followed Elliot to 
the Mediterranean as fourth lieuten-
ant in the seventy-gun Chichester�
Inglis’s career touched on several naval 
operations that have a broader interest 
beyond his career� Tildesley’s detailed 
accounts of these events often provide 
valuable new information based on 
documentary evidence� They include 
coverage of Inglis’s first command, 
in 1768, of the eight-gun schooner 
Sultana—a replica of which was built 
in Maryland in 2001—and his service 
in that ship enforcing the Naviga-
tion Acts� This included operations 
in Chesapeake Bay, where he met 
Colonel George Washington, and later 
the notorious smuggling operations 
in Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay� 
While in command of Sultana, Inglis 
was professionally interested in law 
enforcement and became one of the 
subscribers to the first American edition 
of Blackstone’s Commentaries� Later, 
Inglis was in command of a ship during 
the mutiny at the Nore� He participated 
in the battle of Camperdown and was 
involved with an attempt to persuade the 
Dutch warships under Van Dirckinck 
to defect to the British in 1796�
Tildesley’s study of Captain John Inglis 
is a notable addition to the literature� His 
work complements recent studies, such 
as Hilary Rubinstein’s Trafalgar Captain: 
Durham of the Defiance; The Man Who 
Refused to Miss Trafalgar (2005), Victor 
T� Sharman’s Nelson’s Hero: The Story 
of His “Sea-Daddy,” Captain William 
Locker (2005), and Bryan Elson’s Nelson’s 
Yankee Captain: The Life of Boston 
Loyalist Sir Benjamin Hallowell (2008)� 
In his work, Tildesley breaks away from 
the Nelson-Trafalgar focus and gives 
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a new, illuminating insight through 
this case study of a captain’s career�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
The Greek Genocide in American Naval War Dia-
ries: Naval Commanders Report and Protest Death 
Marches and Massacres in Turkey’s Pontus Region, 
1921–1922, ed� Robert Shenk and Sam Koktzo-
glou� New Orleans: Univ� of New Orleans Press, 
2020� 400 pages� $24�95�
Living in an information-saturated 
world in which social media and 
ubiquitous cell phone use allow the 
worst atrocities of war to be livestreamed 
on a global scale in a matter of hours 
can make it hard for us to understand 
a time not so long ago when acts of 
senseless violence were obscured by 
long distances and the fog of war�
In the aftermath of the First World War, 
the Ottoman Empire disintegrated into a 
bloody intercommunal conflict between 
millennia-old Greek communities along 
the Black Sea and a new nationalist 
Turkish government� There to witness it 
was the U�S� Black Sea Fleet, which was 
tasked with maintaining the security of 
American interests, primarily relating to 
tobacco companies and U�S� relief work-
ers, in the Turkish hinterland during the 
Greco-Turkish War� As neutral observers 
(the United States never declared war on 
the Ottoman Empire, despite its alliance 
with the Central Powers), the fleet used 
this network of contacts to report on al-
legations of ethnic cleansing and forced 
population removal� While the plight of 
the Ottoman Empire’s Greek population 
on the Ionian coast during the great fire 
of Smyrna in 1922 is covered well in pre-
vious scholarship, editors Robert Shenk 
and Sam Koktzoglou shed additional 
light on the fate of the Pontic Greek 
communities of the Black Sea coast, 
using the U�S� Navy as the narrator�
The bulk of The Greek Genocide in 
American Naval War Diaries uses 
condensed accounts from the war 
diaries deposited in the National 
Archives of American destroyers based 
on the Pontic coast to build a body 
of compelling evidence of wartime 
atrocities� Shenk, who previously has 
written more broadly on the region 
in America’s Black Sea Fleet, and 
Koktzoglou highlight the challenges 
naval officers faced in discerning the 
ground truth in a wartime environ-
ment in which sea power stopped at 
the shoreline� The accounts capture 
the conflicting narratives heard, the 
incomplete information available, and 
the sense of impotence felt by U�S� naval 
officers with no sanction to intervene�
Using the naval war diaries as the 
backbone of the narrative and 
supplementing them with testimony 
from American businessmen and aid 
workers, Shenk and Koktzoglou make 
the case that elements of the Turkish 
government were involved in a direct 
effort to carry out what is defined in 
the modern era as genocide against the 
Greeks of the Pontus region� The war 
diaries detail a series of forced removals 
of the military-age males of the local 
Greek population conducted by Turkish 
forces, often resulting in reports of mass 
killings� Furthermore, the naval diaries 
present accounts brought by internally 
displaced persons and American aid 
workers from the interior of Anatolia 
detailing the wholesale destruction 
of Greek villages, ethnic cleansing, 
and mass rape� Coupled with these 
stories are discussions with Turkish 
government officials outlining their 
justifications for such extreme tactics, 
as well as the uncertainties USN officers 
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faced regarding the true extent of the 
killings and Turkish motivations� Some 
of the accounts from survivors of the 
mass killings and rapes are not for the 
faint of heart, and underscore the sense 
of powerlessness felt by the commanders 
of the Black Sea Fleet, who, despite their 
possession of state-of-the-art weapons 
of war, could do little to stop the chaos�
That is not to say that USN officers 
stood by and did nothing� The war dia-
ries provide several portraits of heroism 
by officers attempting to avert further 
bloodshed and the great professional 
risks some destroyer captains incurred� 
One account in particular highlights 
the power one officer can have when 
compelled by humanitarian virtue� Cap-
tain Arthur L� Bristol Jr� of USS Overton 
risked his future career prospects by 
sending a well-timed letter to compel 
his commanding officer, Admiral 
Mark Bristol (no relation)—who had 
a well-known affinity for the national-
ist government—to issue a formal 
complaint to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
over the planned forced removal of 
noncombatants� This likely spared the 
lives of twelve thousand Greek women 
and children� In multiple accounts, we 
see naval commanders struggling to 
define actions and concepts for which 
they had no words: genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, and a nascent sense of the 
responsibility to protect� We witness in 
these accounts the internal struggle 
of U�S� naval officers caught between 
the promise of America’s new global 
role and the limits of that promise� 
The Greek Genocide in American 
Naval War Diaries is a compelling, 
primary-source resource for scholars 
seeking to understand the human face 
of sea power in the twentieth century�
MICHAEL IMBRENDA
“Vincere!”: The Italian Royal Army’s Counter-
insurgency Operations in Africa, 1922–1940, by 
Federica Saini Fasanotti� Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2020� 224 pages� $44�
Most military historians are familiar 
with the colonial histories of Spain, 
France, Italy, and Great Britain on 
the North African littoral (along with 
Belgium in the Congo, as well as 
Germany and Portugal in southwest 
and southeast Africa)� This recent work 
considers in detail the experience of 
one of these participants as it appears 
from eighty years of retrospection� 
With a title that can be read as conquest 
or victory, the book deals with the 
timely topic of low-intensity conflict in 
Africa in the first part of the twentieth 
century by a European power: Italy’s 
Royal Army in Libya and Ethiopia 
(or the Kingdom of Abyssinia)� These 
were campaigns fought to pacify the 
coastal regions and interior� It is not a 
surprise—with success in the global war 
on terrorism and the “Long War”—that 
something is familiar in these colonial 
campaigns fought within the same 
locations, terrain, and populations as 
today’s� Yet while tactics, techniques, or 
procedures might be similar, the policy 
and strategic goals were very different, 
as were the actual results of the conflicts�
The study divides logically into 
two stand-alone parts, the 1922–31 
campaign in Libya and the 1936–40 
campaign in Ethiopia� Introductions 
and conclusions provide context for 
each campaign; sections on acronyms 
and personalities, as well as glossaries 
and notes, support the narrative� The 
well-written narrative also provides 
after-action lessons that are of interest to 
current efforts in the region� One theme 
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from these campaigns is that the army 
and air force units that conducted initial 
offensive operations had to be replaced 
by locally raised forces to perform 
subsequent pacification and occupation 
duties� This required leaders with lan-
guage and cross-cultural skills prepared 
for a long commitment to their assigned 
theater� In both campaigns, firm 
defensive bases and mobile columns 
were used in conjunction with rudi-
mentary mechanization and air support 
that matured as the campaigns contin-
ued—all experiences similar to those of 
the U�S� Marines in the small-war era�
Saini Fasanotti earned a PhD at the 
University of Milan and is a senior 
visiting fellow at the Brookings Institu-
tion, Washington, DC� This is her 
fifth book, here translated (with only 
a few anomalies) from the Italian 
by Sylwia Zawadzka� Based on Saini 
Fasanotti’s ten years of study in Italian 
archives and on-the-ground research, 
“Vincere!” provides original insights that 
even now will be of interest to those 
responsible for these regions� It serves 
as an example of applied history that 
can be a practical tool to inform policy, 
tactics, procedures, and techniques 
in more-contemporary operations�
CHARLES D� MELSON
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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IN MY VIEW
RESPONSE TO “PEAK OIL, PROGRESSIVISM, AND JOSEPHUS DANIELS, 
1913–21,” BY ROGER STERN, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 73, NO. 4 
(AUTUMN 2020), PP. 139–66.
Sir:
In his article, Dr� Stern describes “the management of an imaginary oil-scarcity 
crisis by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels�” He attributes it to claims by 
Interior Department scientists that the United States soon would run out of oil 
and to the Progressive “ideology” of using the power of the federal government 
to mitigate or eliminate actual or “ostensible” crises (p� 139)�
Readers owe Dr� Stern thanks for digging into this issue, especially for his 
use of the papers of Mark L� Requa� Requa directed the “oil section of a wartime 
agency called the U�S� Fuel Administration” (p� 147) and served as a sort of liaison 
officer for the Petroleum War Service Committee, “a voluntary body composed 
of industry executives” (p� 146)�
However, readers also deserve to have a clearer idea of what Secretary Daniels 
was thinking� In testimony to the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of 
Representatives on 29 January 1914, Daniels revealed that he had been influenced 
by a statement made in the British Parliament by Winston Churchill, the First 
Lord (civilian head) of the Admiralty� Daniels quoted at length from Churchill’s 
statement, in which the First Lord had explained to the House of Commons why 
the Royal Navy was switching from coal to oil, and therefore why the British gov-
ernment needed to have a reliable, secure source or sources of fuel oil�
As Churchill noted, oil-burning warships could sustain a higher speed than 
could coal-burning ones� In addition, for the same weight of fuel, oil gave the 
Royal Navy’s ships greater range� Oil-fired ships also were much easier to refuel, 
and it took many fewer sailors to tend and maintain their boilers� In sum, “there is 
one great special advantage which oil confers upon the British fleet which would 
not be enjoyed by any weaker naval power—I mean the special advantage to the 
strongest navy of not being forced to leave its fighting position in order to refuel�”1
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After explaining the advantages of oil fuel and the need to stockpile it in 
quantity, Churchill turned to the issue that both the British and the American 
governments faced: price� The oil producers primarily were private firms; as 
such, they responded to changes in supply and demand in the petroleum market 
by adjusting the price of fuel oil and other petroleum products� What these firms 
wanted and needed was the flexibility that an open market gave them� However, 
what many major consumers of petroleum products wanted was price stability; 
to get it, they negotiated long-term supply contracts� The result, explained 
Churchill, was “that the oil market in future years is going to be greatly divided 
up and pegged out among different consumers,” which made the policy of relying 
on annual procurement contracts high risk� As he said, “Our stake in oil-burning 
ships is becoming so important that we must have the certainty of being able to 
buy a steady supply of oil at a steady price�”2
The oil producers needed market flexibility; the Royal Navy needed the 
certainty of an affordable supply� How could these different positions be 
reconciled? Churchill’s proposed solution to this problem had several parts� 
One part was that “the admiralty should become the independent owner and 
producer of its own supplies of liquid fuel�” As he put it to the Commons, “I do 
not myself see any reason why we should shrink, if necessary, from entering this 
field of State enterprise�” Another part was “that we must become the owners or, 
at any rate, the controllers at the source, of at least a proportion of the supply of 
natural oil which we require�”3 Was this socialism? No� “[W]e are moving toward 
that position of independence outside the oil market which is our ultimate policy 
to secure�” After all, if the Royal Navy’s dockyards provided a “check on private 
constructors,” why could not the Royal Navy act to guarantee a reasonably priced 
supply of oil fuel for its ships?
These arguments by Churchill were the same basic arguments that Daniels 
gave to the House Naval Affairs Committee� Indeed, the fact that the Royal Navy 
was acting to secure a supply of oil was reason enough for Daniels to want to 
secure as-yet-untapped oil supplies in California� Churchill had told the House 
of Commons, “We are, or soon shall be, able to draw oil from Burmah [sic], 
California, Persia, Texas, Roumania [sic], Borneo, Egypt, Mexico, and Trinidad�”4 
Daniels did not want to risk being unable to draw on California oil; he did not 
dare place the Navy in the position of having to go hat in hand to the British to 
purchase oil at exorbitant prices from sources they controlled�
The U�S� Navy was shifting to oil from coal before Daniels was confirmed as the 
Secretary of the Navy—and even before the British made the decision to switch 
to oil themselves�5 Daniels therefore found himself in the position of trying to 
meet a rising demand for oil from the Navy—his Navy—while watching other 
major consumers negotiate long-term contracts with producers� As Churchill 
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understood, the problem was not just the availability of oil; it was also the price� 
Daniels could foresee a situation in which the high price of oil could constrain 
not only the ability of the U�S� fleet to deploy but even its size� Churchill had laid 
out a plan that could serve as a model to head off this potential crisis�
Daniels laid Churchill’s comments before the House Naval Affairs Committee 
in January 1914 so the committee’s members could think about what the British 
government was doing� In August 1917, Congress passed the Food and Fuel 
Control Act (PL 65-41), giving the federal government the authority to control 
the distribution of food products and fuel� As Dr� Stern pointed out in his article, 
that was the legal basis for Secretary Daniels’s efforts to place some California oil 
off limits to foreign purchasers�
As Dr� Stern argued, Secretary Daniels may have acted during and immediately 
after World War I on the basis of incorrect scientific advice to secure California 
oil supplies for the U�S� Navy� However, I believe that the evidence shows that 
what also prompted him to take this action was less a “Progressive” ideology 
than a sincere desire to protect the Navy from a form of price gouging� Daniels 
watched what the Royal Navy was doing and understandably chose to follow its 
lead in controlling sources of oil�
TOM HONE
N O T E S  T O  M R .  H O N E ’ S  L E T T E R
 1� Hearings before [the] Committee on Naval 
Affairs of the House of Representatives on Esti-
mates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, 
1914, 63rd Cong�, p� 671 (1914) (statement 
of Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy), 
quoting Winston Churchill�
 2� Ibid�, p� 672�
 3� Ibid�
 4� Ibid�, p� 671�
 5� See Norman Friedman, U.S. Battleships: An 
Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp� 104–105�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program  
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading  
Program.
 Since 2006, the President of the Naval War College has functioned as the executive agent for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Pro-
gram (CNO-PRP)� The dean of the College of Distance Education has provided 
oversight, with this author serving as the program manager� (The Reflections on 
Reading article that appeared in the Winter 2021 issue of the Naval War College 
Review detailed how a new slate of book titles was generated recently for the 
CNO’s consideration�) After a review of recommendations and the incorporation 
of additional input, on 23 February 2021 CNO Admiral Michael M� Gilday, USN, 
released his update to the CNO-PRP� The updated book list can be found on 
the CNO-PRP website at www�navy�mil/CNO-Professional-Reading-Program� 
Portions of the following text are adapted from the Navy press release that an-
nounced the launch of the new program�
The goal of the program is to help sailors extend their personal and profes-
sional development beyond their primary designators and ratings� “It is critically 
important for our Navy to be a learning organization,” said Gilday� “One of the 
very best ways to do that is to foster an environment where every Sailor deepens 
their level of understanding, learning, and leadership skills� That’s why this book 
list is so important� � � � Make no mistake, to outthink our competitors today, we 
must study and apply lessons we’ve learned from our past�”
With a motto of “Read well to lead well,” this updated reading list aims to do 
the following:
• Enhance professionalism and improve critical thinking skills
• Foster a deep appreciation for naval and military history and heritage
• Increase knowledge of joint war fighting and strengthen sailors’ ability to 
make sound judgments
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• Develop a greater appreciation of the views of others and a better under-
standing of our changing world
• Encourage discussion about the maritime profession and the ever-evolving 
role of sea power in this day and age 
The CNO-PRP list includes fifty-three titles organized into four key lines of 
effort: Readiness, Capabilities, Capacity, and Sailors� Additionally, the works are 
subdivided into tiers—foundational, advanced, and capstone—indicating which 
books are most appropriate during the various stages of a sailor’s career�
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Russell Smith identified 
twenty-one additional books as suggested reading� “Reading is a fundamental 
staple in the growth and development of any leader,” said Smith� “For this list, 
the titles included were methodically chosen in order to provide a specific focus 
on targeted areas for reinforcement, a focus that will provide enlisted Sailors the 
greatest benefit given our role in the organization� A focus on team dynamics, 
seeking innovative solutions, leveraging the incredible strengths inherent in the 
diversity of our enlisted force, and the virtues of altruistic service to a cause great-
er than ourselves—these are the things that enable the enlisted force to execute 
the vision of our commanders, leading to unit success and our Navy prevailing 
in combat when called upon�”
Together, the CNO and MCPON lists offer a variety of writing categories and 
genres� They include works of fiction and nonfiction, and span topics ranging 
from the expressly military to strategy, management, technology, and more�
Most of the seventy-four books are available at no cost to sailors in both 
e-book and digital-audio formats from the Navy MWR digital library collection� 
Directions on how to sign up for an account and access these books are available 
at the CNO-PRP website, and eligible patrons can download the books at www 
�navymwrdigitallibrary�org�
By design, some of the recommended books may be considered a bit contro-
versial� Gilday has written, “While I do not endorse every viewpoint of the books 
on this reading list, I believe exposure to varied ideas improves the critical think-
ing skills of our sailors�”
The fifty-three titles in the CNO’s portion of the newly revised, fifth iteration 
of the CNO-PRP and their respective authors are as follows:
Army of None  Paul Scharre
Artificial Intelligence Basics Tom Taulli
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy James R� Holmes
Burn-In  P� W� Singer and August Cole
The Character Gap Christian Miller
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Deep Thinking Garry Kasparov
The Dichotomy of Leadership Jocko Willink and Leif Babin
Ego Is the Enemy Ryan Holiday
The End of Grand Strategy Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski
Fearless  Eric Blehm
Fed Up  Gemma Hartley
The Fifth Domain Richard A� Clarke and Robert K� Knake
The Fleet at Flood Tide James D� Hornfischer
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat Wayne P� Hughes Jr�
Fortune Favors Boldness Barry M� Costello
The Future of Violence Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum
The Future of War Lawrence Freedman
Genius Weapons Louis A� Del Monte
Ghost Fleet  P� W� Singer and August Cole
The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty Dan Ariely
How to Be an Antiracist Ibram X� Kendi
Human Compatible Stuart Russell
The Inevitable  Kevin Kelly
The Infinite Game Simon Sinek
Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer
The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors James D� Hornfischer
The Leader’s Bookshelf James Stavridis and R� Manning Ancell
Leaders Eat Last Simon Sinek
Matterhorn  Karl Marlantes
Military Ethics George Lucas
Mindset  Carol S� Dweck
Neptune’s Inferno James D� Hornfischer
The New Jim Crow Michelle Alexander
The New Rules of War Sean McFate
The Next 100 Years George Friedman
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No Ordinary Disruption Richard Dobbs et al�
No Pity  Joseph P� Shapiro
One Nation under Drones John E� Jackson
Our Robots, Ourselves David A� Mindell
The Perfect Weapon David E� Sanger
Red Star over the Pacific Toshi Yoshihara and James R� Holmes
The Road to Character David Brooks
Sea Power  James Stavridis
Seapower  Geoffrey Till
The Second Most Powerful Man in the World Phillips Payson O’Brien
Sexual Minorities and Politics Jason Pierceson
Six Frigates  Ian W� Toll
Start with Why Simon Sinek
A Tactical Ethic Dick Couch
Tiny Habits  B� J� Fogg
Toward a New Maritime Strategy Peter D� Haynes
We Can’t Talk about That at Work! Mary-Frances Winters
What It Is like to Go to War Karl Marlantes
The next Reflections article will highlight the twenty-one books in the 
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